Keep neo-conservatism out of Northeast Asia

Susumu Saito Director Trilateral Institute Inc. (Sankyoku Keizai Kenkyusho) The Asahi Shimbun Tokyo

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi will celebrate the second anniversary of his Cabinet on April 26. During the two years, Koizumi has continued to blunder on economic policy. Now, his national security policy will likely be detrimental to the long- term national interests of nation. By openly supporting the Anglo-American war of "aggression" on Iraq, Koizumi has surpassed past administrations' stances on national defense since Japan regained independence in 1952.

UN charters basically approve only two kinds of wars: Wars of pure self-defense against aggression and wars sanctioned by the UN Security Council. All others simply fall in the category of aggression, whether they are dubbed preemptive wars, wars for liberation or wars for implanting democracy.

When the Korean War erupted in June 1950, Japan was still under the Allied occupation, so Japan had no chance to express its stance as an independent nation.

As for the Vietnam War, the Japanese government showed only a certain level of understanding by continuing to provide the U.S. with the use of military bases in Japan. But Japan never openly supported the war itself.

For the past five decades, Tokyo has avoided being drawn into military conflicts by way of the U.S. by denying even Japan's right for collective security, taking advantage of the one-sided nature of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

The basic principles Japan "upheld" were not to antagonize any nation militarily and to denounce the use of military power, except those purely for self-defense or those sanctioned by the UN.

In other words, there was a tacit understanding among a majority of Japanese that denouncing wars, reducing hatred against Japan and limiting Japan's military operations to defense against aggression would produce the most effective national security in the long run.

Indeed, Japan's stance seemed to have paid off; antagonism against Japan apparently waned in Asia and the rest of the world.

Japan's hard-earned credit as a peaceful nation, however, evaporated instantly with Koizumi's open support for the war on Iraq without much debate in the Diet.

The Japanese public should be aware that they have no excuse for accusations that their hands are stained with the blood of soldiers and civilians killed in the war on Iraq.

Koizumi's reasoning is that Japan cannot afford to antagonize and alienate the U.S. by opposing the war because Japan cannot defend itself against threats such as North Korea without U.S. help through the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

As a real friend of U.S.Is this really the case? Can't Japan defend itself in the Northeast Asian theater? Are the national interests of Japan always identical with those of the U.S.? Should Japan, as a real friend of the U.S., frankly advise the American public that the current U.S. administration's policy is detrimental to U.S. and mutual interests in the long run?

To be fair to Koizumi, the hypocritical nature of Japan's debate on defense policy among the ruling and opposition parties for the past five decades is actually to blame for Japan's lack of preparedness in dealing with any situation in the Northeast Asian theater. It also allowed Koizumi to cross the threshold of the past Cabinets' stances on national security.

The "threat" from Pyongyang has flared up, particularly in Japan, since a North Korean missile passed over this country in 1998. And the threat has been fanned further by the Bush administration for the past two years.

However, putting the geopolitical balance of Northeast Asia in a historical perspective will shed some light on future security arrangements in this region.

That is, the geopolitical balance among Japan, China and Korea has been uniquely stable since Korea was united back in 676, except for the brief interruption of 1910-1945 when the Korean Peninsula fell under Japanese rule.

It should be noted that no other part of the world has enjoyed such prolonged geopolitical stability. Successive Chinese dynasties, however strong they were, never tried to place Korea under direct rule. The dynasties knew that political costs outweighed the benefits.

This intrinsically stable geopolitical balance began to be swayed as European and American colonial empires started destabilizing China. Consequently, a power vacuum emerged after the Opium War.

The power vacuum in Northeast Asia was about to be filled by the Russian empire, so the Korean Peninsula began to be perceived as a dagger by the Japanese. Otherwise, for many centuries Korea has never been a threat against Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan, Korea and China have operated in their respective historical territories, and there has been no major territorial dispute. The collapse of the Soviet Union has greatly reduced pressure from Moscow on Northeast Asia for the past decade.

But the sole distortion remaining is the division of the Korean Peninsula. It was initially caused by U.S. ignorance of the geopolitical nature of Northeast Asia when World War II ended, and has been set as a result of the Korean War.

Both China and Russia established diplomatic relations with South Korea more than a decade ago. The remaining asymmetry in diplomatic relations is between North Korea on one hand, and South Korea, Japan and the U.S. on the other. This asymmetry constitutes the most basic source of instability in the region.

The U.S. government has been busy playing up the threat of a nuclear North Korea for the past decade. However, the U.S., China and Russia have long been big nuclear players in Northeast Asia.

As some American thinkers defying conventional wisdom suggest, a nuclear Korea, both North and South, and a nuclear Japan might bring back intrinsic geopolitical stability in Northeast Asia because such a military arrangement would neutralize the threats of all players in the region.

A realistic for such a military arrangement could constitute a realistic collateral for a truly independent Korea, and all the four major powers in the region should quietly accept it.

Only then, North and South Koreans themselves could start the reunification process, free of the major powers.

A Korean Peninsula with military threats neutralized against each other would open up the entire Northeast Asia as a unified economic market benefiting all players in the region.

Japan could still take the initiative to establish formal diplomatic relations between North and South Korea and Japan-even if the U.S. opposes. What Japan and both Koreas share in common is that they cannot afford to let the region be another experimental field for the neo-conservatives in the Bush administration.