Lee's memoirs shed light on Indonesia-Singapore relations

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): Remarks by President Abdurrahman Wahid about bilateral relations between Indonesia and Singapore, made after the ASEAN Informal Summit in Singapore last month, have once again made the top the center of debate.

This time around, however, cooler heads prevailed in Jakarta, and much blame has been put on Abdurrahman's unfortunate and wrong interpretation of some of the remarks, policies and reactions of Singapore leaders.

As usual, Abdurrahman was not well prepared for the summit, since he is unable to read and nobody around him has the real ability to advise him on pertinent issues. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's remarks to Abdurrahman on Malaysia's relations with Singapore should have been treated as a Malaysian problem, not Indonesia's. Abdurrahman might have been influenced by Mahathir's views, but the racial overtones of the relationship between Indonesia and Singapore could never be his own opinion.

The same is true of the problem of the water supply to Singapore, which is not an Indonesian problem since we are not supplying any water to Singapore as yet.

There is criticism in the Indonesian elite of Singapore, because there have been high expectations on the Indonesian side about Singapore's contribution in overcoming the Indonesian economic crisis. It seems some Indonesian leaders, in the government and the private sector, believe the Singapore government is not really committed to assisting Indonesia more than any other government. The view is that the Singapore government is only ready to support the interest of the private sector to invest, but it will not take a greater risk by engaging its state-owned enterprises.

Indonesia needs to understand the mentality of Singapore as a small country that has always been frugal and cautious, and that it has achieved much through effort and sacrifices. Despite the country's gains, it remains cautious and frugal. This understanding is important for the bilateral relationship.

In the meantime, Singapore has changed gradually. During the height of the crisis, Singapore did provide humanitarian assistance that was distributed through various social organizations, including the nation's largest Muslim organization Nadhlatul Ulama (NU). Singapore has been and still is involved in peacekeeping in East Timor. It has decent numbers of "Peace Corps", especially in teaching, training and health care, not only assigned in Southeast Asia but also Africa and, in the future, Latin America.

Singapore is also helping the new members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in public management and English, and in granting fellowships to a good number of ASEAN students to study at the nation's universities. The political system is undergoing a gradual opening. Singaporean companies are becoming more internationalized. Of course, that is in Singapore's national interest, especially with its aim to become a high tech society in the near future. But these developments are also helpful to the region.

The pace of change may still be too slow, but the trend is obvious and there is no way back. The country still feels severely constrained in its strategic environment, but if it develops according to a certain vision and trend, where an increase of good neighborliness will be one important part, that will help it overcome, or at least alleviate, the constraints still existing in the region.

With this background in mind, it is useful to discuss the second volume of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew's memoirs, From Third World To First, The Singapore Story 1965-2000.

Many who have read both volumes of his memoirs say the second is more direct and easier to follow. It is, by all accounts, a monumental work. The first part explains about Singapore's nation-building efforts and the "social engineering" undertaken by Lee and his able colleagues in the government and the People's Action Party (PAP).

The second part discusses Singapore's foreign relations through Lee's eyes. Especially interesting are his observations about other leaders in the region and the world; his evaluation about other countries was gained through experience. The second part is definitely the most interesting section of the book, and the reader learns much from Lee's sharp, astute perspective.

The first part is concise to the point of being too short. In fact, it should have more elaboration, because although Singapore as a city-state is special and in many ways is an exception to the rule in nation-building processes, it is the most successful of "socially engineered" countries. It has been achieved due to a number of factors; among the most important is that it has the most uncorruptable and smartest leadership.

Another factor is the small city-state nature of the country that is easier to govern. The regional environment, which could be volatile and pose a constraint to Singapore, also provides a strong reminder to unify the country. Last but not least is luck. Every time there has been a crisis the leadership and the nation are saved. Ultimately, however, all these factors are dependent on leadership.

There will be challenges ahead, but a strong basis has been laid down by Lee's generation of leaders. The future might be different, and questions could be raised whether the same strategies and social engineering could be repeated for the future. As Lee admits in his memoirs, they surely have to be changed to be successful in the future.

It also could be questioned whether the same toughness against dissent and the opposition could be applied all the time, because this would prevent the emergence of a responsible opposition, which is necessary to keep Singapore viable in the longer term. Of course, the economic successes have been a very important factor for the PAP to win again and again. However, after a certain level of income is reached, the populace will demand a better quality of life, including greater participation and more freedom of expression.

When it comes to ties with Indonesia, Lee enjoyed superb relations with Soeharto, because they shared the same strategy of development: put economic development first, with political stability as a prerequisite. Besides that, other matters are secondary. Soeharto also was able to keep Indonesia together and establish a new relationship with Singapore, namely as countries that were equal and not subordinate to each other.

Lee decided to leave the Malayan Federation because of the principle of equality based on a merit system. It is understandable that he would not want to be subdued by Indonesia in the same mold as Malaysia tried to do earlier. If there is a sacred principle in Lee's mind, it is that nothing will be taken for granted and that he would not allow Singapore to be bullied by anybody else.

Since Soeharto bent over backwards not to assert Indonesia's will on its neighbors, he was regarded by Lee as a real friend and a regional leader at the same time. It may be the reason Lee tolerated for too long the abuses of Soeharto, especially his problems with corruption, cronyism and nepotism. He was reluctant to advise Soeharto after he himself had taken a backseat in government; by then the extent of the crisis was too deep and Soeharto could not be saved.

Lee might be wrong to assume that the military alone is the only instrument capable of keeping Indonesia unified. He has yet to adjust to changes in the role of the military in Indonesia. Of course, he was completely right about Habibie, who was nothing more than a stooge of Soeharto politically; Soeharto's mistake was to have too much trust in the man, who later double-crossed him.

Lee did his part when Habibie was still the favorite of Soeharto by keeping good relations with him. However, this relationship did not work in the end. Part of the problem was Habibie's personality -- the fact that he was clueless about politics -- and partly due to his immediate surroundings consisting of some members of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) who were anti-Chinese and took Singapore for granted. During the Habibie period, Singapore was not able to do much for Indonesia.

Singapore's Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, headed by S.R. Nathan, now president of Singapore, took the initiative to establish broad based relations with other leaders who were then in the opposition. This was a welcome initiative, because it was obvious that despite his all-out efforts Habibie could not survive the transition period.

Abdurrahman is another personality and leader. He is an open- minded Muslim scholar, very impressive in his vision of reaching out to minorities and to being inclusive. He is a democrat, modernist and a Muslim leader and seems to be able to heal the nation's divisions.

But, alas, the verdict is still out on him. His capability to manage and keep the nation united is still being tested, not the least because of his capriciousness in making policies. In addition, there is a lack of organization to implement his vision and programs. He also expected too much from Singapore, while failing to understand Singapore's bottom line.

Thus, once in a while it is inevitable that relations are rocky under his leadership. However, it is much better than the situation under Habibie, because Abdurrahman at least has a vision that gives hope for the relationship.

For the time being Singapore has to be patient with Indonesia, and reach out much more than before to all sectors of the elite. Singapore has to try to do more to assist Indonesia, because in the end a stable and wealthy Indonesia is also in Singapore's interest.

In fact, in the eyes of the Indonesian elite, Singapore has never been more respected than today because of its achievements. It is a respect that is more than what Singaporeans could expect. Singapore must not be timid in dealing with Indonesia; it should not be afraid to criticize and express its opinion about Indonesia. But by the same token, Singapore also must not be timid about helping its neighbor.

The author is a member of the Board of Directors, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.