Lessons from Yugoslavia

Lessons from Yugoslavia

The article is based on a paper presented by Makmur Keliat, a
University of Indonesia lecturer, at a recent seminar on the Non-
Aligned Movement with the theme "The Crisis of Yugoslavia and the
Role of Non-Aligned Movement", organized by the university's Non-
Aligned Movement Study Center.

JAKARTA (JP): Yugoslavia presents an interesting paradox from
the European continent. While large parts of Europe, as shown in
the case of the European Community, have been in the continuous
process of integration, Yugoslavia has displayed a contradictory
trend.

When the country became a federal republic on Nov. 29, 1945,
it included six republics -- Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. In June 1991, Croatia and
Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia. Macedonia
followed suit in January 1992. Bosnia-Herzegovina took the same
step in 1992. The remaining republics that have agreed to unite
and declared themselves the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are
Serbia and Montenegero.

The latest mass media reports have given an impression that
the process of disintegration might continue unabated. Though a
peace plan to end the Kosovo conflict was accepted in June 1999,
after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) 11-week air
war against Yugoslavia, there is no clear indication that Kosovo
separatists, mainly represented by the Kosovo Liberation Army,
will cease their demand for independence. In addition there has
been a report that Montenegro is also moving slowly toward
independence. Therefore, it may not be an exaggeration to say
that Yugoslavia in the post cold war has been remarkably noted
for the process of its disintegration.

In order to avoid emotional bias in discussion, this article
attempts to analyze the conflict in Yugoslavia by focusing on two
kinds of tensions that may have taken place in the country --
between the idea of state and that of nation, and between demand
for democratization and demand for national unity. In a nutshell,
the article tries to show that the break-up of Yugoslavia is the
outcome of these two tensions.

Let us begin from the first tension. Seen from a historical
perspective, Yugoslavia is almost similar with Indonesia in the
sense that the existence of the state precedes the existence of
the nation. Indeed, the term Yugoslavia, meaning the Land of the
South Slav, was coined in 1929 by King Alexander I.

Indeed, a hundred years before the establishment of
Yugoslavia, one could find in the country the Serbs who were
predominantly Orthodox, the Albanians and the Bosnian people who
were primarily Muslim, and the Croats and the Slovenes who were
dominantly Roman Catholic. To a large extent, one could also say
that Yugoslavia was established as a multi-nation-state. This, in
turn, brought about a huge task for the government to convince
its citizen, whose cultural and historical backdrop were so
diverse, that the idea of the state would represent the idea of
nation.

It is under these circumstances that the conflict in
Yugoslavia need to be understood. Accordingly, Yugoslavia is
distinct from countries that have been endowed with homogeneous
cultural and historical legacy, such as Japan, in which the
establishment of nation precedes the establishment of state.
Yugoslavia is almost like Indonesia where nation building seems
to have become an unfinished and painstaking business. In this
regard, the main difference may lie in the form of government.
The form of federal government on the basis of ethnic landscape,
adopted by Yugoslavia when it was established in 1945, appeared
to have worked effectively only for a short-term solution.

The overlapping boundary line between ethnic jurisdiction with
political jurisdiction structured within a form of federal
government has a great tendency to erect a psychological block
for the whole populace in their efforts to search for a single
national identity. Rather than weakening traditional sentiments,
such a federal government seems to have cultivated a distinctive
feeling in the mental constructs of the entire ethnic groups that
they are basically different culturally. This has also become
evident in the north-eastern part of India, where various
separatist movements have recurred in Nagaland, Mizoram, Megalaya
and Assam. However, there is a striking difference between
Yugoslavia and India.

In Yugoslavia, the federal government was not established
along with the political mechanism for participation, while in
India, there has been political pluralism as clearly indicated by
the presence of many political parties and the freedom of
expression. Such political circumstances were absent in
Yugoslavia.

During the late president Josip Broz Tito's leadership,
political participation was only channeled through a centralized
communist party. What is the difference then is that though the
separatist movement has posed a problem for the Indian federal
government, it has failed in gaining wide political support from
local people. The majority still put their strong belief in the
idea of political pluralism.

In fact, if one looks back to the history of Yugoslavia, she
or he would come to know that the conflict provoked by ethno
nationalism has been there through several generations. The only
difference is that the spirit of ethno nationalism in the past
did not turn into violent conflict on a massive scale due to the
figure of Tito.

When he was still alive, Tito was seen as an undisputed
leader, despite the fact that he was not a Serb. Very few people
dared to challenge him and the policies he imposed were largely
accepted with no significant criticism.

In the mean time, the cold war had also made it easy for Tito
to cultivate a sort of united feeling among the populace. Since
the collective and bitter memories from the Balkanization period
were still vivid, Tito did not face a huge task to mold a
dominant perception that the country could easily turn into the
theater of war because of other regional power's intervention.

It is in this context that Yugoslavia's foreign policy since
the very beginning was designed not to side with any bloc and the
most important priority at the time of cold war was how to
preserve its independence and territorial integration.

The crucial moment came out shortly after Tito passed away in
1980. Almost similar with the case of Indonesia after former
president Soeharto stepped down in May 1998, Yugoslavia was
immediately faced with the crisis of national leadership not only
in terms of its legitimacy but also in terms of its power
effectiveness. This was clearly symbolized by the adoption of
collective leadership in the presidency.

At a glance, this solution seems to have been motivated by the
idea of political democracy that no one could govern Yugoslavia
like Tito had ruled the country. On the other side of the coin,
however, such a collective leadership could also indicate the
failure of political institutionalization.

The political framework left out by Tito did not work,
particularly in the context of leadership succession, as there
has been a power vacuum since he passed away. In this context,
Tito can be considered as the most proper example of a successful
dictator as he never intended to prepare for his successor. It,
therefore, will not come as a great surprise, that there has been
political disaster since his rule.

Now let us discuss the second tension. Many had pinned their
hopes that when an authoritarian leader was ousted from power and
if market reform was introduced, then the prospects for the
evolvement of stable democracy would become bright. This has not
turned into reality in Yugoslavia.

In fact, following the death of Tito, several market reforms
had been introduced and the most progressive one had been
launched when Ante Markovic was appointed as prime minister of
Yugoslavia in 1989. He was noted for his strong advocacy for a
Western economic system. It is also worth mentioning that the
first free election, as a symbol of democratization, was carried
out in 1990. Ironically the election were won by politicians who
advocated the secession of their republics from Yugoslavia. As a
result, the demands for separation has become increasingly
stronger. Why has this happened?

The first reason may lie in the lack of vision among the
ruling elite after the end of cold war. It has been clear that
ideology, following the end of cold war, has ceased to be a glue
for the preservation of the national unity. From a political
point of view, the ruling elite in Yugoslavia seems to have not
been well prepared for this abrupt change. Before the break-up of
the country, they could not find answers to the following
question: What is Yugoslavia for? Where is the country heading?
Who is now the common external enemy?

As a matter of fact, not only the Albanians, the Bosnians, the
Croats and the Slovenes were disappointed with the system built
by Tito, but also the Serbs as an ethnic majority. All ethnic
groups seem to have their own version and interpretation of the
historical events. As such, making objective judgments seems to
be impossible unless one takes a partisan stance.

An example can be learned from the case of the Kosovo
conflict. Serbians have insisted that Kosovo is the cradle of
their civilization and for this reason they have demanded that
the status of special autonomy for the Kosovo province given by
Tito in 1974 should be abolished. On the other hand, Albanians
who are the majority in Kosovo have put forward another version
of history. They have argued, it is their ancestors who were the
first settlers in the province and by saying so they have refused
to accept the argument aired by Serbians. Keeping this debate in
mind, one can see that the history of Yugoslavia tends to be seen
by political leaders and intellectuals of all ethnic groups not
as an asset but as a liability.

The second reason may lie in the lack of democratic tradition.
It has been clear from the case of Yugoslavia, as shown earlier,
that the free general election and market reforms conducted by
breaking state monopolies of economic resources are not a
sufficient condition for democratization. What has lacked,
referring to Habermas' conceptual thinking, is the existence of a
public sphere, through which private individuals are engaged in
rational critical debates concerning public matters. The validity
of each statement would be judged not by baseless racial or
religious sentiments but solely by reason. The absence of this
condition would generate only a political change without
democratization.

After more than 30 years ruled by a totalitarian government,
it is reasonable to say that Yugoslavia does not have sufficient
institutional resources for the evolvement of critical, rational
debate. Moreover, intellectuals who dared to raise their
criticism against Tito were punished severely. Milovan Djilas is
a case in point. He was put in jail by Tito simply because he
wrote the book The New Class, criticizing the behavior of
Yugoslavia's communist party elite.

Without a long tradition for critical debate, it is no wonder
the political elite after the death of Tito have been strongly
encouraged to raise communal sentiment to the effect of equating
the idea of democracy with the idea of self-determination. This
is certainly a misleading interpretation. It also has not come as
a great surprise if territorial integration, as a symbol of
national unity and one of the very foundations of the state, has
not been accepted without question.

Thus, at least two lessons can be picked up from the break-up
of Yugoslavia. First, the hostile relations between different
ethnic and religious groups in the country is not the cause of
the current conflict. By contrast it is merely a natural product
of the totalitarian government inherited from the era of Tito's
leadership. Second, there is no short-cut and instant formula for
the evolvement of democracy, particularly for developing
countries marked by diversity of culture and history and by a
lack of tradition for critical debate.