Leaders abuse religion for gain
Leaders abuse religion for gain
By Hery Haryanto Azumi
JAKARTA (JP): Islamic movements in Indonesia's era of
transition are marked by their declining sociocultural roles and
an increase in their political orientation. The euphoria of
reform has seduced them to compete for political power by
exploiting their religious base. When power is within their
reach, they inevitably use religious legitimacy either to support
or oppose those in power.
This has been the phenomenon of the past three years. To begin
with, the period of former president B.J. Habibie was considered
a representative of modernist Muslims, as founder and chairman of
the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI).
Support for Habibie mainly came from modernist Muslims who
enjoyed closeness with the former New Order regime, especially in
the 1990s when many of their cadres came to office as ministers
and legislators.
Consequently, when Habibie was threatened with being ousted
due to his close ties with former president Soeharto, mass
mobilization took place. Islamic symbols were used and Islamic
organizations stated that Habibie was a representative of
Muslims, and therefore had to be defended from his rivals'
political attacks.
Students who wanted him to resign were considered anti-
Islamic, communists and Christians because of their apparent
headquarters at the East Jakarta campus of the Indonesian
Christian University and the Central Jakarta campus of the
Catholic Atmajaya University, despite the fact that many students
were Islamic activists affiliated to other movements.
In spite of Habibie's support from "modernists Muslims",
traditionalist Muslims, best represented by the largest Muslim
organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), formerly chaired by President
Abdurrahman Wahid, did not render their support to Habibie.
NU endeavored to develop a more inclusive cultural paradigm
oriented to empower the grass roots. However, the ascension of
Abdurrahman to the presidency also resulted in a similar
phenomenon.
The continuous attacks from his political rivals have
triggered a unique defense mechanism from his followers. The
first memorandum of censure from the legislature invited protests
from Muslims in villages, the seat of the President's support.
They flooded Jakarta to prevent another censure which could lead
to impeachment.
What was interesting, however, was the proposal of
distinguished ulemas that an Islamic legal opinion should be
issued on the rebellion or dissidence (bughat), for those
considered trying to topple him. In their view, Abdurrahman, or
Gus Dur, was democratically elected and had not violated the
Constitution, so no measures should be permitted which could lead
to his impeachment.
As far as politics is concerned, it is clear that Islamic
movements tend to use their religious legitimacy to justify
political interests.
What is worrying is the possibility of Islamic movements
becoming trapped in political games, leading to the loss of their
social and cultural roles. Conflict among respective followers
will only result in battles among Muslims themselves. Abundant
support for the respective movements due to religious affiliation
only makes Islam a tool for political triumph.
This factional conflict spells disaster for cultural
discourse. All resources will be exhausted for political
objectives. Empowerment of the grass roots will also be
neglected; this includes inter-group dialog that allows mutual
acceptance of different cultures.
NU could, for example, enrich the modernist Muhammadiyah with
the cultural touch that it lacks. In turn, NU could also borrow
technical and practical advantages from Muhammadiyah.
Political parties with links both to NU and Muhammadiyah,
mainly the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National
Mandate Party (PAN), should play their political games without
involving these two large organizations, which could be
destroyed.
The Islamic movements should also restrain themselves from
intervening in politics. They should focus on their struggle for
the benefit of oppressed people, not for factional gains. Wasn't
Islam born to free the oppressed?
The writer is a student at the State Institute for Islamic
Studies Jakarta and a volunteer at the International Republican
Institute Indonesia.