Let Indonesians choose a ruler

Let Indonesians choose a ruler

By Nova Poerwadi

JAKARTA (JP): Donna K. Woodward commented that it would be a pity
if presidential frontrunner Megawati Soekarnoputri were "mistaken
for a reform leader" (The Jakarta Post, Sept. 28, 1999).

Woodward based her comment on the Sept. 20 edition of
Newsweek, where Megawati blasts incumbent B.J. Habibie for not
being far-sighted enough in dealing with the self-determination
ballot in East Timor.

Woodward also comments on how Megawati seems to have been
catapulted by events and her Sukarno (founding president) name,
with little to commend her as a reform leader. The writer also
paints Habibie in glowing colors in ways we have come to expect
from foreign observers.

But like many foreigners who occasionally come to comment on
developments in Indonesia, it seems Woodward has made a bold
character judgment of Megawati (whom she portrays as a dishonest
and hypocritical counter-reformist), without fully understanding
the background which has led to the current political situation
in this country.

This article will not try to paint a portrait of Megawati as a
saint, because a perfect person she is definitely not. One of her
main weaknesses is that the Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) chairwoman does take her time to
comment on pressing issues.

But as events show, rather than weakening her public support,
the matronly party leader's silence has worked to her advantage,
setting her apart from the "soundbyte politicians" prevalent in
Jakarta (who often have to issue humiliating retractions hours
later).

Her political platform, though often ambiguous, is clearly
that of gradual change, based on the insistence that there is
nothing inherently wrong with the system, only with the people
who are running it.

This clearly goes against the views of those proposing radical
change, who blame the system for corrupting even the most honest
men, including the idealist Sukarno and the pragmatist Soeharto.

Megawati's stance is clearly seen in her party's line on
constitutional amendments, which rejects any change to the
hallowed 1945 Constitution, unless absolutely necessary. On the
military's dual role? Gradual phase-out as opposed to immediate
pullout. On public presidential debates? Not the Indonesian way,
according to her.

Whether her willingness to stand against the tide of "popular
opinion" makes Megawati less of a reformist is open to question.
So is the assertion that Habibie's continued appeasement of
public opinion indicates his reformist credentials.

What for his supporters is a sign of Habibie's openness and
flexibility, is for his critics a sign of his weakness and
inconsistencies. Clearly, Woodward either misinterpreted or
missed the dynamics of "reformist" and "anti-reformist" in
Indonesia, especially between the two main groups each claiming
to carry the reformist banner.

The pro-Habibie camp claims to champion the reformist cause
because of the democratic reforms carried out under his
leadership, especially in relation to freedom of expression and
electoral reform. Habibie's one-year rule saw the dawn of press
freedom and the deregulation of the print media. It also saw
Indonesia's first true multiparty election in over forty years.

Habibie's supporters claim Megawati's nationalist camp will
return the country to the autocratic Soeharto years, or even the
disastrous last years of the Sukarno regime. The Muslim-based
elements of Habibie's supporters also fear a return to the
allegedly anti-Muslim days of Soeharto's early years, due to the
fact that nationalists are regarded as secular.

Those fears are being exacerbated by Megawati's reluctance to
be drawn into a political debate, and her more "conservative"
stance on some basic issues, putting herself more in line with
the military than with student activists demanding "revolution".

But the pro-Megawati camp sees things much differently. They
say they have been calling for reforms, even before Soeharto
relinquished power, at the threat of abduction and even death.

One historical tidbit that Woodward failed to mention is that
many lost their lives during a government backed takeover of
Megawati's PDI headquarters in July 1996. To PDI leaders,
Megawati's persecution and her camp's opposition to Soeharto's
rule began long before the "other, braver national leaders"
Woodward mentions, began to attack Soeharto's regime at its
moment of weakness (due to the economic crisis) in 1998.

The Megawati camp claim to the reformist banner is the fact
that Habibie was very much a part of the Soeharto regime for much
of the leader's 32-year-rule. If, as Woodward says, Megawati
remained silent while Soeharto's army ravaged East Timor, then
Habibie was part of the regime at the time!

One's silence during the Soeharto years is not a testament to
one's approval of the alleged atrocities that happened, so using
that argument to praise then research and technology minister
Habibie above the then opposition party leader Megawati is
clearly a case of selective memory.

To the pro-Megawati camp, the dramatic changes allowed to
happen in Indonesian society, including that of press freedom,
happened not because of Habibie, but despite him. They note how
Habibie continues to have to be pressured into reform, even to
allow snap elections in June, after mentioning no such elections
during his inaugural speech, the night after he took office.

Habibie's reformist credentials are also encumbered by the
political machine that has chosen to vehemently support him, the
Golkar party, the political force that sustained Soeharto's
decades of rule over Indonesia. The latest scandal, that of Bank
Bali, which allegedly saw Golkar cadres funneling billions of
rupiah into Habibie's reelection bid, has also caused people to
think it is politics as usual at the Habibie camp.

But again, much as we shouldn't romanticize Megawati we must
not completely vilify her immediate predecessor. Whether
advertently or not, Habibie has done much to the presidential
office. He has finally given the administration in Jakarta, less
of a "Javanese" face, because he hails from South Sulawesi.

After decades of having a military man at the top, Habibie
represents the return to a more civilian government. He should be
commended for finally succeeding in demystifying the presidency,
after having had two "superhuman" leaders, Sukarno and Soeharto,
assume the office for over fifty years. Finally, an accessible
president who is "merely human"!

Megawati's biggest challenge should she be elected president,
would be to fulfill the almost messianic expectations placed on
her, both by her supporters, and from those who have given up on
"merely human" leaders like Habibie.

Tough job, considering she would have to deal with many
current problems, from the investigation into former president
Soeharto's wealth to the crisis in East Timor.

In the meantime, she doesn't seem to be gloating that her
prediction came true about Timor (as Woodward insinuates), but
instead presents herself as an angry matron slapping Habibie's
wrist for the pain and suffering he inadvertently caused to her
"children".

If there is a lesson on leadership to be learned from the East
Timor ordeal, it is that leaders are expected to understand that
political ideals have to take into account the political reality
in the field.

No matter how Habibie will sugarcoat the messy aftermath of
the East Timor ballot during his upcoming accountability speech,
it will not auger well towards his reelection bid. Repeating his
recent speech referring to East Timor as a "burden" and labeling
nationalist sentiments growing around the country as "short
sighted" surely won't endear him to the increasingly nationalist
public.

By quickly vilifying Megawati for predicting the obvious based
on her understanding of political realities in East Timor (which
unfortunately came true), Woodward gives us again an example of
the many uninformed Westerner's editorializing, what is now
passing as "fact" in much of Indonesia's and the international
media.

It's bad enough she presumptuously concludes that Megawati is
some kind of "Phantom Menace" to Indonesian democracy, it is
worse that she based that assessment on the fragmented material
available to her and the myopic view in which Western-based media
seem to analyze the rest of the world.

As some local analysts keep warning, it's time to put
substance ahead of style in analyzing leadership.

Although Megawati's style puts her at a disadvantage to
foreigners who don't even have to live under her possible
presidency, it was certainly good enough for the majority of
Indonesian voters. For locals, the question of style has given
way to whether Megawati can deliver on her hype.

At least local analysts and journalists, even those opposed to
her candidacy, come to the table with more than newspaper
clippings and soundbytes at their disposal.

We must agree with Woodward's assertion, that we can not blame
Habibie alone for the loss of East Timor, but neither can we
blame Megawati, for inadvertently gaining from what it did to
Habibie's domestic standing.

What we can partly blame is how foreigners with only
superficial knowledge of how Indonesian society and politics
work, tend to exacerbate an already explosive problem, and try to
give us ready-made conclusions and solutions.

As usual, it is the members of the local media who have to
pick up the pieces, and live with the impact of their three-
minute television slots or columns written in newspapers.

The writer is a journalist with RCTI television.