Koizumi politics adverse to democracy

Etsushi Tanifuji, The Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo

The political play presented by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's theatrical company went off like clockwork.

When his postal privatization bills were rejected in the Upper House, Koizumi immediately dissolved the lower chamber and called a snap election, which he presented to voters as a referendum on postal privatization.

He effectively cast his candidates in roles where they could convince voters that postal privatization would serve the common good. His strategy led to a sweeping victory. It was indeed splendid.

Selling political parties, candidates and policies like products based on systematized plans and strategies is called political marketing. The idea calls for political strategists to make the most of the media to secure public support and to present complicated political problems in as simplified a form as possible. For that, politicians need to clearly distinguish themselves from their opponents. By offering sharply contrasting views, they get noticed.

Political marketing encourages politicians who want to win public support to label themselves as "good guys" and lump opposing forces together as "bad guys." It also recommends that people who are regarded as symbols of a certain policy to be placed in key posts.

Koizumi staged a one-issue election and stressed the difference between those in favor of postal privatization and those against.

Supporters of postal privatization became "reformers" and "good guys" while opponents were labeled the "old guard" and "undesirables." He also pitted "assassins" to run against candidates who opposed postal privatization.

The Sept. 11 election was a classic example of political marketing. The media seized upon this simplified picture and amplified the political drama.

Meanwhile, opposition parties were helpless in the presence of the Liberal Democratic Party and before they knew it, the election was over.

In Europe, election campaigns can last four to five weeks. But in Japan they are waged for a scant 12 days. With such a short time frame, public opinion once formulated is difficult to change. Even the media was unable to counter Koizumi's political strategy.

The race ended in a triumph for Koizumi politics that relied heavily on the media, in particular television.

The first prime minister in Japan to recognize the role the media could play in an election campaign was Eisaku Sato, who governed from 1964 to 1972. Subsequent administrations of Kakuei Tanaka, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Morihiro Hosokawa also manipulated the media.

Along the way, political campaigns gradually became more sophisticated. Thus, Koizumi's use of the media represents nothing more than an extension of this trend.

In fact, though, no one has so consciously manipulated the media as Koizumi. For him, it was an essential tool, given his reliance on "public opinion" in the absence of a firm support base within the LDP.

There was another aspect in this election that underwent a drastic change-the emergence of "private"agendas.

Political campaigns naturally reflect a politician's personal needs and opinions. But in a democracy, politicians need to explain why a certain project will benefit the public. That is the only way to reach a consensus.

I am not saying the prime minister's political style is undemocratic. However, there is no evidence to show that he made a serious effort to transform his "private" agenda -postal reform-into a "public" one.

Structural reform, which started out as the prime minister's "private" pet project, had somehow turned into a "desirable" public goal. But Koizumi stopped short of offering a proper explanation. On top of that, those who opposed his policy were cast as "undesirables."

As the prime minister's "private" thoughts came to the fore, "party" politics regressed. As a result, the nature of politics changed from one in which parties vie for power to one that questions the propriety of Koizumi politics.

However, the prime minister failed to convince all LDP members to accept postal privatization as the party's "public" goal.

That is why he ousted the so-called "forces of resistance" within the LDP and called the election to realize his "private" project.

But as the election took on the appearance of a theatrical performance and postal privatization alone came to attract attention, it overshadowed many important political problems that still need to be addressed.

How many voters who took part in the election process have gained a new political outlook as a result?

How satisfied are they with the election outcome?

Although theatrical politics advances politics all at once and produces immediate results, it could hinder profound understanding of the political scene and undermine calm judgment because it dampens active debate.

The writer is a Waseda University professor of political science.