Let's get it right this time around

James Van Zorge, Political Risk and Government Relations Consultants, Jakarta

Why can't they seem to ever get it right? Mired in a climate of political uncertainty since the fall of Soeharto, the Indonesian polity has proven itself incapable of providing the leadership and courage that is needed to address effectively the more pressing challenges that face the nation. The latest signs coming from the Megawati Soekarnoputri administration is that this disturbing trend is likely to continue.

Looking back, the fact that Soeharto's first successor, B.J. Habibie, was unable to lead his country is -- in retrospect -- not much of a surprise. Seen as not much more than an old crony of Soeharto, Habibie was ousted on relatively short order because he could never gain the legitimacy he needed to survive.

His successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, was hailed as a legitimate figure, but given his erratic behavior and lack of a power base, he too was doomed to failure and forced eviction. Then there is Megawati: Unlike Habibie and Abdurrahman, the new president possesses both the legitimacy and the power base that are requisites for becoming an effective leader in the post-Soeharto era. But where is Megawati's political capital being used? Unfortunately, the answer is, towards no apparent end.

Surveying the presidents' cabinets that succeeded Soeharto would suggest that, even there, Indonesia can't seem to get it right. Habibie's cabinet was competent, but corrupt. Abdurrahman's team of ministers was incompetent and, for the most part, also corrupt. Now we have Megawati's cabinet, which although can be given kudos for being incorruptible, is incompetent.

Take the case of the budget deficit. Rather than taking charge and ordering a timely disposal of state-owned enterprises, Megawati and her team have taken the incredulous position of saying that the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks has resulted in a lack of investor appetite. What they are afraid of saying in public, but everybody still knows, is that corrupt government officials in places such as Padang, West Sumatra, are blocking asset disposals.

One could argue that the executive office's hands are tied in deals such as Semen Gresik because of an intransigent parliament, but here again the reality is different: If Megawati and her cabinet had the political courage to deal with the vested interests of the corrupt minority, they could rightfully and legally insist upon selling state assets-with or without the cooperation of their counterparts in the legislature.

By failing to take firm action, the Megawati administration is losing a US$520 million deal and, perhaps even worse, setting a precedent that will poison the integrity of regional autonomy.

In earlier days, the government's talent for creating excuses, waffling and finger-pointing were effective in deflecting criticism of bad governance. But it has now come to a point where the patience of the multilaterals and the international donor community is being severely tested.

The Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), for example, is now insisting on accountability and performance. Here, Megawati's dream team seems to be doing little more than dreaming, and is starting to sound like Malaysia in saying that perhaps Indonesia doesn't need the IMF.

On the edge of a global recession and a severe decline in direct foreign investment throughout the developing world, such posturing can be seen as an attempt to play brinkmanship, at best, and could result in encouraging nationalist sentiments at a juncture where Indonesia can least afford to turn inwards.

The failure to display courage is not just going to spell trouble for the economy, but will affect Indonesia's foreign relations, as well. In the war against terrorism, Megawati has fallen into the trap of trying to balance the interests of a small extremist minority on the domestic front with those of her key allies on the international stage.

On the one hand, the president talks of supporting the fight against the likes of al-Qaeda, but on the other hand does little to contain the behavior of extremist groups at home. Megawati also seems eager to display some support by sending Indonesian troops to join a possible UN peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, but shows little if any resolve in addressing the skeletons in Indonesia's closet, such as East Timor and Maluku.

In the end analysis, one must wonder whether or not the Megawati administration is naive enough to believe that the world community will be forgiving of Indonesia for its poor track record in human rights in return for a small group of peacekeepers in a place outside its own borders.

Amidst this unsettling environment, there is some good news. Unlike her predecessors, Megawati still enjoys the support of most Indonesians. If Megawati were to be more courageous and ask her followers to support her in making the hard decisions on economic reform and national security, her opponents would have a difficult time in maintaining the status quo of yesteryear. Megawati and her cabinet have the political capital to make a difference in Indonesia's future, but they should be mindful of the old adage, "Use it, or lose it".