JP/6/PAULO

JP/6/PAULO

Sharp criticism of UNTAET's role in East Timor

Paulo Gorjco
Lusmada University
Portugal
paulogorjao@yahoo.com

After more than two years and six months, the legacy of the
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
is still marred by several structural problems.

First, East Timor became independent while conflicting claims
on land and property ownership remained unresolved. By itself,
this was already a significant underachievement. Yet without
clear land and property rules, foreign investment could not flow
to the territory. This reality was recognized by the UNTAET
administrator himself, Sergio Vieira de Mello.

Second, UNTAET wasted much time in its dealing with the future
of the National Liberation Armed Forces of East Timor (Falintil),
another problem it acknowledged.

Moreover, when UNTAET was compelled to act due to the threat
of mutiny among Falintil's ranks, the integration of its former
members into the new East Timorese Defense Forces (FDTL) was left
to personal loyalties, instead of clear and transparent criteria.

Third, UNTAET was incapable of establishing and maintaining a
functioning justice system. Indeed, it is a miracle that there
were a few convictions for crimes committed during 1999. At the
same time, intra-East Timorese reconciliation did not occur,
while refugees in West Timor returned to the territory at a
snails' pace. The idea of amnesty towards perpetrators of
violence has been always in the air, but without clarity.

Fourth, the "Timorization", i.e. the incorporation of the
local population at all levels of the public administration, only
progressed under pressure from the East Timorese. It was only
later on that the international "experts" working for UNTAET
started to teach local citizens how to do what they were doing.

Fifth, UNTAET left East Timor with a Constitution drafted
according to Fretilin's wishes and with a parliament controlled
entirely by the Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent
East Timor). Again, this was short-sighted.

UNTAET could have chosen to select several East Timorese
representatives from different parties, religious groups, non
government organizations and minority groups. Then, with UNTAET
support, they would draft an inclusive and widely representative
Constitution, which would certainly have more political
legitimacy than the current one.

The interim Assembly elected in August 2001 should not have
been allowed to automatically become the new parliament. Fresh
elections should have been scheduled in the near future.

Various East Timorese also cite the above examples, though
they are also partially responsible for shortcomings.

None of the above problems have been resolved in the past six
months.

Uncertainty continues to face former Falintil members. There
are at least two veterans' associations, which reveal different
loyalties within the East Timorese political system. The justice
system is seriously understaffed and almost paralyzed, while the
established Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation is
taking too long to start functioning.

Moreover, the amnesty law to be approved by the parliament
continues under careful and long study.

There are several explanations for the apparent executive and
legislative paralysis that took place in the last six months. The
lack of a competent bureaucracy is one of them.

Also, in the same way that the National Council did not
suggest or prepare any legislative draft regulation to submit to
the UN Transitional Administrator, a similar process is occurring
with the new parliament vis-a-vis the government.

When the members of the parliament are not absent -- which
many of them repeatedly are without any justification -- they
spend most of their time dealing with minor details which do not
result in any substantive legislative outcome. Indeed, they have
not come forward with any relevant legislation in the last six
months, despite Fretilin's clear majority.

In turn, this fact is related with the third reason why
democratic governance has been so poor thus far. The East
Timorese have no prior democratic experience and the last six
months have been a learning experience in every way. The
presidency, the government, and the parliament are still looking
for the right balance of power among them.

Institution-building is probably the greatest challenge that
East Timor will experience in the forthcoming years. Like
elsewhere, institution-building is always a protracted process,
with many pitfalls in its path.

In the last six months, the East Timorese had a first taste of
how hard the exercise of self-ruling can be. The results have not
been brilliant. For the sake of democratic legitimacy in East
Timor, we can only look forward to see a better performing
political system in the forthcoming months.

The writer is also a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defense
Studies Center.