Let Indonesians choose a ruler

By Nova Poerwadi

JAKARTA (JP): Donna K. Woodward commented that it would be a pity if presidential frontrunner Megawati Soekarnoputri were "mistaken for a reform leader" (The Jakarta Post, Sept. 28, 1999).

Woodward based her comment on the Sept. 20 edition of Newsweek, where Megawati blasts incumbent B.J. Habibie for not being far-sighted enough in dealing with the self-determination ballot in East Timor.

Woodward also comments on how Megawati seems to have been catapulted by events and her Sukarno (founding president) name, with little to commend her as a reform leader. The writer also paints Habibie in glowing colors in ways we have come to expect from foreign observers.

But like many foreigners who occasionally come to comment on developments in Indonesia, it seems Woodward has made a bold character judgment of Megawati (whom she portrays as a dishonest and hypocritical counter-reformist), without fully understanding the background which has led to the current political situation in this country.

This article will not try to paint a portrait of Megawati as a saint, because a perfect person she is definitely not. One of her main weaknesses is that the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) chairwoman does take her time to comment on pressing issues.

But as events show, rather than weakening her public support, the matronly party leader's silence has worked to her advantage, setting her apart from the "soundbyte politicians" prevalent in Jakarta (who often have to issue humiliating retractions hours later).

Her political platform, though often ambiguous, is clearly that of gradual change, based on the insistence that there is nothing inherently wrong with the system, only with the people who are running it.

This clearly goes against the views of those proposing radical change, who blame the system for corrupting even the most honest men, including the idealist Sukarno and the pragmatist Soeharto.

Megawati's stance is clearly seen in her party's line on constitutional amendments, which rejects any change to the hallowed 1945 Constitution, unless absolutely necessary. On the military's dual role? Gradual phase-out as opposed to immediate pullout. On public presidential debates? Not the Indonesian way, according to her.

Whether her willingness to stand against the tide of "popular opinion" makes Megawati less of a reformist is open to question. So is the assertion that Habibie's continued appeasement of public opinion indicates his reformist credentials.

What for his supporters is a sign of Habibie's openness and flexibility, is for his critics a sign of his weakness and inconsistencies. Clearly, Woodward either misinterpreted or missed the dynamics of "reformist" and "anti-reformist" in Indonesia, especially between the two main groups each claiming to carry the reformist banner.

The pro-Habibie camp claims to champion the reformist cause because of the democratic reforms carried out under his leadership, especially in relation to freedom of expression and electoral reform. Habibie's one-year rule saw the dawn of press freedom and the deregulation of the print media. It also saw Indonesia's first true multiparty election in over forty years.

Habibie's supporters claim Megawati's nationalist camp will return the country to the autocratic Soeharto years, or even the disastrous last years of the Sukarno regime. The Muslim-based elements of Habibie's supporters also fear a return to the allegedly anti-Muslim days of Soeharto's early years, due to the fact that nationalists are regarded as secular.

Those fears are being exacerbated by Megawati's reluctance to be drawn into a political debate, and her more "conservative" stance on some basic issues, putting herself more in line with the military than with student activists demanding "revolution".

But the pro-Megawati camp sees things much differently. They say they have been calling for reforms, even before Soeharto relinquished power, at the threat of abduction and even death.

One historical tidbit that Woodward failed to mention is that many lost their lives during a government backed takeover of Megawati's PDI headquarters in July 1996. To PDI leaders, Megawati's persecution and her camp's opposition to Soeharto's rule began long before the "other, braver national leaders" Woodward mentions, began to attack Soeharto's regime at its moment of weakness (due to the economic crisis) in 1998.

The Megawati camp claim to the reformist banner is the fact that Habibie was very much a part of the Soeharto regime for much of the leader's 32-year-rule. If, as Woodward says, Megawati remained silent while Soeharto's army ravaged East Timor, then Habibie was part of the regime at the time!

One's silence during the Soeharto years is not a testament to one's approval of the alleged atrocities that happened, so using that argument to praise then research and technology minister Habibie above the then opposition party leader Megawati is clearly a case of selective memory.

To the pro-Megawati camp, the dramatic changes allowed to happen in Indonesian society, including that of press freedom, happened not because of Habibie, but despite him. They note how Habibie continues to have to be pressured into reform, even to allow snap elections in June, after mentioning no such elections during his inaugural speech, the night after he took office.

Habibie's reformist credentials are also encumbered by the political machine that has chosen to vehemently support him, the Golkar party, the political force that sustained Soeharto's decades of rule over Indonesia. The latest scandal, that of Bank Bali, which allegedly saw Golkar cadres funneling billions of rupiah into Habibie's reelection bid, has also caused people to think it is politics as usual at the Habibie camp.

But again, much as we shouldn't romanticize Megawati we must not completely vilify her immediate predecessor. Whether advertently or not, Habibie has done much to the presidential office. He has finally given the administration in Jakarta, less of a "Javanese" face, because he hails from South Sulawesi.

After decades of having a military man at the top, Habibie represents the return to a more civilian government. He should be commended for finally succeeding in demystifying the presidency, after having had two "superhuman" leaders, Sukarno and Soeharto, assume the office for over fifty years. Finally, an accessible president who is "merely human"!

Megawati's biggest challenge should she be elected president, would be to fulfill the almost messianic expectations placed on her, both by her supporters, and from those who have given up on "merely human" leaders like Habibie.

Tough job, considering she would have to deal with many current problems, from the investigation into former president Soeharto's wealth to the crisis in East Timor.

In the meantime, she doesn't seem to be gloating that her prediction came true about Timor (as Woodward insinuates), but instead presents herself as an angry matron slapping Habibie's wrist for the pain and suffering he inadvertently caused to her "children".

If there is a lesson on leadership to be learned from the East Timor ordeal, it is that leaders are expected to understand that political ideals have to take into account the political reality in the field.

No matter how Habibie will sugarcoat the messy aftermath of the East Timor ballot during his upcoming accountability speech, it will not auger well towards his reelection bid. Repeating his recent speech referring to East Timor as a "burden" and labeling nationalist sentiments growing around the country as "short sighted" surely won't endear him to the increasingly nationalist public.

By quickly vilifying Megawati for predicting the obvious based on her understanding of political realities in East Timor (which unfortunately came true), Woodward gives us again an example of the many uninformed Westerner's editorializing, what is now passing as "fact" in much of Indonesia's and the international media.

It's bad enough she presumptuously concludes that Megawati is some kind of "Phantom Menace" to Indonesian democracy, it is worse that she based that assessment on the fragmented material available to her and the myopic view in which Western-based media seem to analyze the rest of the world.

As some local analysts keep warning, it's time to put substance ahead of style in analyzing leadership.

Although Megawati's style puts her at a disadvantage to foreigners who don't even have to live under her possible presidency, it was certainly good enough for the majority of Indonesian voters. For locals, the question of style has given way to whether Megawati can deliver on her hype.

At least local analysts and journalists, even those opposed to her candidacy, come to the table with more than newspaper clippings and soundbytes at their disposal.

We must agree with Woodward's assertion, that we can not blame Habibie alone for the loss of East Timor, but neither can we blame Megawati, for inadvertently gaining from what it did to Habibie's domestic standing.

What we can partly blame is how foreigners with only superficial knowledge of how Indonesian society and politics work, tend to exacerbate an already explosive problem, and try to give us ready-made conclusions and solutions.

As usual, it is the members of the local media who have to pick up the pieces, and live with the impact of their three- minute television slots or columns written in newspapers.

The writer is a journalist with RCTI television.