Legacy of Ken Arok lives on

Legacy of Ken Arok lives on

By Aboeprijadi Santoso

AMSTERDAM (JP): President B.J. Habibie should be applauded for
condemning the May riots and offering an apology in July and in
his State of the Nation address in August. However, he in effect
retracted the apology when he denied the incidence of gang rape,
following statements made by the police chief, the head of the
State Intelligence Coordinating Board and the commander of the
Armed Forces (ABRI). The rapes have been greeted with outrage
both domestically and internationally.

Why, then, should Habibie retract the apology when the issue
is still under investigation by a team initiated by the President
himself? Does the state merely need to be sure before it acts, or
has the state of rape become so politically vulnerable that it
has been concluded that it is time to "rape" the reports?

Whatever the state's priorities are, it should at least
consider the reports, be empathetic and understand the great
concern expressed by society and the victims. After all, the
issue is highly sensitive and has received greater coverage
precisely because it resulted from actions of the state itself
which affected the life of the nation as a whole. Rape and themes
associated with rape are not incidental, but part of the history
of the nation. As such it may help us to gain a better
understanding of the relationship between the state, violence and
women.

Several months ago, Christianto Wibisono was quoted by Suara
Pembaruan, in its May 22 edition, as arguing that throughout
Soeharto's rule, as much as during Sukarno's rule, Indonesians
had been living with the legacy of Ken Arok's adventurous pattern
of political behavior. This is the tale of the 13th century
eastern Javanese kingdom, Singasari. Ken Arok was its first king
in 1227.

Once a new regime was established, they appeased the ruler,
while he became firmer. As he repressed, so did they. When he
quit, they haunted him, but kept the old institutions alive. With
one dictator gone, all but the structure of social life and the
mentality was gone. Like Ken Arok and Brutus, Indonesians tend to
join in the killing of their enemies, but continue the social
habits.

At transition, indeed, violence thrives as conflicts should be
resolved. Ken Arok, who usurped power by killing the king,
actually became a legitimate ruler only because he married, if
not raped, Queen Ken Dedes, who was seen as the source of light
and thus of power. The essential idea seems to be that women and
sexual relationships establish a normative means to a legitimate
reign. Indeed, the late president Sukarno conceived the state as
the very union of male (yoni, symbolized by the National
Monument) and female sexuality (lingga, represented by the
parliamentary building).

As a brave young fighter (jago), Ken Arok was a popular
bandit. As a symbol, he signified the ideal of a strong and
courageous hero who established a new kingdom. His image included
qualities embraced by the Indonesian term perkasa which WJS
Purwadarminta's classic dictionary defines as "brave, courageous,
powerful, (by) force, violence". Significantly, but not
incidentally, the same qualities are associated with the word
perkosa (rape) and included in the dictionary description. The
conceptual affinity of the two terms -- "brave" and "rape" -- in
Indonesian discourse should be obvious.

Physical strength and bravery -- themselves related to rape
and women by virtue of the strength shown to her -- may therefore
be interlinked in a set of characteristics we ought to expect
from the state, state officials and state's actions.

The case of July 27, 1996 reminds us of the contribution
popular images have in real processes. On that day, the state
acted against a potential challenger, the Indonesian Democratic
Party (PDI) faction of Megawati Soekarnoputri, in order to
exclude her from the 1997 general election. Rachlan Nashidik, who
witnessed the military-supported units of the Soerjadi-led PDI
attacking Megawati's headquarters, has noted how symbolic the
tragic event was. It was a contrast, reflecting a social life
dominated by the male and military environment, he said. A brutal
force of the state crushed a weak group supporting a popular
female leader. The violent units, wearing red or black T-shirts,
confronted a legitimate political faction led by a soft woman
leader dressed in white. The event, perceived as "bad guys versus
a good lady", turned out to be an important prelude to Soeharto's
decline.

It was not the first time the state's might faced female
resistance. In 1965, it was challenged by a woman communist
force, Gerwani. In the 1980s, Marsinah, the labor leader who was
brutally sexually assaulted and killed, became a symbol of
resistance. The rise of female leaders and female solidarity
groups over recent months is another good example.

The rape of Chinese women last May is neither unique nor
bearing religious or communal significance because it was partly
the consequence of the state's actions. A member of the Volunteer
Team, Karlina Leksono, has argued that the systematically
organized rapes constituted a climax of the escalation of state
violence. "Women were hit not only because they could not resist
but because they will keep silent," she said in Amsterdam
recently.

Facing silence, one may add, the state proves its absolute
supremacy over the society. Such a climax may be viewed as the
great victory of Rambo's political jingoism, of Ken Arok's
jagoism syndrome, if you like, which was made possible under the
conditions of imbalance between state and society. Lack of
imbalance, on the other hand, would create the need of
powerbrokers, which explains the rise of the Mafia in 19th
century Sicily and vanished with the rise of Italian fascism.
Under the state's hegemony, the would-be-powerbrokers instead
become pre-modern tyrants (Ken Arok), Rambo type military
adventurers or fascists.

In the case of Soeharto's New Order regime of economic
expansion, we witnessed increasing state political domination and
centralization, resulting not only in social, sectional and
regional imbalances, but also growing resistance. Chief among the
latter are student protests, labor strikes and fierce resistance
in East Timor, Aceh and Irian.

Certain ethnic women become targets whenever the state faces
its most critical problems. In East Timor the state has faced
resistance from the local population since the mid-1970s. The
widespread mass graves, numerous cases of rape and scattered
"villages of widows" are not publicly discussed. The same
phenomenon is now being unearthed in Aceh as a result of military
operations when the state faced problems of control in the early
1990s. Finally, when the state leader faced a mounting financial
crisis with the economy and legitimacy, the political struggle
turned to violence last May, and it was Chinese women who became
the victims.

The May tragedy, then, should be viewed as the "missing link"
between the failure of the state's Rambo elements to provoke
students riots up to May 12 (i.e. until the shootings at Trisakti
University) and the critical moments after the state crisis was
only partly resolved by Soeharto's exit. If the Rambos failed to
seize power via riots and gang rapes, neither did the state
succession stop the atrocities.

At issue is, precisely, the mechanism and instruments of state
violence. The recent dismissal of Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto,
following probes into abductions in East Timor, leaves this
mechanism fully intact. The fact that state apparatuses were not
democratically controlled, easily led to human rights violations,
atrocities and impunities. Like the Achenese and East Timorese
women who resisted, the Chinese women and girls defy state
authorities by keeping silent. Victims survive because they
resist.

To force victims of rape to give public testimony, therefore,
is to hide the real issue. To continue to do so would be like
celebrating Ken Arok when he raped his wife in order to rape the
state.

The writer is a journalist based in Amsterdam, the
Netherlands.