Thu, 07 Jan 1999

Local stability hurdle for ASEAN

By J. Soedjati Djiwandono

JAKARTA (JP): With Cambodia's admission into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) last year, at the association's sixth summit, the dream of an ASEAN-10 has finally become reality.

The economic and political crisis that has beset some ASEAN countries, however, seems to have left affairs of the association on the back burner, at least, apparently, for 1999.

However, it will no longer justify the division of the region into a "rich" and "poor" Southeast Asia.

The Bangkok Declaration of 1967 provides that the association is open for membership to the other countries of the region. The provision expresses the aspiration for a one, undivided Southeast Asia. The realization of such an aspiration would, at least, reconfirm the reference to Southeast Asia in the designation of the association and would more firmly establish the identity of Southeast Asia as a region.

An expanded ASEAN into ASEAN-10 representing the entire region will improve its chance to act as a group and to be treated as such by the outside world on an equal basis. This would mean potentially strengthening ASEAN's bargaining position vis--vis the world.

That, however, will depend not only on whether it can continue to maintain mutually beneficial economic cooperation and trade relations with external powers, but also on its credibility and respectability.

These, in turn, will be determined by the extent to which the member states, individually as well as collectively, manage to put their own houses in order, a principle underlying the association in the first place in its joint efforts to create regional order, peace and stability, free from external interference.

Indeed, globalization has been the catchword of today's world. The rapidly spreading monetary and economic crisis in the region is but one piece of evidence of the strength of the trend toward globalization. Never have the nations of the world, especially within the region, been so open to one another as now.

One would expect that the crisis will help bring relations and cooperation among ASEAN members closer together. This may have been true with regard to the economic field. Yet, interestingly, that does not seem to be the case in the political field.

More than in any other country in the region, the monetary and economic crisis in Indonesia is tightly intertwined with its political system, and thus with the whole political life of the nation. It is worth noting that Indonesia was one of the opponents to the idea of "flexible engagement" proposed by Thailand and supported by the Philippines at the annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Manila. The Thai proposal may be regarded as an extension of the policy of "constructive engagement" developed by ASEAN states particularly with reference to Myanmar.

The largest member, yet perhaps among the least confident economically as well as politically now, Indonesia has been the strongest proponent of ASEAN's traditional policy of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

In the present-day world, however, which is becoming increasingly open, interconnected and interdependent, it is not always easy to draw the line between what is strictly the domestic affair of a nation and what should be the concern of humanity, and, thus, of the international community. Nevertheless, sometimes a nation's pragmatic considerations that relate to its short-term interests take precedence.

Thus caught between the pressures for the pursuit of a somewhat extreme policy of economic sanction and isolation on Myanmar and practically "no policy" of noninterference, ASEAN tried to tackle the dilemma by the horns when considering the entry of the country into ASEAN a few years back.

ASEAN would rather try to help through "constructive engagement", to "show our understanding and support for a peaceful reconciliation among the people of Myanmar," as Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas was reported as saying at that time. Yet constructive engagement, according to him, did not mean "turning a blind eye to developments that could be detrimental to the country, because any negative development could affect the whole region."

So far, however, that kind of policy seems to have meant not much more than burying their heads in the sand, pretending as though everything was fine and in good order. But it is understandable, especially as far as Indonesia is concerned, in light of what has been happening inside the country for over the past two years. It has turned out that Indonesia has not done better at all as far as domestic affairs are concerned. Together with Singapore, and particularly Malaysia, Indonesia would rather resort to a play of words, preferring "interaction" to "engagement", whatever fine difference there may be between the two terms.

Recent domestic developments in Southeast Asia that may impact on the rest of ASEAN now include Malaysia, and worst of all, Indonesia. Today, it is these two countries that make headlines and cover stories in the region, no longer Cambodia and Myanmar.

And while by no means approving, one may now understand better why the ASEAN states never condemned Cambodia's Pol Pot, Indonesia's Soeharto, or Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad (for his treatment of his former deputy, Anwar Ibrahim).

Indeed, the promotion of good governance and the establishment of a civil society, which do relate to domestic stability, are problems that are common to all ASEAN members.

It will depend on their performance in these fields whether ASEAN-10 ensures greater security and stability, not only for its members individually but also collectively for the region as a whole. And it will earn its credibility and respectability in the international community only by clearly demonstrating its commitment, not to the much-boasted but mostly distorted "Asian values", but to universal values in the common interest of humanity and by adhering to certain internationally accepted standards and norms of behavior.