'Krumbach Declaration': A stab in the back

'Krumbach Declaration': A stab in the back

By Dino Patti Djalal

JAKARTA (JP): A forum of reconciliation among conflicting East
Timorese groups is facing a gloomy future after the failure of
their recent dialog in Krumbach, Austria.

The Indonesian East Timorese who took part in the fourth All
Inclusive Intra East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD) held in Krumbach
on Oct. 31 until Nov. 3 returned to Jakarta recently with
despondent faces.

The AIETD 1998, as Ambassador at Large Lopes Da Cruz bluntly
put it, had "failed", a fact well reflected in the inability of
the forum to produce a common declaration.

Some quarters have begun to cast doubt about the future of
AIETD, the only United Nations-sponsored forum to gather East
Timorese figures of all shades of opinion, from inside and from
the diaspora.

Da Cruz, during a press conference, blamed the failure of
AIETD 1998 squarely on Jose Ramos Horta, an anti-integration
participant, and some of his associates for having committed
insidious acts which "humiliated Portugal, Indonesia and the UN".

The convening of AIETD this year assumed particular
significance in view of the recent developments in the efforts to
settle the East Timor question. Since June this year, the
Indonesian government has announced its readiness to grant
"special status with wide ranging autonomy" as part and parcel of
a final settlement to the East Timor question.

This new proposal is now being actively discussed by the
foreign ministers and senior officials of Indonesia and Portugal
under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, a process
commonly known as the "tripartite negotiations".

One of the decisions taken by the two ministers in their last
meeting in New York on Aug. 4-5 was to resume the AIETD process.

The basic purpose of AIETD was clear -- to foster a conducive
atmosphere for the benefit of the tripartite negotiations.

It was never meant to be a "parallel negotiating track" or a
substitute to the tripartite talks to discuss the political
status of East Timor.

The primary contribution and relevance of AIETD henceforth
rest on the capacity of the East Timorese figures in that forum
to promote reconciliation and confidence-building.

Actually, there was some cause for optimism prior to AIETD
1998.

Firstly, at AIETD 1997, also held in Krumbach, Horta had begun
to show some moderation. Back then, he had urged the participants
to keep the discussions within the parameters set by the UN and
even attempted bridging divergent views.

Secondly, the participants' acceptance of the UN invitation to
take part in AIETD 1998 was taken to mean that they would honor
the rules of the game as were clearly stated in the letter of
invitation.

Thirdly, AIETD 1997 nearly completed a draft proposal for
establishing a Center for Culture and Development of Timor
Lorosae (CCDTL), and had established groundwork for human
resources development as well as a program for an exchange of
visits between East Timorese inside and in the diaspora
(Portugal, Australia and Macao). All AIETD 1998 needed to do to
maintain the momentum was to tie up last year's loose ends.

From day one of the last meeting, Horta and some of his
associates arrived on the scene with their guns blazing.
According to Indonesian participant Jose Tavares, Horta stated to
the open forum point blank that he no longer cared what the
Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers and the UN had to say
about the AIETD and that he was interested and determined only to
talk politics in the AIETD, never mind the cultural center.

Yet, the pro-integration participants and the East Timorese
group led by Abilio Araujo stood their ground and urged the forum
to respect the terms of reference set by the UN, which had guided
the previous three AIETD meetings.

Horta's insistence on transforming the AIETD discussion into a
political negotiation is in fact incomprehensible in the context
of recent developments. One of the novel elements in the
tripartite negotiations is the agreement to "involve the East
Timorese more closely in the search for a solution".

This would be primarily done by the UN Secretary-General and
his staff who would hold regular consultations with East Timorese
figures of various political opinions, including Horta and his
associates attending the AIETD, to inform them of the
developments in the tripartite talks and to take account of their
views and inputs for the benefit of the negotiations.

This mechanism effectively installs an interactive process
between the tripartite talks and the East Timorese political
groups. Thus, it made no sense to force AIETD 1998 to talk
politics since the various East Timorese political factions
already have a direct channel to the UN Secretary-General and, by
extension, the tripartite process to freely express their
political views.

On day two, Horta produced a "CNRT (Concelho Nacional da
Resistencia Timorense) document" which he insisted should be
stamped by the meeting as the "final declaration" of AIETD 1998.

The document was immediately rejected by the other
participants, for it contained elements which so blatantly
contradicted the position of the pro-integration East Timorese.

"What they essentially wanted us to do was to sign a CNRT
political manifesto. This was wishful thinking. It was as silly
as us asking them to sign the 1975 Balibo Declaration",
Indonesian participant Domingos Policarpo said.

Still, the meeting agreed to work out a revised document which
would reflect a consensus. The participants then conducted
marathon sessions, working throughout the night, and by the
morning of the final day, they managed to produce a consensus
draft "Krumbach Declaration", which was moderately worded but
more substantive than the previous year's declaration.

Then something incredible happened. Unbeknown to the
Indonesian participants, Horta was distributing his "CNRT
document", the one already rejected by the pro-integration
participants, to the journalists outside, labeling it deceptively
as the "Krumbach Declaration 1998", and signed by some of his
pro-independence associates.

The pro-integration participants had known that Horta was
soliciting signatures for his unilateral "declaration", but never
in their wildest imagination thought he would dare go the extra
mile and resort to such dishonorable deception.

The pro-integration participants indeed only found out about
this by chance, when an Indonesian participant who was taking a
break was asked by a wandering journalist about Horta's "Krumbach
Declaration".

By that time, it had become clear to the pro-integration group
that they had been, as Ambassador Da Cruz put it, "betrayed and
stabbed in the back", and that the consensus draft declaration
which they had been laboriously drafted no longer had integrity.
The AIETD 1998 ended, for the first time in four years running,
without a final consensus declaration.

Before departing, the pro-integration issued a statement,
conveyed to the UN Secretary-General, which strongly protested
the cunning ploy of Horta's group. The group of participants led
by Abilio Araujo, who called themselves "The Third Way", also
issued an open statement criticizing Horta's "intolerance and
arrogance" which reflected "the personal ambitions of potential
little tyrants" and regarded his "belligerent gestures"
throughout the meeting as unbecoming of a Nobel Peace Prize
winner.

An equally significant political blow is the fact that the
representatives of East Timor's Bishops Ximenes Belo and Basilio
Nascimento, who attended the AIETD 1998, refused to sign Horta's
"Krumbach Declaration".

There are, in fact, signs of strain within the CNRT on this
issue.

As reported in a Portuguese newspaper, Jose Luis Guterres, who
heads the political committee of the CNRT, criticized Horta for
imposing "his personal opinion" on a CNRT decision, while placing
"his personal wish ahead of the majority of the (CNRT) council
members".

Another "CNRT Council" member, Joao Carrascalao, also lamented
the "absence of respect and discipline" on the part of Horta.
Reliable sources have also said that Xanana Gusmao, the nominal
head of CNRT, was disappointed with the way AIETD 1998 turned
out.

Whatever their motives were, it is clear that what Horta and
some of his associates did seriously damage the building blocks
of reconciliation and confidence-building arduously nurtured by
the UN Secretary-General in the past four years through the AIETD
process.

This is unfortunate because AIETD 1998 was a valuable chance
to show that the East Timorese, despite their political
differences, could work together on matters of common interests.
At this critical time, this would have been a very positive
message to the tripartite process, to the international
community, but most importantly to the people of East Timor who
are closely watching this process.

While Horta's misdeed battered reconciliation and confidence
in AIETD, he should not be allowed to ruin the larger prospects
for peace. All parties must remain hopeful that at a time when
the long-awaited compromise solution is now in sight, when
Indonesia-Portugal relations are improving, when pro-integration
East Timorese are now willing to support autonomy, when
expectations on the ground are running high, and when the
international community is welcoming the recent positive
developments, Horta and his associates would be persuaded to
place the interests of peace and reconciliation for East Timor
above factional and personal interests.

Horta's group must not do to the tripartite negotiations what
they did to the AIETD 1998 process.

Long, festering conflicts in the Southern Philippines, in
Palestine and most recently in Northern Ireland were resolved
only through a hard-won process of moderation, mutual
accommodation and compromise. In the final analysis, that is also
how the conflict in East Timor will be settled once and for all.

The writer is attached to the Directorate General for
Political Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views
expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the
government.

Window A: Some quarters have begun to cast doubt about the future
of AIETD, the only United Nations-sponsored forum to gather East
Timorese figures of all shades of opinion, from inside and from
the diaspora.

Window B: The primary contribution and relevance of AIETD
henceforth rest on the capacity of the East Timorese figures in
that forum to promote reconciliation and confidence-building.