July 27 marks watershed in modern Indonesian history
Max Lane, Center for Asia Pacific, Social Transformation Studies, University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia
There is an interesting parallel between the history of East Timor and of Indonesia in relation to how international public opinion changed towards the presidency of Gen. Soeharto.
In December 1991 a massacre took place at the Santa Cruz cemetery which millions of people around the world later watched on their TV screens. The footage revived active criticism and campaigning of the New Order regime's occupation of East Timor. After the original invasion of East Timor in 1975, there had been several years of intense lobbying and political campaigning by the East Timorese Diaspora as well as by liberal and democratic sections of the public in the United States, Europe and Australia. This was especially the case in Australia.
In Australia, active public campaigning in support of East Timorese independence virtually collapsed in 1983 after the Australian Labour Party (ALP) won the government under Prime Minister Bob Hawke. The ALP's left wing had always been the main support base for such campaigning. The ALP left collapsed under the Hawke administration demoralized by Hawke's conservative policies, including his enthusiastic support for the New Order regime. "Mr President, your people love you," he told Soeharto at a state banquet in Jakarta in 1983.
It was the Dili massacre that revived criticism of the New Order regime's policy on East Timor. But public opinion in Australia in relation to the New Order's rule in the rest of Indonesia was largely unaffected. Critical public opinion was focussed primarily on the Soeharto-Golkar policy on East Timor.
This all changed with July 27, 1996, and the attack on the Jl. Diponegoro headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). As with the Dili massacre, TV footage of the incident appeared again and again on television screens around the world, including in Australia. Millions of Australians saw bodies being brought out on stretchers and placed in vans.
They saw the horde of men charge into the PDI office. They heard the cries and yells of all those involved. Then they read the reports of the casualties and all the rumors at the time of how many people were killed.
A vivid impression was left that the New Order regime, made up of Soeharto, Golkar and the Armed Forces, were willing to use violence against opposition in Jakarta, including against opposition by somebody created from within the New Order elite, such as then PDI chairperson Megawati Soekarnoputri. This impression virtually ended the legitimacy of the New Order regime in international public opinion.
In fact, however, there was more to this process of delegitimizing than just the terrible images of the attack on Jl. Diponegoro and all the descriptions of the repression.
Coverage of Indonesian politics had already started to increase before July 27. The struggle between Megawati and Soeharto was already major news. A strong -- and indeed accurate -- image had been created that Megawati was refusing to budge against Soeharto's maneuvers to crush her political career. This was the first time a figure from the Jakarta political elite was standing firm against Suharto and thereby creating somebody who appeared to be a genuine opposition figure.
It was already clear to most people that Megawati was only interested in defying Soeharto on one issue: Namely her right to lead the PDI. Her silence on the repression against other political figures and groups was widely noted. However, her defiance on the single issue of her own role had clearly turned her into an important political symbol, both in Indonesia and internationally.
But because this defiance was based on such a narrow, self- centered form of resistance, other factors were necessary in order for public opinion in countries like Australia to change. The key development widely reported in Australia was the fact that the PDI offices on Jl. Diponegoro had become a center for the gathering of a wide range of pro-democracy groups.
Very few people in Australia would have heard of the Majelis Rakyat Indonesia (MARI), the coalition of democratic groups that held constant public forums in the PDI offices. But reports did constantly refer to the gatherings there, the free speech forums. The message started to get out in Australia that there was a spectrum of opinion in Indonesia that was opposed to Soeharto and the New Order.
It was not just Megawati's name that started to be familiar, but also that of Sri Bintang Pamungkas and labor leader Mochtar Pakpahan. There had been news reports also of the arrest of another labor leader, Dita Indah Sari in Surabaya earlier in July. Later after July 27, when the New Order tried to blame the riots that took place that day on the Peoples' Democratic Party (PRD), its chairman's name, Budiman Sujatmiko, also became very well known in Australia, the United States and Europe.
There was also an increasing number of other Indonesian critics of Soeharto that gained some profile. These also included academics such as George Aditjondro and Arief Budiman.
The weeks leading up to July 27 itself and then the aftermath all showed people in Australia, that there was a significant range of alternative opinion to that represented by Soeharto, the Armed Forces and Golkar. This further advanced the decline in the New Order's international legitimacy.
There was another aspect of the July 27 process that further strengthened this decline in legitimacy. It also became clear that the dissatisfaction and defiance of the New Order represented by the opposition figures and critics was finding active support among ordinary people, on the streets.
The July arrest of Dita brought to peoples notice that there were worker protests happening that involved thousands of people. There had also been TV reportage of the PDI-organized mass march from the PDI headquarters to Gambir station a few weeks before July 27 that had been met with a military blockade and resulted in injuries.
The courage and militancy of the PDI members inside their headquarters was another potent symbol of this popular sentiment.
The broadcast from July 27 itself also showed demonstrations and protests taking place. And, of course, the rioting itself pointed to widespread mass anger.
The emergence of a figure from within the political elite, Megawati, who persisted in defying Soeharto began the process of eroding the New Order's legitimacy. However, Megawati's narrow agenda would have been insufficient for any real sense of impending change to develop overseas.
July 27 was the beginning of the end of the New Order because of the other factors that had emerged: A coalition of democratic forces; a range of new political figures, including youth, labor leaders and academics; and popular street mobilizations reflecting the demand for change.