Korpri: Government body or state apparatus?

By Ignas Kleden

JAKARTA (JP): The debate on the role of the Indonesian bureaucracy was enlivened at a seminar at the department of political and area studies of the National Institute of Sciences (LIPI) on Feb. 26. The issue of whether or not the monoloyalty of civil servants would be maintained or should be reviewed was raised.

There are many important questions pertaining to the rights and obligations of Indonesian civil servants (Korpri), but first the theoretical status of bureaucracy should be examined. The question arises: Is bureaucracy basically a government body or a state apparatus? The Indonesian language has a very pertinent word for it: alat negara, which literally means state apparatus. The term is mostly used to refer to the role and function of the army. However, one can ask with good reason whether the term may be used to designate Indonesian bureaucracy as well.

The existence of the army for example is justified because the state is allowed to monopolize the use of violence in order to guarantee the security of the people and society. In the same way, the state has bureaucracy at its disposal in order to provide citizens with the service they deserve. For the service it renders, bureaucracy is entitled to use the money the people pay through tax.

Modern bureaucracy is differentiated from traditional patrimonialism in that it does not belong to the realm of personal property of the powerholders (the king). It becomes autonomous, impersonal and is subject to procedural rationality. In traditional patrimonialism the servants are subject to the will and even to the whim and favor of the king. The success or failure of bureaucracy, however, depends not on its goal-oriented rationality but rather on its instrumental rationality.

As a machine it is detached from the changing political goals as well as volatile political situations, and bases its achievement on other criteria. This includes the efficiency and effectiveness of its personnel, the correctness of its procedures, and its distance from personal and power relations. It justifies its existence not by outside criteria but by the criteria from within like a machine.

Bureaucracy could be compared with the engine of a car. The government is the driver. The driver can not only take the car where he wants to go, but he has to adjust himself first to the internal mechanism and the conditions of the engine. The engine is to serve the running. It is not to serve the driver. The driver can only benefit from the engine as long as he makes it serve the running of the car.

In this way, members of the bureaucracy do not belong to a political party but rather to the realm of state power. Their political engagement cannot be carried out on behalf of belonging to the bureaucracy but rather on their personal behalf. Given the above assumption, there are two important consequences for Indonesian civil servants.

First, there should be enough freedom of choice for the members of bureaucracy to give their political loyalty to the political party they want to support. In this case monoloyalty, which might have been an appropriate measure at the beginning to stabilize the government, should be treated as an emergency action which is only transitional and provisional in nature. It is now high time to ask whether or not emergency action should and could be terminated in order for Indonesian bureaucracy to return to its normal situation, namely back to its status as a state apparatus and not as a government body in the first place.

Second, the question arises, whether or not the members of other political parties can work and have a place within the Indonesian bureaucracy. Presently, only those who declare themselves loyal to the dominant ruling party Golkar, are allowed to be dedicated civil servants. This is what is happening in line with the constitution, though it is difficult to say to what extent.

Since bureaucracy is more a state apparatus than a government body, its commitment should be directed to all existing political parties, by means of rendering the same service to those who are looking for it. In modern states, bureaucracy differentiates itself categorically from political parties and even competes with political parties.

In Japan for example, it is said that bureaucrats are supposed to be better qualified than politicians. This is partly due to the training they receive during their service. They are expected to be ready and willing to serve in different positions in different places (in order to have an overview of their job) before they are considered capable enough to assume a leading position.

The high qualifications of Japanese bureaucrats are discernible in the fact that for a very long time (now it is changing) more than 50 percent of them were recruited from the top university in the country, the University of Tokyo.

The fact that the Japanese bureaucrats were recruited from the top university is indicative of the importance the Japanese give to the qualifications of the bureaucrats. But the question most often asked in Japan is why the bureaucrats have to be that qualified. The answer is simple. Because political parties and the government come and go but the bureaucracy remains.

The writer is a sociologist based in Jakarta.