Kissinger's secret trip to China
By Harvey Stockwin
HONG KONG (JP): Henry Kissinger is just completing another "secret" visit to Beijing, but it is far from certain that this time around he'll be able to alter the negative drift of Sino- American relations.
As on his original secret foray from Islamabad to Beijing way back in 1971, which preceded President Richard Nixon's ground- breaking trip in 1972, the former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State has done a great job generally avoiding the press. Whether he travels for himself, for the Clinton Administration, or for the new Republican majority in Congress has not been clarified.
However, The Jakarta Post (belatedly) learned that Kissinger not merely attended a discreet conference at the Georgetown University Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Hong Kong last week, but is also currently seeing some top Chinese leaders in Beijing at the invitation of the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
Remarkably Kissinger managed generally to evade the usually diligent Hong Kong press corps -- no mean feat in itself, and something he did not dare risk in 1971.
In fact, Kissinger, who is accompanied by former secretary of state Alexander Haig and other CSIS notables, would probably have been able to return pretty well undetected to Georgetown, without anyone knowing that he had crossed the Pacific, and had once more paid tribute to the Middle Kingdom, were it not for China's New China News Agency (NCNA).
NCNA, or Xinhua, simply could not resist the temptation to tell the world that a leading American, albeit a "friend of China" like Kissinger, had been lectured on the follies and foolishness of the United States.
If NCNA is a reliable guide, Kissinger's trip was hardly worthwhile -- all that the author of the recent massive book on Diplomacy received for his trans-Pacific jet lag was a repetition of the current Chinese Communist Party (CCP) party line, which he could have read in the CSIS library.
Chinese Premier Li Peng used a July 4 meeting with Kissinger to rebuke Washington for strained relations over the recent U.S. visit by the Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui. "Difficulties in Sino-U.S. relations at the moment are entirely the result of the U.S. government's interference in China's internal affairs by using the Taiwan issue," Li said.
It will be recalled that the Clinton Administration tried hard to avoid giving Taiwan President Lee a visa for a private visit to Cornell University, his alma mater, but it was forestalled by nearly unanimous resolutions in both houses of Congress demanding that the visit proceed. At no stage was there any official recognition of President Lee by the Administration. China was informed in advance that the visit did not mean any change in U.S. policy, but Beijing has chosen to ignore that assurance. The current CCP party line is that U.S. policy towards China has changed.
Li Peng reminded Kissinger that "the United States made an open promise that it would maintain only unofficial relations with Taiwan" and that "it was imperative that the U.S. acknowledge it had taken a wrong step."
"Pragmatic measures" were required, Li reportedly continued, "to heal the wound inflicted by Lee's visit". Meanwhile, Li Peng added, "restraint on the Chinese side should not be construed as weakness and a sign that it can be bullied."
All this was a slightly more abrasive version of the same party line, as uttered by Chinese President and CCP secretary- general Jiang Zemin on July 2.
Speaking to German reporters in Beijing, prior to his visit to Germany, Jiang said the deterioration in Sino-American relations was entirely due to American mistakes. "China does not wish to see Sino-American relations go backwards, but it depends on the U.S. to take concrete action," Jiang said.
There is of course no indication at all in the NCNA reporting of the Kissinger visit whether the former secretary of state politely reminded his hosts that U.S. China policy had not changed, that relations with Taiwan were still unofficial, and that the wrong steps currently being taken were, if anything, by China rather than by the U.S.
We do not even know if Kissinger pointed out, diplomatically of course, that it was Beijing which was blowing the Cornell visit of President Lee out of all proportion.
There are two other issues currently threatening Sino-American relations.
One relates to the issue of security in South Asia. U.S. intelligence believes it has evidence that Beijing is selling missiles to Pakistan (which could be used to threaten India) in contravention of previous Chinese commitments. If this is proven, the law requires that the U.S. impose sanctions on China.
The Clinton Administration says the evidence of the missile sales is not yet water-tight, and therefore takes no action. The suspicion is strong that the U.S. government's stance is more closely related to preventing further deterioration in Sino- American relations than in carefully assessing the evidence.
The other issue relates to a highly emotive topic -- whether or not China respects all holders of American passports, even if they are Chinese human rights activists, and whether or not China abides by its international agreements, such as the Sino- American Consular Access Agreement.
So far, in relation to the Chinese detention of Harry Wu, the answer is no on both counts.
Despite his valid U.S. passport and China visa, Wu has been detained since June 19th.
The suspicion grows that China is once again acting in the belief that "once a Chinese, always a Chinese," and that it retains jurisdiction no matter what passport a Chinese holds. This would explain why China has not yet informed the U.S. of Wu's whereabouts, as provided by the access agreement, and why Chinese officials are stressing that Wu broke Chinese laws on previous visits.
Instead, China again blames the U.S., this time for breaking the consular agreement -- as an American diplomat tries to make a connection with Wu which China refuses to facilitate, as it is legally obliged to do.
It remains doubtful whether Kissinger is capable of telling the Chinese that the Wu episode alone contains the emotional and political capability of blowing Sino-Americans relations right back to the hostile state in which they languished before he first made that Islamabad-Beijing trip.
On the one hand, Kissinger, like Nixon, has grown protective of this phase of the Sino-American relationship, which he helped to create. Unlike Nixon, he has refrained from blunt counter- punching when confronted with Li Peng articulating a CCP hard line.
On the other hand, immersed in realpolitik and the balances of power, Kissinger has never been comfortable with the moral or human rights dimensions of U.S. policy, which the Wu case increasingly and pointedly symbolizes. (Kissinger found a kindred spirit in former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and is probably telling himself that Zhou would never have painted himself, like Li and Jiang have now done, into a "we are right, you are wrong" corner).
So whether Kissinger has used his Beijing visit to remind his Chinese interlocutors of their wrong steps and lack of pragmatism vis-a-vis the U.S. is doubtful. Needless to say, NCNA has not reported on Kissinger's views, except to quote him as uttering the Chinese party line, saying that "the principles of the three Sino-American joint communiques should be honored."
That's what happens when you devote much ingenuity to avoiding those journalists who can, unlike their NCNA colleagues, still think freely about what they write.
Maybe when Kissinger is safely back in Washington we will be reading some U.S. press reports based on conversations with "a former high U.S. official."
Right now, there is no evidence that Kissinger's trip has helped sustain the achievement which he seeks to protect.
Instead, Sino-American relations increasingly illustrate a change in China. In 1971, the CCP party line, while outward unyielding, was flexible in substance. In 1995, the evidence mounts that the hard line is the both the CCP form and substance.
Window A: On the one hand, Kissinger, like Nixon, has grown protective of this phase of the Sino-American relationship, which he helped to create.
Window B: Right now, there is no evidence that Kissinger's trip has helped sustain the achievement which he seeks to protect.