Thu, 01 Oct 1998

Lifting the lid on truth of 1965 abortive coup attempt

Pancasila Sanctity Day on Thursday commemorates the state's success in crushing the 1965 coup attempt by the now defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Hermawan Sulistiyo, a political researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, reflects on a day which changed the course of the nation's history but still holds lingering questions.

Question: The government's version of the abortive coup 33 years ago is under renewed public scrutiny. Do you believe there has been manipulation of historical facts?

Hermawan: Distortion of our history began on Oct. 5, 1965, when the Army issued its own version of the event in a series of propaganda vehicles. Unfortunately, those stories were then used as the basis for writing history.

The late president Sukarno's 1966 letter -- better known as Surat Perintah 11 Maret (Supersemar or Letter of Instruction of March 11) -- mandating then Maj. Gen. Soeharto to take over an operational task to restore order, for example, was later transformed into a legitimate transfer-of-power document. The Army, which had political interest in constructing the history, must be responsible for that.

It seems that no one has countered this version of history?

Some Western scholars have penned various versions of the event, but no Indonesian historians have had the courage to write a different version for fear of reprisals.

Some suggest that former president Soeharto was involved in, or at least was aware of, the plan to kill seven generals, all of whom he reportedly disliked. What is your opinion?

I believe Soeharto was not involved in the killing because there is no evidence. Recent media reports quoting PKI executive Latief as saying from prison that the latter had told him about the plan on the eve of the killings were not supported by evidence.

Was the coup attempt merely the eruption of an internal conflict within the Army?

It was not purely an internal conflict within the Army, but the involvement of PKI leaders and some Army officers indicates that there was then a serious conflict among the political elite. At the same time, the nation also witnessed a serious social rift, marked by recurring clashes between PKI followers and other communities in East Java almost every week.

Do you consider the factual transfer of power from Sukarno to Soeharto, based on Supersemar, as constitutional?

It was unconstitutional because it was not made through constitutional procedures. I think the Army made a mistake by supporting the unconstitutional transfer of power and the purging of the Sukarno regime between 1965 and 1971.

However, Sukarno also made a mistake by refusing to meet the people's demand to disband the PKI. Only two weeks after the coup attempt, mass killings of PKI members broke out in Java and Bali, stirring up a political tension conducive to the transfer of power. About 400,000 people were killed.

Could the demand be made that the government or the Armed Forces take responsibility for the mass killings?

Such a demand is possible but difficult to carry out because the killings occurred 10 years into recurrent social conflicts involving PKI followers and other societal groups, including the Armed Forces. If the case was solved legally, perhaps about one third of the country's population would have to be taken to court. Producing evidence in court would also be very difficult because there would be no documents or data supporting the incidents. Furthermore, no one would have the courage to raise such an issue in a legal process.

The government often accuses demonstrators of being infiltrated by PKI members. Do you believe the PKI is still a latent danger to the nation?

The government uses such a stigma to overcome contemporary political problems because it does not know how to play the political game in a more elegant way. The Armed Forces' recent stigmatization of demonstrating students from Forum Kota was extraneous because even the most stupid student knows that communism, as an ideology, has failed to achieve its goals.

What is the political impact of the recent discussions on the coup attempt with an aim to reconstructing history?

The current heated public discussions indicate that a battle is still going on among the political elite. The Habibie regime -- which is widely regarded as a carbon copy of the Soeharto regime and which lacks legitimacy among the public -- is apparently trying to distance itself from the former government by allowing the open discussions to go on with a hope that it may lead to a conclusion that Soeharto and his supporters made a mistake.

The discussions also gain support from witnesses of the coup attempt who are still alive. With the fall of Soeharto, they now have an opportunity to disclose the facts, some of which have been manipulated.

However, the discussions, which will make the people more critical about their civil rights, may boomerang on the Habibie regime because the public may reach a conclusion that the transfer of power from Soeharto to Habibie on May 21 was also unconstitutional. (riz)