KGB: Fragmentation or reconsolidation?

LONDON: Russia's intelligence network appears to have fragmented steadily since the 1991 break-up of the Soviet Union and its primary intelligence service, the KGB. In fact, after several years of confusion and neglect, a process to revive and reintegrate these services is moving ahead swiftly.

The dismissal on June 20, 1996 of Alexander Korzhakov, Russian President Boris Yeltsin's former bodyguard, has greatly reduced inter-service rivalry within the intelligence network.

Furthermore, the appointment of Russian Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov to the post of Deputy Prime Minister responsible for security on Feb. 4, 1997 underlines a systematic move towards reconsolidating the country's divided security and intelligence community. This trend poses a potential challenge for the West and for Russia's fledgling democracy.

There are six primary intelligence, investigation and security bodies in Russia: * Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) The SVR is the direct successor to the KGB's First Chief Directorate, retaining not only its overseas networks and missions, but also its headquarters at Yasenevo, outside Moscow. It is largely unreformed and is responsible for all aspects of foreign intelligence work. Its head, Col. Gen. Vyacheslav Trubnikov, reports directly to the President. * Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) Although primarily a military intelligence agency, the GRU has many interests and assets. These range from agent networks to spy satellites and Spetsnaz reconnaissance commando forces. Its chief, Col. Gen. Fedor Ladygin, reports to the Chief of the General Staff and the President. * Federal Security Service (FSB) The FSB is Russia's main internal security agency, incorporating relevant former KGB departments. Under Director Nikolai Kovalev, it increasingly draws on information and analysis from other internal security bodies. The FSB has a formal strength of 76,000, including commando units from its Anti-terrorism Directorate and central administrative personnel. In practice, it also has large numbers of informers and ancillary staff, as well as the right to co-opt people and resources from other agencies. * Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) While mainly a law-enforcement agency, the MVD also has formidable political and economic investigation branches. Its Main Directorate for Economic Crimes (GUEP) already has an extensive remit, and Kulikov hopes to give it even greater powers. The MVD's investigation arms, under the Main Investigations Directorate (GSU), have subsumed many of their predecessors' political functions. Although Kulikov claims that the MVD no longer prosecutes political investigations, this is widely doubted. * Federal Government Communications and Information Agency (FAPSI) FAPSI protects state communications and monitors those of foreign powers. It is more than equivalent to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), with a nationwide network of information-collection and assessment offices and its own small military forces. Its Director-General, Col. Gen. Alexander Starovoitov, reports directly to the President. * State Protection Service (GSO) Established in July 1996, the GSO was created from the Main Protection Directorate (GUO) and the Presidential Guard Service (SBP), which still exists as a junior body. The GSO's primary task is protecting the president, the Kremlin and other key government targets. Its total strength is probably around 23- 25,000. While most of these are physical protection officers, the total also includes the GSO's investigation and analysis sections. Set up by Korzhakov, these departments operate secretively, and are directly subordinated to the GSO's Chief of Staff, Oleg Borshchev. Its head, Lt. Gen. Yuri Krapivin, reports directly to the President.

The smaller state agencies include: the paramilitary Tax Police (NP) and the State Customs Committee (GTK), which operates in the economic sector; the intelligence arm of the Federal Border Service (FPS), which also works on border security and counter-intelligence; and the nine regional centers of the Ministry for Emergency Situations (MChS) which all have small intelligence teams.

In addition, some regions and republics in the Russian Federation are developing their own semi-independent security services. Tatarstan, for example, has a Committee of State Security (KGB), which allegedly operates outside Russia, although its links with the FSB are strong.

The final components of this vast array of services are the private security units maintained by most of Russia's major companies. The gas corporation Gazprom, for instance, has a 20,000-strong 'Security Service', headed by a former KGB and State Tax Service senior officer. This body includes both large numbers of heavily armed guards, and skilled and well-resourced commercial- and counter-intelligence officers. The petrochemicals firm Lukoil also has a formidable private army (especially at its Novorossiisk terminal), while Avtovaz in Tol'yatti subsidizes the regular police force and maintains its own 'Plant Security Force'.

Similarly, the Most financial group allegedly has 2,000 armed security personnel in Moscow alone, as well as 200 investigations officers. Its Director of Security is Filipp Bobkov, a former deputy head of the KGB. This appointment highlights one of the most significant issues: even the private security services are led and staffed by former intelligence officers. There is thus considerable collusion and cooperation between all the agencies.

Ironically, Russia's intelligence and security services appear to be working together far more effectively than at any time since 1991. This does not mean they coordinate their activities in complete harmony: budget battles continue and services compete for profile and prestige. On the operational level, however, cooperation has been improving. Kulikov has made it clear that he will seek even greater inter-service coordination.

In part, this policy reflects the end of the disputes that plagued the security and intelligence community in 1993-1996. Newly established agencies competed for resources and access to the president, while Korzhakov sought to establish control over all the internal security agencies. With his dismissal, the services are now free to cooperate as allies rather than rivals. They have also developed closer ties with the government.

Compared with the internal security agencies, the foreign intelligence services suffered badly after 1991. They paid the price for former foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev's 'doveish' policies and for failing to secure funding. Some 30 SVR missions in Latin America, Africa and South-east Asia were closed. The GRU appears to have suffered fewer cuts. Nevertheless, it became increasingly isolated within the Defense Ministry as Chief of the General Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov's relations with successive Defense Ministers Pavel Grachev and Igor Rodionov worsened.

However, several turning-points occurred in 1996. The appointment of SVR Director Yevgeni Primakov as Russian Foreign Minister in January gave the intelligence services a powerful ally. Similarly, the appointment of Gen. Viktor Samsonov as Chief of the General Staff in November, and the inclusion of former GRU officers within Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's personal staff, also improved its standing.

The intelligence and security agencies have also successfully convinced the leadership of their utility. As a result of the war in Chechnya, and an increasing awareness of Russia's potential economic and fiscal problems, they have gained a new role and sense of purpose.

The intelligence agencies have also been granted a much greater mandate within the economy, and now look increasingly towards technological and economic intelligence. Like other agencies, they actively support Russian economic interests, often by limiting or disrupting foreign economic activity.

Telecommunications have been tapped on behalf of Russian competitors, for example, and Western entrepreneurs subjected to surveillance and harassment. The SVR and FAPSI, in particular, support Russian companies, especially those with close government links.

FAPSI is eager to develop the capability to control Russia's entire telecommunications and computer-communications infrastructure. Since 1995, FAPSI has been insisting that it should license all cryptographic services operating within Russia. This would give it the capability to monitor and even control all encrypted data traffic, including mobile telephone conversations, fax transmissions and even secure bank communications.

FAPSI is also establishing a nationwide structure of Regional Information and Analysis Centers, based in constituent republics, regions and major cities, as well as Departmental Information and Analysis Centers within central and regional ministries. Their wide responsibilities range from monitoring local opinion and politics on Moscow's behalf to providing a local communications- intercept capability for the FSB, the police or other agencies. For the internal security organizations, this new economic focus also includes supporting Russian companies, but is above all directed towards revenue collection.

Potential NATO enlargement and Russia's frustrations at its failure to dominate the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have also affected the services. Intelligence operations are reportedly being revived in countries that are likely to join the Western alliance. In 1997, the Polish and Czech authorities accused the SVR of using 'dirty tricks' and disinformation to try to weaken their bids for NATO membership.

The Baltic states have also all complained of increased Russian espionage activity. The GRU has begun to reactivate networks in former Warsaw Pact countries, as a basis for intelligence and sabotage operations in the event of war. Just as important has been the strengthening of their presence within the CIS. The GRU's station in Tajikistan, for example, is already very substantial, and plays a major role in managing military operations there. According to some reports, the GRU is also developing its assets in the Caucasus.

Anatoly Kulikov's appointment as Deputy Prime Minister responsible for security thus signals an increasing consolidation of, and mandate for, the internal security agencies. The post- 1991 lull in Russian foreign espionage is conclusively over, as intelligence operations supporting Moscow's political and economic interests become increasingly common.

Not only does this concern Moscow's neighbors, but it is also a backwards step for democratization in Russia. The variety of espionage and internal security agencies makes them difficult to bring under any genuine public or parliamentary scrutiny.

Tellingly, six services - FAPSI, FPS, FSB, GSO, MVD and SVR- report directly to the president, while another three - GRU, GTK and NP - report to state officials not responsible to parliament. Although Korzhakov's bid to create a coherent, centralized security and intelligence empire under direct presidential control led to his downfall, his dream is now that much closer to reality.

Window A: The intelligence agencies have also been granted a much greater mandate within the economy, and now look increasingly towards technological and economic intelligence.

Window B: Potential NATO enlargement and Russia's frustrations at its failure to dominate the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have also affected the services.