Lobbying whoever to preserve power

Political lobbying is now crisscrossing through political parties and even bypassing them, such as through the alignment of representatives of Irian Jaya, Maluku, Sumatra and Kalimantan. Surabaya-based sociologist Daniel Sparingga helps to throw some light on this bewildering political landscape.

Question: Ahead of the special session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), President Abdurrahman Wahid has been lobbying all kinds or parties, including the caucus of those claiming to represent eastern Indonesia (Irian, Maluku, Sulawesi, Kalimantan), known as the Iramasuka group. Your comment?

Answer: Iramasuka is really a coalition built on a collective awareness based on geographical and anthropological similarities, given the ethnic sentiments involved. In short, they are from the "outer Java islands" in the "Java/non-Java" dichotomy.

Politically, such a coalition does not have an adequately strong interest because the political party basis is often more dominant. Political parties are, therefore, still a threat to groups such as Iramasuka in political bargaining.

So there would clearly be a problem of political legitimacy if a group of people claimed to represent the Iramasuka regions and other areas in Eastern Indonesia.

You mean there would be many protests disturbing negotiations?

Yes. If they enter negotiations with the President this would not easily lead to a guarantee of clear cut results, even though (the Iramasuka coalition) could show strength in certain issues.

When negotiations reach a stage of who gets what, their presence becomes significant. This group has been much criticized because of its intense orientation toward (high ranking) positions. It's being very political in terms of gaining power, as compared to their (demonstrated) commitment to developing the eastern regions.

So results are quite possible if positions are being offered in negotiations.

So would lobbying the Iramasuka group be effective?

It's rather hard to predict its effectiveness in maintaining the position of the President by the time of the special session because ... political parties are still strong.

The question is the influence of the coalition's bargaining with parties using these regional ties. But once again, through their regional headquarters, the control of political parties over their regional supporters is still very strong.

Even the demand to form a regional representatives faction in the Assembly has been hampered by the big political parties.

And hasn't the caucus' actions invited protests from a number of intellectuals in Eastern Indonesia itself, such as from Sulawesi?

People like Hamid Awaluddin from the Hasanuddin University have even become outraged at the (politicians') actions.

He says that, while there is still a problem with the issue of their representation, they have gone so far as to bargain over positions on behalf of eastern Indonesia.

The rage of such critics from the eastern areas is largely based on their suspicion that these (politicians) are mere political opportunists chasing after seats once they get the chance to bargain for positions.

From the times of former president Soeharto it seems the building of regional-based supporters has been considered important.

In the past anything ethnic, racial and regional was considered crucial by the New Order -- but this was related to the belief that (these factors) could threaten the concept of a hegemonic, centralistic nation state.

That is why the management of such diversity was done through conquering local elites, rather than mobilizing masses. The New Order integrated ethnicity, race and regionalism within a hegemonic national political system.

In the past two years this format has become less clear. The strong impression is that (the country) is still ruled by Jakarta while the regions are walking individually within their respective highly dynamic contexts, including the dynamic of economic resources.

The national scope has not related to such local dynamics -- except when Jakarta has tried to retain control of local resources (for its benefit). Iramasuka is a new phenomenon in our democratic transition. President Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) and most of the Jakarta elite have so far been unprepared in responding to this emergence.

The fall of (former president) Habibie was marked by the marginalization of Iramasuka politics, in which those involved had gained extensive opportunities to take up strategic roles in Habibie's time.

Now this group is still trying to play its cards but, at a time of potentially sharp friction at the national level, they have tried to slip in their elitist political agenda amid uncertainty over the future national political configuration.

From the Iramasuka coalition the names Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Hamzah Haz and businessman Baramuli have been mentioned as potential candidates for vice president. How do you see this?

That was the offer of the political elite outside the circle of Gus Dur, assuming that he would be forced to resign following the special session ... (the coalition) could trade with the President's side and also with the political elite who want Gus Dur out of the presidency.

Actually, such lobbying and "cow trading" has been conducted by legislators, but the mainstream lobbying is based on party lines.

The Iramasuka coalition has been learning fast from the (cow trading of) political parties, making use of the reality that the parties have neglected the eastern regions. (Asip A. Hasani)