'Krumbach Declaration': A stab in the back

By Dino Patti Djalal

JAKARTA (JP): A forum of reconciliation among conflicting East Timorese groups is facing a gloomy future after the failure of their recent dialog in Krumbach, Austria.

The Indonesian East Timorese who took part in the fourth All Inclusive Intra East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD) held in Krumbach on Oct. 31 until Nov. 3 returned to Jakarta recently with despondent faces.

The AIETD 1998, as Ambassador at Large Lopes Da Cruz bluntly put it, had "failed", a fact well reflected in the inability of the forum to produce a common declaration.

Some quarters have begun to cast doubt about the future of AIETD, the only United Nations-sponsored forum to gather East Timorese figures of all shades of opinion, from inside and from the diaspora.

Da Cruz, during a press conference, blamed the failure of AIETD 1998 squarely on Jose Ramos Horta, an anti-integration participant, and some of his associates for having committed insidious acts which "humiliated Portugal, Indonesia and the UN".

The convening of AIETD this year assumed particular significance in view of the recent developments in the efforts to settle the East Timor question. Since June this year, the Indonesian government has announced its readiness to grant "special status with wide ranging autonomy" as part and parcel of a final settlement to the East Timor question.

This new proposal is now being actively discussed by the foreign ministers and senior officials of Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, a process commonly known as the "tripartite negotiations".

One of the decisions taken by the two ministers in their last meeting in New York on Aug. 4-5 was to resume the AIETD process.

The basic purpose of AIETD was clear -- to foster a conducive atmosphere for the benefit of the tripartite negotiations.

It was never meant to be a "parallel negotiating track" or a substitute to the tripartite talks to discuss the political status of East Timor.

The primary contribution and relevance of AIETD henceforth rest on the capacity of the East Timorese figures in that forum to promote reconciliation and confidence-building.

Actually, there was some cause for optimism prior to AIETD 1998.

Firstly, at AIETD 1997, also held in Krumbach, Horta had begun to show some moderation. Back then, he had urged the participants to keep the discussions within the parameters set by the UN and even attempted bridging divergent views.

Secondly, the participants' acceptance of the UN invitation to take part in AIETD 1998 was taken to mean that they would honor the rules of the game as were clearly stated in the letter of invitation.

Thirdly, AIETD 1997 nearly completed a draft proposal for establishing a Center for Culture and Development of Timor Lorosae (CCDTL), and had established groundwork for human resources development as well as a program for an exchange of visits between East Timorese inside and in the diaspora (Portugal, Australia and Macao). All AIETD 1998 needed to do to maintain the momentum was to tie up last year's loose ends.

From day one of the last meeting, Horta and some of his associates arrived on the scene with their guns blazing. According to Indonesian participant Jose Tavares, Horta stated to the open forum point blank that he no longer cared what the Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers and the UN had to say about the AIETD and that he was interested and determined only to talk politics in the AIETD, never mind the cultural center.

Yet, the pro-integration participants and the East Timorese group led by Abilio Araujo stood their ground and urged the forum to respect the terms of reference set by the UN, which had guided the previous three AIETD meetings.

Horta's insistence on transforming the AIETD discussion into a political negotiation is in fact incomprehensible in the context of recent developments. One of the novel elements in the tripartite negotiations is the agreement to "involve the East Timorese more closely in the search for a solution".

This would be primarily done by the UN Secretary-General and his staff who would hold regular consultations with East Timorese figures of various political opinions, including Horta and his associates attending the AIETD, to inform them of the developments in the tripartite talks and to take account of their views and inputs for the benefit of the negotiations.

This mechanism effectively installs an interactive process between the tripartite talks and the East Timorese political groups. Thus, it made no sense to force AIETD 1998 to talk politics since the various East Timorese political factions already have a direct channel to the UN Secretary-General and, by extension, the tripartite process to freely express their political views.

On day two, Horta produced a "CNRT (Concelho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense) document" which he insisted should be stamped by the meeting as the "final declaration" of AIETD 1998.

The document was immediately rejected by the other participants, for it contained elements which so blatantly contradicted the position of the pro-integration East Timorese.

"What they essentially wanted us to do was to sign a CNRT political manifesto. This was wishful thinking. It was as silly as us asking them to sign the 1975 Balibo Declaration", Indonesian participant Domingos Policarpo said.

Still, the meeting agreed to work out a revised document which would reflect a consensus. The participants then conducted marathon sessions, working throughout the night, and by the morning of the final day, they managed to produce a consensus draft "Krumbach Declaration", which was moderately worded but more substantive than the previous year's declaration.

Then something incredible happened. Unbeknown to the Indonesian participants, Horta was distributing his "CNRT document", the one already rejected by the pro-integration participants, to the journalists outside, labeling it deceptively as the "Krumbach Declaration 1998", and signed by some of his pro-independence associates.

The pro-integration participants had known that Horta was soliciting signatures for his unilateral "declaration", but never in their wildest imagination thought he would dare go the extra mile and resort to such dishonorable deception.

The pro-integration participants indeed only found out about this by chance, when an Indonesian participant who was taking a break was asked by a wandering journalist about Horta's "Krumbach Declaration".

By that time, it had become clear to the pro-integration group that they had been, as Ambassador Da Cruz put it, "betrayed and stabbed in the back", and that the consensus draft declaration which they had been laboriously drafted no longer had integrity. The AIETD 1998 ended, for the first time in four years running, without a final consensus declaration.

Before departing, the pro-integration issued a statement, conveyed to the UN Secretary-General, which strongly protested the cunning ploy of Horta's group. The group of participants led by Abilio Araujo, who called themselves "The Third Way", also issued an open statement criticizing Horta's "intolerance and arrogance" which reflected "the personal ambitions of potential little tyrants" and regarded his "belligerent gestures" throughout the meeting as unbecoming of a Nobel Peace Prize winner.

An equally significant political blow is the fact that the representatives of East Timor's Bishops Ximenes Belo and Basilio Nascimento, who attended the AIETD 1998, refused to sign Horta's "Krumbach Declaration".

There are, in fact, signs of strain within the CNRT on this issue.

As reported in a Portuguese newspaper, Jose Luis Guterres, who heads the political committee of the CNRT, criticized Horta for imposing "his personal opinion" on a CNRT decision, while placing "his personal wish ahead of the majority of the (CNRT) council members".

Another "CNRT Council" member, Joao Carrascalao, also lamented the "absence of respect and discipline" on the part of Horta. Reliable sources have also said that Xanana Gusmao, the nominal head of CNRT, was disappointed with the way AIETD 1998 turned out.

Whatever their motives were, it is clear that what Horta and some of his associates did seriously damage the building blocks of reconciliation and confidence-building arduously nurtured by the UN Secretary-General in the past four years through the AIETD process.

This is unfortunate because AIETD 1998 was a valuable chance to show that the East Timorese, despite their political differences, could work together on matters of common interests. At this critical time, this would have been a very positive message to the tripartite process, to the international community, but most importantly to the people of East Timor who are closely watching this process.

While Horta's misdeed battered reconciliation and confidence in AIETD, he should not be allowed to ruin the larger prospects for peace. All parties must remain hopeful that at a time when the long-awaited compromise solution is now in sight, when Indonesia-Portugal relations are improving, when pro-integration East Timorese are now willing to support autonomy, when expectations on the ground are running high, and when the international community is welcoming the recent positive developments, Horta and his associates would be persuaded to place the interests of peace and reconciliation for East Timor above factional and personal interests.

Horta's group must not do to the tripartite negotiations what they did to the AIETD 1998 process.

Long, festering conflicts in the Southern Philippines, in Palestine and most recently in Northern Ireland were resolved only through a hard-won process of moderation, mutual accommodation and compromise. In the final analysis, that is also how the conflict in East Timor will be settled once and for all.

The writer is attached to the Directorate General for Political Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the government.

Window A: Some quarters have begun to cast doubt about the future of AIETD, the only United Nations-sponsored forum to gather East Timorese figures of all shades of opinion, from inside and from the diaspora.

Window B: The primary contribution and relevance of AIETD henceforth rest on the capacity of the East Timorese figures in that forum to promote reconciliation and confidence-building.