Long winding road to democracy

By Daniel Dhakidae

This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented at a seminar, "Toward Structural Reforms for Democratization in Indonesia: Problems and Prospects", in Jakarta from Aug. 12 to Aug. 14 jointly organized by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences and the Ford Foundation. This is the second of two articles.

JAKARTA: During the early 1990s, then president Soeharto started to further strengthen his power base by placing more of his cronies and family members in positions of power. Government officials, even to the level of regent, became more directly controlled by the president.

At its congress in 1994, Golkar recruited more and more of Soeharto's family members into its leadership. One of the president's daughters was even made a Golkar chairwoman while one of his sons became the grouping's treasurer. Soeharto's family, however, had been involved in politics for some time before the move.

Another development that occurred in the 1990s was the political emergence of Islam following a relative lack of influence during the 1970s and 1980s. Moslem organizations became a political power to be reckoned with as became evident with the creation of the Association of Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals (ICMI).

Following Soeharto's resignation, East Timor activist Ramos Horta stated that it was Michel Camdessus, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who had brought the president down. The argument, however, was an oversimplification of the developments that the New Order faced in Soeharto's final days.

The New Order's collapse -- if you actually believe it has been swept away -- cannot be brought to light without understanding the inner workings of the regime's power base and political alliances.

Simply put, the New Order was an alliance of the bureaucracy, the middle class and the military, especially its hundreds of generals. All united to do business of various sorts. Power became so concentrated that only 200 conglomerates were generating a full 58 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP).

A further 24 percent of the GDP was generated by the dozens of state companies, leaving only the remaining 8 percent to the rest of the country.

Even members of the academic world shared in some of the fringe benefits of doing business by becoming consultants and researchers in the business world. All ended up in encapsulating the New Order as a regime.

The only source of its legitimacy was success in development. It asked for no legitimacy from society. Once the economy collapsed, the very legitimacy of the regime was swept away.

The economic crisis, however, was only the latest and biggest blow to the New Order after a series of past crises. During its last five years, power holders became seen as abusing their privileges while the government intervened more and more in people's daily lives.

Some examples include:

* A head-on clash with non-governmental organizations in the case of a large dam project in Kedungombo, Central Java, saw officials evict a large number of people for the project. Since its legitimacy did not rest with the people, the regime cared little about the sacrifice made for the sake of development.

* The crisis within the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) was another example. As a party created by the New Order, it had never been allowed to develop an independent course. However, Megawati Soekarnoputri, a daughter of the late president Sukarno and the party's chairwoman from 1992, could not be controlled by the government. She began steps to liberalize the party -- a development seen as a threat by the New Order.

To counter this, the regime doctored a split within the party, successfully cracking it from within. The storming of its headquarters in 1996 resulted in a carefully prearranged outburst of chaos, arson and looting, in an incident known as the July 27 tragedy.

* The government precipitated a political communications crisis with the closing down of prestigious news magazines like Tempo, Editor and DeTIK. While DeTIK was a newcomer, Tempo and Editor were products of the New Order and should have become showcase publications. Their independent reporting, however, forced the government to close them down in 1994, a move which sparked a series of protests within the middle class over a loss of independent sources of information.

* ICMI's rise in the political arena divided the military into so-called nationalist officers, nicknamed "red and white officers" for the colors of the national flag, and "green officers", a color associated with Islam.

The economic crisis intensified this series of political crises by giving an opportunity for the country's students to stage demonstrations against the regime. The demonstrations culminated with the occupation of the People's Consultative Assembly complex -- a New Order symbol of the people's mandate to the president -- to bring Soeharto down on May 21.

With Soeharto gone, it is difficult to say whether the New Order is actually gone or still in place.

Democracy can be defined as the predominance of civil society over the state, or the predominance of elected bodies over the bureaucracy.

Indonesia's three democracies -- constitutional democracy, Guided Democracy and the New Order -- have all proved to be failures.

The constitutional democracy of the 1950s failed due to a weak state, while the strong governments of the other two also proved insufficient because of their predominance over society.

Only a good combination of a strong state and an equally strong society can guarantee a truly successful democracy. Democracy for Indonesia requires the striking of a good balance between the two.

Strong military interventions in society and politics throughout the years during the three periods continually put democracy in jeopardy.

Military intervention was responsible for the demise of constitutional democracy of the 1950s. A failed military coup brought Guided Democracy to an end. And outrage over excessive military activities -- the Trisakti shootings, atrocities in Aceh and the kidnapping of political activists -- stoked the flames of the social turmoil that brought Soeharto down.

The downfall of Soeharto does not necessarily pave the way for democracy. Indonesia must still wage an uphill struggle in its long and winding road to democracy.

Democracy in Indonesia cannot simply be achieved through technical solutions like establishing new political parties and new election laws. Instead, it must be achieved through the involvement of society -- and we are only at a very early stage of understanding democracy as an ideal institution and culture.

Indonesian democracy largely depends on the military. Therefore, a total review of the role of the Armed Forces should be conducted before we can understand what kind of government the country will have. In order to create a viable democracy, Indonesia must first demilitarize its civilian institutions.

The writer is the head of the research and development division of Kompas daily.

Window: Simply put, the New Order was an alliance of the bureaucracy, the middle class and the military, especially its hundreds of generals. All united to do business of various sorts.