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July 27 marks watershed in modern Indonesian history

| Source: JP

July 27 marks watershed in modern Indonesian history

Max Lane, Center for Asia Pacific, Social Transformation Studies,
University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia

There is an interesting parallel between the history of East
Timor and of Indonesia in relation to how international public
opinion changed towards the presidency of Gen. Soeharto.

In December 1991 a massacre took place at the Santa Cruz
cemetery which millions of people around the world later watched
on their TV screens. The footage revived active criticism and
campaigning of the New Order regime's occupation of East Timor.
After the original invasion of East Timor in 1975, there had been
several years of intense lobbying and political campaigning by
the East Timorese Diaspora as well as by liberal and democratic
sections of the public in the United States, Europe and
Australia. This was especially the case in Australia.

In Australia, active public campaigning in support of East
Timorese independence virtually collapsed in 1983 after the
Australian Labour Party (ALP) won the government under Prime
Minister Bob Hawke. The ALP's left wing had always been the main
support base for such campaigning. The ALP left collapsed under
the Hawke administration demoralized by Hawke's conservative
policies, including his enthusiastic support for the New Order
regime. "Mr President, your people love you," he told Soeharto at
a state banquet in Jakarta in 1983.

It was the Dili massacre that revived criticism of the New
Order regime's policy on East Timor. But public opinion in
Australia in relation to the New Order's rule in the rest of
Indonesia was largely unaffected. Critical public opinion was
focussed primarily on the Soeharto-Golkar policy on East Timor.

This all changed with July 27, 1996, and the attack on the Jl.
Diponegoro headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).
As with the Dili massacre, TV footage of the incident appeared
again and again on television screens around the world, including
in Australia. Millions of Australians saw bodies being brought
out on stretchers and placed in vans.

They saw the horde of men charge into the PDI office. They
heard the cries and yells of all those involved. Then they read
the reports of the casualties and all the rumors at the time of
how many people were killed.

A vivid impression was left that the New Order regime, made up
of Soeharto, Golkar and the Armed Forces, were willing to use
violence against opposition in Jakarta, including against
opposition by somebody created from within the New Order elite,
such as then PDI chairperson Megawati Soekarnoputri. This
impression virtually ended the legitimacy of the New Order regime
in international public opinion.

In fact, however, there was more to this process of
delegitimizing than just the terrible images of the attack on Jl.
Diponegoro and all the descriptions of the repression.

Coverage of Indonesian politics had already started to
increase before July 27. The struggle between Megawati and
Soeharto was already major news. A strong -- and indeed accurate
-- image had been created that Megawati was refusing to budge
against Soeharto's maneuvers to crush her political career. This
was the first time a figure from the Jakarta political elite was
standing firm against Suharto and thereby creating somebody who
appeared to be a genuine opposition figure.

It was already clear to most people that Megawati was only
interested in defying Soeharto on one issue: Namely her right to
lead the PDI. Her silence on the repression against other
political figures and groups was widely noted. However, her
defiance on the single issue of her own role had clearly turned
her into an important political symbol, both in Indonesia and
internationally.

But because this defiance was based on such a narrow, self-
centered form of resistance, other factors were necessary in
order for public opinion in countries like Australia to change.
The key development widely reported in Australia was the fact
that the PDI offices on Jl. Diponegoro had become a center for
the gathering of a wide range of pro-democracy groups.

Very few people in Australia would have heard of the Majelis
Rakyat Indonesia (MARI), the coalition of democratic groups that
held constant public forums in the PDI offices. But reports did
constantly refer to the gatherings there, the free speech forums.
The message started to get out in Australia that there was a
spectrum of opinion in Indonesia that was opposed to Soeharto and
the New Order.

It was not just Megawati's name that started to be familiar,
but also that of Sri Bintang Pamungkas and labor leader Mochtar
Pakpahan. There had been news reports also of the arrest of
another labor leader, Dita Indah Sari in Surabaya earlier in
July. Later after July 27, when the New Order tried to blame the
riots that took place that day on the Peoples' Democratic Party
(PRD), its chairman's name, Budiman Sujatmiko, also became very
well known in Australia, the United States and Europe.

There was also an increasing number of other Indonesian
critics of Soeharto that gained some profile. These also included
academics such as George Aditjondro and Arief Budiman.

The weeks leading up to July 27 itself and then the aftermath
all showed people in Australia, that there was a significant
range of alternative opinion to that represented by Soeharto, the
Armed Forces and Golkar. This further advanced the decline in the
New Order's international legitimacy.

There was another aspect of the July 27 process that further
strengthened this decline in legitimacy. It also became clear
that the dissatisfaction and defiance of the New Order
represented by the opposition figures and critics was finding
active support among ordinary people, on the streets.

The July arrest of Dita brought to peoples notice that there
were worker protests happening that involved thousands of people.
There had also been TV reportage of the PDI-organized mass march
from the PDI headquarters to Gambir station a few weeks before
July 27 that had been met with a military blockade and resulted
in injuries.

The courage and militancy of the PDI members inside their
headquarters was another potent symbol of this popular sentiment.

The broadcast from July 27 itself also showed demonstrations
and protests taking place. And, of course, the rioting itself
pointed to widespread mass anger.

The emergence of a figure from within the political elite,
Megawati, who persisted in defying Soeharto began the process of
eroding the New Order's legitimacy. However, Megawati's narrow
agenda would have been insufficient for any real sense of
impending change to develop overseas.

July 27 was the beginning of the end of the New Order because
of the other factors that had emerged: A coalition of democratic
forces; a range of new political figures, including youth, labor
leaders and academics; and popular street mobilizations
reflecting the demand for change.

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