JP/6/YOMIURI

Weston Konishi

Program Associate Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs Washington.

The Daily Yomiuri Asia News Network Tokyo

These are unusually uneventful times for U.S.-Japan relations. Bilateral ties are on such an even keel that there is hardly a new issue to spark debate across the Pacific. Even the typical problems that aggravated Japan-U.S. ties in the past, such as trade wars and tensions in Okinawa Prefecture, are in a lull for the time being. It is an oddly peaceful moment for a bilateral relationship that the historian Walter LaFeber once characterized as "the clash."

On the whole, the current state of calm is a good thing, and Tokyo and Washington deserve some credit for steering the two nations clear of rocky waters. As U.S. Sen. John Rockefeller, D- W. Va., said in his remarks at a recent public event in Washington, such seeming normality was exactly what the two governments dreamed of at the height of trade wars in the mid- 1980s.

In particular, Japan-U.S. relations since January 2001 have also benefited from strong ties between government officials of both countries and the fact that the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush includes an unprecedented number of Japan hands in senior positions. The camaraderie that exists at various levels of the two governments has gravitated to the top, establishing a genuine rapport between Prime Minister Junichi Koizumi and Bush.

The overwhelmingly positive tone in current relations between Japan and the United States, however, may lead to unrealistic expectations that smooth times will last forever. After all, not all of the calm is due to adept policymaking. The two countries have been fortunate to avoid unforeseen problems such as they faced with the Ehime Maru accident in 2001 or with criminal incidents involving U.S. servicemen in Okinawa Prefecture.

Nevertheless, this is a more ephemeral period than it appears. There are potentially contentious issues that lurk beneath the surface and that may quickly dissolve the good chemistry in bilateral diplomacy. Two important and potentially divisive issues involve the tacit quid pro quo that seems to exist between Koizumi and Bush.

The unwritten agreement is for Bush to support Koizumi's lackluster reforms in exchange for his support for controversial U.S. foreign policies, particularly in the Middle East. The arrangement serves both leaders well by providing Koizumi with a prestigious U.S. endorsement while Bush gains a much-needed voice of support in the international community.

This bargain was clearly seen at the June Group of Eight summit in Kananaskis, Canada, where both leaders had a chance to meet one-on-one. Koizumi told Bush that the Japanese economy bottomed out in May and that his reforms were starting to show signs of results, an assertion that other G-8 leaders apparently found hard to believe. Nevertheless, Bush took Koizumi's words at face value and congratulated Koizumi for making progress in his reform agenda.

According to media reports, Koizumi returned the favor by repeatedly expressing his support for Bush's Middle East policy speech on June 24, in which he called for a change of leadership in the Palestinian Authority. Many of the other G-8 leaders were openly skeptical of the Bush administration's Middle East peace plan, but Koizumi was apparently outspoken in his support for the controversial U.S. proposal to replace Yasser Arafat.

The leaders of the two countries have so far undoubtedly managed to create the appearance of solidarity in Japan-U.S. relations. At the same time, however, they may be fooling themselves by not confronting deeper apprehensions they have toward one another's policies.

On one hand, Washington is increasingly doubtful that Koizumi is doing enough to improve his nation's prolonged economic slump. On the other hand, Tokyo is growing wary of so-called unilateralist U.S. foreign policy.

Just as Bush has played down concerns about the Japanese economy, for instance, his treasury secretary, Paul O'Neil, and other officials in Washington have become increasingly frank in their assessments of Japan.

Koizumi's unwavering support for U.S. foreign policy, including the war on terrorism, may also be at odds with the prevailing mood in Tokyo.

For now, these contradictions are simply overlooked, but they will be harder to ignore if the scenarios that both nations fear most are realized. If Japan's economy continues to decline and is perceived as pulling down the already struggling U.S. economy, Bush will be forced to openly criticize Koizumi's perfunctory reforms.

Likewise, Koizumi may be forced to publicly disagree with Bush's foreign policy agenda, particularly if it leads to further unrest in the Middle East. A preemptive U.S. attack on Iraq, which some believe is imminent, would also put Koizumi in a difficult position.

To be sure, the gentleman's agreement between Koizumi and Bush has successfully kept both the stagnant Japanese economy and unilateralist U.S. foreign policy from becoming bilateral issues.

But much of this success is due to a denial that these issues deeply trouble both leaders. When that is revealed, it will likely spell the end of smooth bilateral ties and the return to the open disputes that plagued relations in the past.