Lee's memoirs shed light on Indonesia-Singapore relations
Lee's memoirs shed light on Indonesia-Singapore relations
By Jusuf Wanandi
JAKARTA (JP): Remarks by President Abdurrahman Wahid about
bilateral relations between Indonesia and Singapore, made after
the ASEAN Informal Summit in Singapore last month, have once
again made the top the center of debate.
This time around, however, cooler heads prevailed in Jakarta,
and much blame has been put on Abdurrahman's unfortunate and
wrong interpretation of some of the remarks, policies and
reactions of Singapore leaders.
As usual, Abdurrahman was not well prepared for the summit,
since he is unable to read and nobody around him has the real
ability to advise him on pertinent issues. Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad's remarks to Abdurrahman on Malaysia's
relations with Singapore should have been treated as a Malaysian
problem, not Indonesia's. Abdurrahman might have been influenced
by Mahathir's views, but the racial overtones of the relationship
between Indonesia and Singapore could never be his own opinion.
The same is true of the problem of the water supply to
Singapore, which is not an Indonesian problem since we are not
supplying any water to Singapore as yet.
There is criticism in the Indonesian elite of Singapore,
because there have been high expectations on the Indonesian side
about Singapore's contribution in overcoming the Indonesian
economic crisis. It seems some Indonesian leaders, in the
government and the private sector, believe the Singapore
government is not really committed to assisting Indonesia more
than any other government. The view is that the Singapore
government is only ready to support the interest of the private
sector to invest, but it will not take a greater risk by engaging
its state-owned enterprises.
Indonesia needs to understand the mentality of Singapore as a
small country that has always been frugal and cautious, and that
it has achieved much through effort and sacrifices. Despite the
country's gains, it remains cautious and frugal. This
understanding is important for the bilateral relationship.
In the meantime, Singapore has changed gradually. During the
height of the crisis, Singapore did provide humanitarian
assistance that was distributed through various social
organizations, including the nation's largest Muslim organization
Nadhlatul Ulama (NU). Singapore has been and still is involved in
peacekeeping in East Timor. It has decent numbers of "Peace
Corps", especially in teaching, training and health care, not
only assigned in Southeast Asia but also Africa and, in the
future, Latin America.
Singapore is also helping the new members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in public management and
English, and in granting fellowships to a good number of ASEAN
students to study at the nation's universities. The political
system is undergoing a gradual opening. Singaporean companies are
becoming more internationalized. Of course, that is in
Singapore's national interest, especially with its aim to become
a high tech society in the near future. But these developments
are also helpful to the region.
The pace of change may still be too slow, but the trend is
obvious and there is no way back. The country still feels
severely constrained in its strategic environment, but if it
develops according to a certain vision and trend, where an
increase of good neighborliness will be one important part, that
will help it overcome, or at least alleviate, the constraints
still existing in the region.
With this background in mind, it is useful to discuss the
second volume of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew's memoirs, From
Third World To First, The Singapore Story 1965-2000.
Many who have read both volumes of his memoirs say the second
is more direct and easier to follow. It is, by all accounts, a
monumental work. The first part explains about Singapore's
nation-building efforts and the "social engineering" undertaken
by Lee and his able colleagues in the government and the People's
Action Party (PAP).
The second part discusses Singapore's foreign relations
through Lee's eyes. Especially interesting are his observations
about other leaders in the region and the world; his evaluation
about other countries was gained through experience. The second
part is definitely the most interesting section of the book, and
the reader learns much from Lee's sharp, astute perspective.
The first part is concise to the point of being too short. In
fact, it should have more elaboration, because although Singapore
as a city-state is special and in many ways is an exception to
the rule in nation-building processes, it is the most successful
of "socially engineered" countries. It has been achieved due to a
number of factors; among the most important is that it has the
most uncorruptable and smartest leadership.
Another factor is the small city-state nature of the country
that is easier to govern. The regional environment, which could
be volatile and pose a constraint to Singapore, also provides a
strong reminder to unify the country. Last but not least is luck.
Every time there has been a crisis the leadership and the nation
are saved. Ultimately, however, all these factors are dependent
on leadership.
There will be challenges ahead, but a strong basis has been
laid down by Lee's generation of leaders. The future might be
different, and questions could be raised whether the same
strategies and social engineering could be repeated for the
future. As Lee admits in his memoirs, they surely have to be
changed to be successful in the future.
It also could be questioned whether the same toughness against
dissent and the opposition could be applied all the time, because
this would prevent the emergence of a responsible opposition,
which is necessary to keep Singapore viable in the longer term.
Of course, the economic successes have been a very important
factor for the PAP to win again and again. However, after a
certain level of income is reached, the populace will demand a
better quality of life, including greater participation and more
freedom of expression.
When it comes to ties with Indonesia, Lee enjoyed superb
relations with Soeharto, because they shared the same strategy of
development: put economic development first, with political
stability as a prerequisite. Besides that, other matters are
secondary. Soeharto also was able to keep Indonesia together and
establish a new relationship with Singapore, namely as countries
that were equal and not subordinate to each other.
Lee decided to leave the Malayan Federation because of the
principle of equality based on a merit system. It is
understandable that he would not want to be subdued by Indonesia
in the same mold as Malaysia tried to do earlier. If there is a
sacred principle in Lee's mind, it is that nothing will be taken
for granted and that he would not allow Singapore to be bullied
by anybody else.
Since Soeharto bent over backwards not to assert Indonesia's
will on its neighbors, he was regarded by Lee as a real friend
and a regional leader at the same time. It may be the reason Lee
tolerated for too long the abuses of Soeharto, especially his
problems with corruption, cronyism and nepotism. He was reluctant
to advise Soeharto after he himself had taken a backseat in
government; by then the extent of the crisis was too deep and
Soeharto could not be saved.
Lee might be wrong to assume that the military alone is the
only instrument capable of keeping Indonesia unified. He has yet
to adjust to changes in the role of the military in Indonesia. Of
course, he was completely right about Habibie, who was nothing
more than a stooge of Soeharto politically; Soeharto's mistake
was to have too much trust in the man, who later double-crossed
him.
Lee did his part when Habibie was still the favorite of
Soeharto by keeping good relations with him. However, this
relationship did not work in the end. Part of the problem was
Habibie's personality -- the fact that he was clueless about
politics -- and partly due to his immediate surroundings
consisting of some members of the Association of Indonesian
Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) who were anti-Chinese and took
Singapore for granted. During the Habibie period, Singapore was
not able to do much for Indonesia.
Singapore's Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, headed
by S.R. Nathan, now president of Singapore, took the initiative
to establish broad based relations with other leaders who were
then in the opposition. This was a welcome initiative, because it
was obvious that despite his all-out efforts Habibie could not
survive the transition period.
Abdurrahman is another personality and leader. He is an open-
minded Muslim scholar, very impressive in his vision of reaching
out to minorities and to being inclusive. He is a democrat,
modernist and a Muslim leader and seems to be able to heal the
nation's divisions.
But, alas, the verdict is still out on him. His capability to
manage and keep the nation united is still being tested, not the
least because of his capriciousness in making policies. In
addition, there is a lack of organization to implement his vision
and programs. He also expected too much from Singapore, while
failing to understand Singapore's bottom line.
Thus, once in a while it is inevitable that relations are
rocky under his leadership. However, it is much better than the
situation under Habibie, because Abdurrahman at least has a
vision that gives hope for the relationship.
For the time being Singapore has to be patient with Indonesia,
and reach out much more than before to all sectors of the elite.
Singapore has to try to do more to assist Indonesia, because in
the end a stable and wealthy Indonesia is also in Singapore's
interest.
In fact, in the eyes of the Indonesian elite, Singapore has
never been more respected than today because of its achievements.
It is a respect that is more than what Singaporeans could expect.
Singapore must not be timid in dealing with Indonesia; it should
not be afraid to criticize and express its opinion about
Indonesia. But by the same token, Singapore also must not be
timid about helping its neighbor.
The author is a member of the Board of Directors,
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.