Long winding road to democracy

Long winding road to democracy

By Daniel Dhakidae

This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented
at a seminar, "Toward Structural Reforms for Democratization in
Indonesia: Problems and Prospects", in Jakarta from Aug. 12 to
Aug. 14 jointly organized by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences
and the Ford Foundation. This is the second of two articles.

JAKARTA: During the early 1990s, then president Soeharto
started to further strengthen his power base by placing more of
his cronies and family members in positions of power. Government
officials, even to the level of regent, became more directly
controlled by the president.

At its congress in 1994, Golkar recruited more and more of
Soeharto's family members into its leadership. One of the
president's daughters was even made a Golkar chairwoman while one
of his sons became the grouping's treasurer. Soeharto's family,
however, had been involved in politics for some time before the
move.

Another development that occurred in the 1990s was the
political emergence of Islam following a relative lack of
influence during the 1970s and 1980s. Moslem organizations became
a political power to be reckoned with as became evident with the
creation of the Association of Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals
(ICMI).

Following Soeharto's resignation, East Timor activist Ramos
Horta stated that it was Michel Camdessus, the managing director
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who had brought the
president down. The argument, however, was an oversimplification
of the developments that the New Order faced in Soeharto's final
days.

The New Order's collapse -- if you actually believe it has
been swept away -- cannot be brought to light without
understanding the inner workings of the regime's power base and
political alliances.

Simply put, the New Order was an alliance of the bureaucracy,
the middle class and the military, especially its hundreds of
generals. All united to do business of various sorts. Power
became so concentrated that only 200 conglomerates were
generating a full 58 percent of the country's gross domestic
product (GDP).

A further 24 percent of the GDP was generated by the dozens of
state companies, leaving only the remaining 8 percent to the rest
of the country.

Even members of the academic world shared in some of the
fringe benefits of doing business by becoming consultants and
researchers in the business world. All ended up in encapsulating
the New Order as a regime.

The only source of its legitimacy was success in development.
It asked for no legitimacy from society. Once the economy
collapsed, the very legitimacy of the regime was swept away.

The economic crisis, however, was only the latest and biggest
blow to the New Order after a series of past crises. During its
last five years, power holders became seen as abusing their
privileges while the government intervened more and more in
people's daily lives.

Some examples include:

* A head-on clash with non-governmental organizations in the
case of a large dam project in Kedungombo, Central Java, saw
officials evict a large number of people for the project. Since
its legitimacy did not rest with the people, the regime cared
little about the sacrifice made for the sake of development.

* The crisis within the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) was
another example. As a party created by the New Order, it had
never been allowed to develop an independent course. However,
Megawati Soekarnoputri, a daughter of the late president Sukarno
and the party's chairwoman from 1992, could not be controlled by
the government. She began steps to liberalize the party -- a
development seen as a threat by the New Order.

To counter this, the regime doctored a split within the party,
successfully cracking it from within. The storming of its
headquarters in 1996 resulted in a carefully prearranged outburst
of chaos, arson and looting, in an incident known as the July 27
tragedy.

* The government precipitated a political communications
crisis with the closing down of prestigious news magazines like
Tempo, Editor and DeTIK. While DeTIK was a newcomer, Tempo and
Editor were products of the New Order and should have become
showcase publications. Their independent reporting, however,
forced the government to close them down in 1994, a move which
sparked a series of protests within the middle class over a loss
of independent sources of information.

* ICMI's rise in the political arena divided the military into
so-called nationalist officers, nicknamed "red and white
officers" for the colors of the national flag, and "green
officers", a color associated with Islam.

The economic crisis intensified this series of political
crises by giving an opportunity for the country's students to
stage demonstrations against the regime. The demonstrations
culminated with the occupation of the People's Consultative
Assembly complex -- a New Order symbol of the people's mandate to
the president -- to bring Soeharto down on May 21.

With Soeharto gone, it is difficult to say whether the New
Order is actually gone or still in place.

Democracy can be defined as the predominance of civil society
over the state, or the predominance of elected bodies over the
bureaucracy.

Indonesia's three democracies -- constitutional democracy,
Guided Democracy and the New Order -- have all proved to be
failures.

The constitutional democracy of the 1950s failed due to a weak
state, while the strong governments of the other two also proved
insufficient because of their predominance over society.

Only a good combination of a strong state and an equally
strong society can guarantee a truly successful democracy.
Democracy for Indonesia requires the striking of a good balance
between the two.

Strong military interventions in society and politics
throughout the years during the three periods continually put
democracy in jeopardy.

Military intervention was responsible for the demise of
constitutional democracy of the 1950s. A failed military coup
brought Guided Democracy to an end. And outrage over excessive
military activities -- the Trisakti shootings, atrocities in Aceh
and the kidnapping of political activists -- stoked the flames of
the social turmoil that brought Soeharto down.

The downfall of Soeharto does not necessarily pave the way for
democracy. Indonesia must still wage an uphill struggle in its
long and winding road to democracy.

Democracy in Indonesia cannot simply be achieved through
technical solutions like establishing new political parties and
new election laws. Instead, it must be achieved through the
involvement of society -- and we are only at a very early stage
of understanding democracy as an ideal institution and culture.

Indonesian democracy largely depends on the military.
Therefore, a total review of the role of the Armed Forces should
be conducted before we can understand what kind of government the
country will have. In order to create a viable democracy,
Indonesia must first demilitarize its civilian institutions.

The writer is the head of the research and development
division of Kompas daily.

Window: Simply put, the New Order was an alliance of the
bureaucracy, the middle class and the military, especially its
hundreds of generals. All united to do business of various sorts.