Likely scenarios in RI's future

Likely scenarios in RI's future

By Scott Burchill and Damien Kingsbury

MELBOURNE (JP): The cancellation of the visit of Indonesian
President Abdurrahman Wahid to Australia -- for the fourth time
-- is probably fortuitous for both countries.

Abdurrahman's presidency appears to be in terminal decline and
little of substance, beyond gestures of goodwill, could have been
achieved now.

This is particularly so if we are simultaneously witnessing
the denouement of the Howard government.

Ahead of likely changes of administration in Jakarta and
Canberra, it is timely to canvas possible scenarios in the
bilateral relationship, including the likely approach of a
Beazley Labor government to continuing political volatility in
Jakarta. With the caveat that, like Kremlinology, Jakarta-
watching is anything but an exact science, there are three
possible scenarios.

The first is that President Abdurrahman will resist efforts by
Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri to topple him, thus
triggering a political war of attrition that would last until the
presidential election in 2004. This would be economically
disastrous and politically destabilizing if both sides call their
supporters onto the streets.

The Indonesian military (TNI) has indicated that it will not
tolerate public mayhem, and may react in the usual way. However,
over the last three years the TNI has frequently clashed with the
national police (Polri) in such circumstances, with each shooting
at the other. This could be catastrophic if it happened in
Abdurrahman's power base of East Java, or in Jakarta.

Within this scenario, the power struggle would lead to an even
more complete policy paralysis than currently exists, and a
collapse of institutional legitimacy and territorial integrity
across the archipelago.

In such circumstances, the IMF would be likely to suspend
further financial aid, increasing the economic hardship of
ordinary people.

Meanwhile, the Australian government could only watch in
horror and continue to be used as a whipping boy by Indonesian
'nationalists' as a part of their domestic agenda.

The second scenario is that Abdurrahman accepts his lame duck
status, retains the presidency but hands over all decision-making
power to Megawati and her supporters. This is unlikely to satisfy
the vanity of either player. Abdurrahman promised just such a
deal in August 2000 and promptly reneged on it.

In the event, Megawati may not want to inherit the mess that
is contemporary Indonesia, nor be the next target for the Amien
Rais-led Islamic parties.

In this scenario, the Australian government would remain an
irrelevant bystander, unable to progress the bilateral
relationship due to a confusing devolution of authority.

The third and at this stage most likely scenario is that
Abdurrahman will be impeached and constitutionally removed some
time after July. As his successor, Megawati will attempt to
establish a 'national unity cabinet' comprising members of the
key parties and technocrats. The presidency would become
increasingly titular and ceremonial, relying on advisors to run
the day to day affairs of government.

Under Megawati, Indonesia would retreat to a technocratic and
nationalist (i.e. no dissent) position, relying on her own
allegedly corrupt coterie (including husband Taufiq Kiemas) and
former Soeharto crony Arifin Panigoro, among others. For national
stability, she would also rely on the now dominant group within
the TNI, led by 'gradual reformer' Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, to whom
Megawati is ideologically close. Current corruption and human
rights investigations, such as they are, would effectively end.

Although Megawati would come to power with the support of the
Islamic parties, that would diminish soon after achieving office.
To counter this, Megawati would seek a rapprochement with Gus
Dur's PKB (National Awakening Party) and Soeharto's old party,
Golkar. With greater TNI influence and Megawati's own nationalist
predilections, there would likely be a harder line on communal
violence and separatism, with commensurately worsening human
rights abuses. In total, this third scenario would represent a
slightly less cohesive, less formally centralized version of
Soeharto's New Order.

In Canberra, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT), like the discredited Jakarta lobby, is already looking
forward to the return of "stability", and Megawati's group is
being courted. On current form, DFAT will want to deflect
domestic concerns about escalating violence in Aceh and West
Papua, while restating support for Indonesia's territorial
integrity.

And at the request of the Indonesian government, Canberra will
consider re-establishing ADF-TNI training links as a symbol of
strengthening ties, and to gain greater access to Indonesia's
real power brokers.

In the event of a change of government in Canberra, there
could be a significant reshuffle of DFAT by incoming Foreign
Minister Brereton, reflecting a more "robust" posture. This,
however, could produce tensions within the government, especially
with those who want to downplay Jakarta's human rights
performance.

As an impotent outside observer, what can and should Canberra
do?

First, it should abandon the "papering-over-the-cracks"
approach to foreign relations, and remind Indonesia of the
benefits of liberal democracy before the reform process there
expires. Acknowledging its limited influence, Australia should
concentrate on promoting structural economic and legal reform,
civilian control of the TNI and acceptance of likely territorial
changes. There should be less emphasis on transient
personalities.

Canberra should not renew training links between the ADF and
the TNI until the TNI has come under solid civilian control,
abandoned its political role and ended its function as
Indonesia's brutal and corrupt policeman.

The real problem continues to be Indonesia's inability to
reconcile itself to a participatory, representative and
accountable political system. In response to the still-birth of
democracy in Indonesia and its partial fragmentation, Canberra
will need to respond more deftly, more precisely and with greater
honesty than it has in the past.

Scott Burchill is lecturer in international relations at
Deakin University, Victoria, Australia. Dr. Damien Kingsbury is
Senior Lecturer in International Development at Deakin
University. His latest book is South-East Asia: A Political
Profile (Oxford, 2001).