Little choice for Indonesia in U.S. policy

Aleksius Jemadu, Lecturer, Parahyangan Center for International Studies (PACIS), Parahyangan University, Bandung

When U.S. President George W. Bush received President Megawati Soekarnoputri's assurance last year that Indonesia would support the U.S. fight against international terrorism, it was the best promise he could expect from the leader of a country with the largest Muslim population in the world.

However, almost one year after Megawati made the promise, things have not really worked out as well as the U.S. government would have liked. According to U.S. government officials, Indonesia should have made more concrete action in responding to the widespread allegation that this country hosts some elements of the al-Qaeda global network.

This will be one of the most important issues U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell will raise at his meeting with Indonesian leaders during his visit here. It is quite obvious that U.S. and Indonesian leaders have different definitions of the situation. Following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington last year, the American government has been preoccupied with its war against terrorism. The U.S. is ready to use its military, political and economic power to win that war.

Indonesian leaders may not find it difficult to understand the U.S. insistence to eliminate terrorist networks wherever they exist. But it does not necessarily mean that the U.S. may dictate what the Indonesian government should do in dealing with the issue of terrorism.

Another important dimension is related to the fact that the structure of Indonesian foreign policy-making has changed dramatically as an inevitable consequence of the democratization process. Under Soeharto's authoritarian rule, it was the president who had the final say in deciding how Indonesia should react to any crucial international issue. This is no longer the case. The making and implementation of today's national foreign policy has become the "business" of many players with competing and sometimes conflicting interests. For instance, Vice President Hamzah Has, who has extensive support among Islamic constituents, may not always agree with the policy preference of President Megawati, especially in responding to American demands for a tougher policy over religious radical groups. The legislative members and the military have also become increasingly assertive in foreign policy matters.

Under these circumstances, what will come out of the diplomatic bargaining between Secretary of State Colin Powell and his Indonesian counterparts? This is not an easy question. What is obvious is that the U.S. and Indonesia need each other more than ever before.

Without Indonesia's support, the U.S. may run the risk of being alienated by the moderate Islamic world. Indonesia needs American support not only in producing its recovery from the economic crisis but also in maintaining the nation's territorial integrity. The Indonesian government is quite happy with the fact that after Sept. 11 the U.S. had become deliberately less sympathetic to Aceh's independence movement. No wonder the Indonesian Military (TNI) is strengthening its security approach in cracking down on the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

The Indonesian Army seems to believe that the U.S. government will eventually end its embargo over the sale of military equipment to Indonesia.

The military leaders are convinced that sooner or later the U.S. will support the modernization of the Indonesian Military to make it more effective in combating international terrorism. On the other hand, the U.S. expects that internal reform within the military will continue until the army officers who committed past human rights violations are brought to justice. It remains to be seen just how far the U.S. government will sacrifice its commitment to promote human rights in order to secure the support of the Indonesian Military in cracking down on terrorist groups.

Finally, there is the political contingency leading up to the 2004 presidential election. It is highly likely that presidential candidates will compete for U.S. government support. There is no doubt that the U.S. will use its bargaining power in that it will only give support to a candidate who has a real agenda and capacity to accomplish the American goal of combating terrorism in this region.

Unfortunately, with the increasing post-Cold War infallibleness of the American might in global politics and the gloomy outlook of the Indonesian road to recovery, Indonesian leaders are left with only little chance of escaping the trap of American power politics and unilateralism.