Lobbying whoever to preserve power

Lobbying whoever to preserve power

Political lobbying is now crisscrossing through political
parties and even bypassing them, such as through the alignment of
representatives of Irian Jaya, Maluku, Sumatra and Kalimantan.
Surabaya-based sociologist Daniel Sparingga helps to throw some
light on this bewildering political landscape.

Question: Ahead of the special session of the People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR), President Abdurrahman Wahid has been
lobbying all kinds or parties, including the caucus of those
claiming to represent eastern Indonesia (Irian, Maluku, Sulawesi,
Kalimantan), known as the Iramasuka group. Your comment?

Answer: Iramasuka is really a coalition built on a collective
awareness based on geographical and anthropological similarities,
given the ethnic sentiments involved. In short, they are from the
"outer Java islands" in the "Java/non-Java" dichotomy.

Politically, such a coalition does not have an adequately
strong interest because the political party basis is often more
dominant. Political parties are, therefore, still a threat to
groups such as Iramasuka in political bargaining.

So there would clearly be a problem of political legitimacy if
a group of people claimed to represent the Iramasuka regions and
other areas in Eastern Indonesia.

You mean there would be many protests disturbing negotiations?

Yes. If they enter negotiations with the President this would
not easily lead to a guarantee of clear cut results, even though
(the Iramasuka coalition) could show strength in certain issues.

When negotiations reach a stage of who gets what, their
presence becomes significant. This group has been much criticized
because of its intense orientation toward (high ranking)
positions. It's being very political in terms of gaining power,
as compared to their (demonstrated) commitment to developing the
eastern regions.

So results are quite possible if positions are being offered
in negotiations.

So would lobbying the Iramasuka group be effective?

It's rather hard to predict its effectiveness in maintaining
the position of the President by the time of the special session
because ... political parties are still strong.

The question is the influence of the coalition's bargaining
with parties using these regional ties. But once again, through
their regional headquarters, the control of political parties
over their regional supporters is still very strong.

Even the demand to form a regional representatives faction in
the Assembly has been hampered by the big political parties.

And hasn't the caucus' actions invited protests from a number
of intellectuals in Eastern Indonesia itself, such as from
Sulawesi?

People like Hamid Awaluddin from the Hasanuddin University
have even become outraged at the (politicians') actions.

He says that, while there is still a problem with the issue of
their representation, they have gone so far as to bargain over
positions on behalf of eastern Indonesia.

The rage of such critics from the eastern areas is largely
based on their suspicion that these (politicians) are mere
political opportunists chasing after seats once they get the
chance to bargain for positions.

From the times of former president Soeharto it seems the
building of regional-based supporters has been considered
important.

In the past anything ethnic, racial and regional was
considered crucial by the New Order -- but this was related to
the belief that (these factors) could threaten the concept of a
hegemonic, centralistic nation state.

That is why the management of such diversity was done through
conquering local elites, rather than mobilizing masses. The New
Order integrated ethnicity, race and regionalism within a
hegemonic national political system.

In the past two years this format has become less clear.
The strong impression is that (the country) is still ruled by
Jakarta while the regions are walking individually within their
respective highly dynamic contexts, including the dynamic of
economic resources.

The national scope has not related to such local dynamics --
except when Jakarta has tried to retain control of local
resources (for its benefit). Iramasuka is a new phenomenon in our
democratic transition. President Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) and
most of the Jakarta elite have so far been unprepared in
responding to this emergence.

The fall of (former president) Habibie was marked by the
marginalization of Iramasuka politics, in which those involved
had gained extensive opportunities to take up strategic roles in
Habibie's time.

Now this group is still trying to play its cards but, at a
time of potentially sharp friction at the national level, they
have tried to slip in their elitist political agenda amid
uncertainty over the future national political configuration.

From the Iramasuka coalition the names Yusril Ihza Mahendra,
Hamzah Haz and businessman Baramuli have been mentioned as
potential candidates for vice president. How do you see this?

That was the offer of the political elite outside the circle
of Gus Dur, assuming that he would be forced to resign following
the special session ... (the coalition) could trade with the
President's side and also with the political elite who want Gus
Dur out of the presidency.

Actually, such lobbying and "cow trading" has been conducted
by legislators, but the mainstream lobbying is based on party
lines.

The Iramasuka coalition has been learning fast from the (cow
trading of) political parties, making use of the reality that the
parties have neglected the eastern regions. (Asip A. Hasani)