Let's get it right this time around

Let's get it right this time around

James Van Zorge, Political Risk and Government Relations Consultants,
Jakarta

Why can't they seem to ever get it right? Mired in a climate
of political uncertainty since the fall of Soeharto, the
Indonesian polity has proven itself incapable of providing the
leadership and courage that is needed to address effectively the
more pressing challenges that face the nation. The latest signs
coming from the Megawati Soekarnoputri administration is that
this disturbing trend is likely to continue.

Looking back, the fact that Soeharto's first successor, B.J.
Habibie, was unable to lead his country is -- in retrospect --
not much of a surprise. Seen as not much more than an old crony
of Soeharto, Habibie was ousted on relatively short order because
he could never gain the legitimacy he needed to survive.

His successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, was hailed as a legitimate
figure, but given his erratic behavior and lack of a power base,
he too was doomed to failure and forced eviction. Then there is
Megawati: Unlike Habibie and Abdurrahman, the new president
possesses both the legitimacy and the power base that are
requisites for becoming an effective leader in the post-Soeharto
era. But where is Megawati's political capital being used?
Unfortunately, the answer is, towards no apparent end.

Surveying the presidents' cabinets that succeeded Soeharto
would suggest that, even there, Indonesia can't seem to get it
right. Habibie's cabinet was competent, but corrupt.
Abdurrahman's team of ministers was incompetent and, for the most
part, also corrupt. Now we have Megawati's cabinet, which
although can be given kudos for being incorruptible, is
incompetent.

Take the case of the budget deficit. Rather than taking
charge and ordering a timely disposal of state-owned enterprises,
Megawati and her team have taken the incredulous position of
saying that the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks has resulted in a lack
of investor appetite. What they are afraid of saying in public,
but everybody still knows, is that corrupt government officials
in places such as Padang, West Sumatra, are blocking asset
disposals.

One could argue that the executive office's hands are tied in
deals such as Semen Gresik because of an intransigent parliament,
but here again the reality is different: If Megawati and her
cabinet had the political courage to deal with the vested
interests of the corrupt minority, they could rightfully and
legally insist upon selling state assets-with or without the
cooperation of their counterparts in the legislature.

By failing to take firm action, the Megawati administration is
losing a US$520 million deal and, perhaps even worse, setting a
precedent that will poison the integrity of regional autonomy.

In earlier days, the government's talent for creating excuses,
waffling and finger-pointing were effective in deflecting
criticism of bad governance. But it has now come to a point
where the patience of the multilaterals and the international
donor community is being severely tested.

The Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), for example, is now
insisting on accountability and performance. Here, Megawati's
dream team seems to be doing little more than dreaming, and is
starting to sound like Malaysia in saying that perhaps Indonesia
doesn't need the IMF.

On the edge of a global recession and a severe decline in
direct foreign investment throughout the developing world, such
posturing can be seen as an attempt to play brinkmanship, at
best, and could result in encouraging nationalist sentiments at a
juncture where Indonesia can least afford to turn inwards.

The failure to display courage is not just going to spell
trouble for the economy, but will affect Indonesia's foreign
relations, as well. In the war against terrorism, Megawati has
fallen into the trap of trying to balance the interests of a
small extremist minority on the domestic front with those of her
key allies on the international stage.

On the one hand, the president talks of supporting the fight
against the likes of al-Qaeda, but on the other hand does little
to contain the behavior of extremist groups at home. Megawati
also seems eager to display some support by sending Indonesian
troops to join a possible UN peacekeeping force in Afghanistan,
but shows little if any resolve in addressing the skeletons in
Indonesia's closet, such as East Timor and Maluku.

In the end analysis, one must wonder whether or not the
Megawati administration is naive enough to believe that the world
community will be forgiving of Indonesia for its poor track
record in human rights in return for a small group of
peacekeepers in a place outside its own borders.

Amidst this unsettling environment, there is some good news.
Unlike her predecessors, Megawati still enjoys the support of
most Indonesians. If Megawati were to be more courageous and ask
her followers to support her in making the hard decisions on
economic reform and national security, her opponents would have a
difficult time in maintaining the status quo of yesteryear.
Megawati and her cabinet have the political capital to make a
difference in Indonesia's future, but they should be mindful of
the old adage, "Use it, or lose it".