Little choice for Indonesia in U.S. policy

Little choice for Indonesia in U.S. policy

Aleksius Jemadu, Lecturer, Parahyangan Center for International
Studies (PACIS), Parahyangan University, Bandung

When U.S. President George W. Bush received President Megawati
Soekarnoputri's assurance last year that Indonesia would support
the U.S. fight against international terrorism, it was the best
promise he could expect from the leader of a country with the
largest Muslim population in the world.

However, almost one year after Megawati made the promise,
things have not really worked out as well as the U.S. government
would have liked. According to U.S. government officials,
Indonesia should have made more concrete action in responding to
the widespread allegation that this country hosts some elements
of the al-Qaeda global network.

This will be one of the most important issues U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell will raise at his meeting with Indonesian
leaders during his visit here. It is quite obvious that U.S. and
Indonesian leaders have different definitions of the situation.
Following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington last year, the American government has been
preoccupied with its war against terrorism. The U.S. is ready to
use its military, political and economic power to win that war.

Indonesian leaders may not find it difficult to understand the
U.S. insistence to eliminate terrorist networks wherever they
exist. But it does not necessarily mean that the U.S. may dictate
what the Indonesian government should do in dealing with the
issue of terrorism.

Another important dimension is related to the fact that the
structure of Indonesian foreign policy-making has changed
dramatically as an inevitable consequence of the democratization
process. Under Soeharto's authoritarian rule, it was the
president who had the final say in deciding how Indonesia should
react to any crucial international issue. This is no longer the
case. The making and implementation of today's national foreign
policy has become the "business" of many players with competing
and sometimes conflicting interests. For instance, Vice President
Hamzah Has, who has extensive support among Islamic constituents,
may not always agree with the policy preference of President
Megawati, especially in responding to American demands for a
tougher policy over religious radical groups. The legislative
members and the military have also become increasingly assertive
in foreign policy matters.

Under these circumstances, what will come out of the
diplomatic bargaining between Secretary of State Colin Powell and
his Indonesian counterparts? This is not an easy question. What
is obvious is that the U.S. and Indonesia need each other more
than ever before.

Without Indonesia's support, the U.S. may run the risk of
being alienated by the moderate Islamic world. Indonesia needs
American support not only in producing its recovery from the
economic crisis but also in maintaining the nation's territorial
integrity. The Indonesian government is quite happy with the fact
that after Sept. 11 the U.S. had become deliberately less
sympathetic to Aceh's independence movement. No wonder the
Indonesian Military (TNI) is strengthening its security approach
in cracking down on the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

The Indonesian Army seems to believe that the U.S. government
will eventually end its embargo over the sale of military
equipment to Indonesia.

The military leaders are convinced that sooner or later the
U.S. will support the modernization of the Indonesian Military to
make it more effective in combating international terrorism. On
the other hand, the U.S. expects that internal reform within the
military will continue until the army officers who committed past
human rights violations are brought to justice. It remains to be
seen just how far the U.S. government will sacrifice its
commitment to promote human rights in order to secure the support
of the Indonesian Military in cracking down on terrorist groups.

Finally, there is the political contingency leading up to the
2004 presidential election. It is highly likely that presidential
candidates will compete for U.S. government support. There is no
doubt that the U.S. will use its bargaining power in that it will
only give support to a candidate who has a real agenda and
capacity to accomplish the American goal of combating terrorism
in this region.

Unfortunately, with the increasing post-Cold War
infallibleness of the American might in global politics and the
gloomy outlook of the Indonesian road to recovery, Indonesian
leaders are left with only little chance of escaping the trap of
American power politics and unilateralism.