Likely scenarios in RI's future

By Scott Burchill and Damien Kingsbury

MELBOURNE (JP): The cancellation of the visit of Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid to Australia -- for the fourth time -- is probably fortuitous for both countries.

Abdurrahman's presidency appears to be in terminal decline and little of substance, beyond gestures of goodwill, could have been achieved now.

This is particularly so if we are simultaneously witnessing the denouement of the Howard government.

Ahead of likely changes of administration in Jakarta and Canberra, it is timely to canvas possible scenarios in the bilateral relationship, including the likely approach of a Beazley Labor government to continuing political volatility in Jakarta. With the caveat that, like Kremlinology, Jakarta- watching is anything but an exact science, there are three possible scenarios.

The first is that President Abdurrahman will resist efforts by Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri to topple him, thus triggering a political war of attrition that would last until the presidential election in 2004. This would be economically disastrous and politically destabilizing if both sides call their supporters onto the streets.

The Indonesian military (TNI) has indicated that it will not tolerate public mayhem, and may react in the usual way. However, over the last three years the TNI has frequently clashed with the national police (Polri) in such circumstances, with each shooting at the other. This could be catastrophic if it happened in Abdurrahman's power base of East Java, or in Jakarta.

Within this scenario, the power struggle would lead to an even more complete policy paralysis than currently exists, and a collapse of institutional legitimacy and territorial integrity across the archipelago.

In such circumstances, the IMF would be likely to suspend further financial aid, increasing the economic hardship of ordinary people.

Meanwhile, the Australian government could only watch in horror and continue to be used as a whipping boy by Indonesian 'nationalists' as a part of their domestic agenda.

The second scenario is that Abdurrahman accepts his lame duck status, retains the presidency but hands over all decision-making power to Megawati and her supporters. This is unlikely to satisfy the vanity of either player. Abdurrahman promised just such a deal in August 2000 and promptly reneged on it.

In the event, Megawati may not want to inherit the mess that is contemporary Indonesia, nor be the next target for the Amien Rais-led Islamic parties.

In this scenario, the Australian government would remain an irrelevant bystander, unable to progress the bilateral relationship due to a confusing devolution of authority.

The third and at this stage most likely scenario is that Abdurrahman will be impeached and constitutionally removed some time after July. As his successor, Megawati will attempt to establish a 'national unity cabinet' comprising members of the key parties and technocrats. The presidency would become increasingly titular and ceremonial, relying on advisors to run the day to day affairs of government.

Under Megawati, Indonesia would retreat to a technocratic and nationalist (i.e. no dissent) position, relying on her own allegedly corrupt coterie (including husband Taufiq Kiemas) and former Soeharto crony Arifin Panigoro, among others. For national stability, she would also rely on the now dominant group within the TNI, led by 'gradual reformer' Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, to whom Megawati is ideologically close. Current corruption and human rights investigations, such as they are, would effectively end.

Although Megawati would come to power with the support of the Islamic parties, that would diminish soon after achieving office. To counter this, Megawati would seek a rapprochement with Gus Dur's PKB (National Awakening Party) and Soeharto's old party, Golkar. With greater TNI influence and Megawati's own nationalist predilections, there would likely be a harder line on communal violence and separatism, with commensurately worsening human rights abuses. In total, this third scenario would represent a slightly less cohesive, less formally centralized version of Soeharto's New Order.

In Canberra, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), like the discredited Jakarta lobby, is already looking forward to the return of "stability", and Megawati's group is being courted. On current form, DFAT will want to deflect domestic concerns about escalating violence in Aceh and West Papua, while restating support for Indonesia's territorial integrity.

And at the request of the Indonesian government, Canberra will consider re-establishing ADF-TNI training links as a symbol of strengthening ties, and to gain greater access to Indonesia's real power brokers.

In the event of a change of government in Canberra, there could be a significant reshuffle of DFAT by incoming Foreign Minister Brereton, reflecting a more "robust" posture. This, however, could produce tensions within the government, especially with those who want to downplay Jakarta's human rights performance.

As an impotent outside observer, what can and should Canberra do?

First, it should abandon the "papering-over-the-cracks" approach to foreign relations, and remind Indonesia of the benefits of liberal democracy before the reform process there expires. Acknowledging its limited influence, Australia should concentrate on promoting structural economic and legal reform, civilian control of the TNI and acceptance of likely territorial changes. There should be less emphasis on transient personalities.

Canberra should not renew training links between the ADF and the TNI until the TNI has come under solid civilian control, abandoned its political role and ended its function as Indonesia's brutal and corrupt policeman.

The real problem continues to be Indonesia's inability to reconcile itself to a participatory, representative and accountable political system. In response to the still-birth of democracy in Indonesia and its partial fragmentation, Canberra will need to respond more deftly, more precisely and with greater honesty than it has in the past.

Scott Burchill is lecturer in international relations at Deakin University, Victoria, Australia. Dr. Damien Kingsbury is Senior Lecturer in International Development at Deakin University. His latest book is South-East Asia: A Political Profile (Oxford, 2001).