'Knowledge revolution' transforms the world

'Knowledge revolution' transforms the world

By Hilman Adil

JAKARTA (JP): In foreign policy, the primary task of the
policymaker is to articulate the country's external interests and
order them in some scheme of relative importance.

They are, among others, first, self-preservation of physical
integrity or unity. Second, independence or the relative freedom
from interference in what a country regards as its internal
affairs.

These are two external interests that Indonesian foreign
policy will increasingly have to deal with in the near future.

The Indonesian sovereign state is facing increasing
challenges. First, can the present political system withstand
challenges to democratic government and the rule of law?

Second, can any social consensus survive in the face of ethnic
or communal divisions, like in Aceh, Irian Jaya and Maluku?

Third, the growing social and economic disparities caused by
the monetary crisis and rising violence as a result of the
breakdown of law.

Fourth, concerns about the future definition of a national
identity posed by the threat of disintegration.

These concerns have led to uncertainty about the direction
which Indonesia will be taking, and doubts whether the
institutions, processes, concepts and myths that sustained the
infant Republic and nation-building efforts in the formative
years are still relevant.

The evolving strategic and operational agenda, in light of the
diminishing conventional external threat and the changed
structure of international politics, enabling a "unipolar" world
and the "knowledge revolution" to emerge, has rendered the
traditional security concept (ketahanan nasional) obsolete.

Indonesian foreign policy-making has changed radically in the
past few years. There was East Timor, the Asian economic crisis
of 1997 to 1999 and the economic uncertainties of globalization,
to name but a few.

But there is also a more subtle, and much less understood
phenomenon -- a profound normative shift in the relations between
nation-states. This essentially means a change in the previous
norm of "expected and required" behavior at a particular time in
the society of states.

These international norms did not change much for 300 years
after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). Exceptions were the
addition of an antislavery norm in the 19th century and an anti-
imperial and colonial norm since the early 20th century .

The change in international norms has increased rapidly,
especially in the past decade.

Instances in which new or revised norms have become evident
include the rights of national governments in relation to
minority groups, especially human rights, although the latter is
not new.

For example, the United States' Declaration of Independence
briefly defines human rights as "life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness". It is the changed structure of international politics
that enabled the concept to be treated as a norm which could be
attributed to a "unipolar" world with the U.S. as paramount
power.

This does not necessarily mean that this norm can only be
enforced against weak states. In a military sense this might be
true, but in globalization pressures of international consensus
can also be effectively applied to major powers still dependent
on international financial institutions.

Indonesia's future policies would have to be in the context of
U.S. military superiority and its economic, cultural and
diplomatic dominance (the latter two termed "soft power").

If Vice President Al Gore becomes president that policy line
will be continued, although most probably with more pressure for
the observance of environmental norms and human rights.

If Governor George W. Bush wins the race, changes will
probably be marginal. But as a member of the Republican Party it
would be probably be easier for him than for Al Gore to get some
policies through Congress, especially if both the Senate and the
House of Representatives have a Republican majority.

The present global structure will most likely be determined by
the U.S. as the "unipolar" power, at least for the next three or
four decades. This also means that Western influence on
international norms will almost certainly continue to be an
irritant to many non-Western countries, including Indonesia.

Another contentious issue which might affect interstate
relations is government action violating international norms.
These new norms often deal with matters that used to be defined
"essentially within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state".

"The knowledge revolution" based on new technologies is
potentially far more transformatory in its long-term effects than
the "unipolar" phenomena. All its consequences are unpredictable,
but the least so is its ability to redistribute power, both
domestically and internationally.

That redistribution of power is currently most apparent in
Western democracies. The world of Internet and e-mail is more
likely to change society and the distribution of power within it,
empowering dissidents, especially ethnic minorities and the
economically disadvantaged.

The "knowledge revolution" has facilitated non-governmental
organizations in challenging prevailing norms, which proved to be
effective in the actions against the World Trade Organization in
Seattle.

The basis of NGOs is not the nation, still less the
government. In fact, it is the individual. NGO's reject the
concept of nations, nationalism, national interests and
especially national sovereignty. The concept assumes that
humanity is one great society, in which its members are citizens
of the "cosmopolis" and are entitled to the same rights,
regardless of the views of respective governments.

Finally, in view of the prolonged serious crisis, the unipolar
world and the "knowledge revolution", we cannot expect a more
assertive foreign policy in the near future.

The writer is a research professor at the National Institute
of Sciences (LIPI) in Jakarta.