Sat, 04 Oct 2003

JP/6/LIDDLE

MEGAWATI's PRESIDENCY: A CONTRARIAN VIEW

R. William Liddle Professor of Political Science The Ohio State University Ohio, U.S.A.

President Megawati Soekarnoputri, in office just over two years, has not won universal praise for her leadership skills. The pampered oldest child of national founding father Sukarno, she is said to have little interest in either government or politics. At cabinet meetings, according to insiders, she listens passively to ministers' reports, allows little discussion, and adjourns for lunch as quickly as possible.

She rarely appears in public, even during crises like the terrorist bombings in Bali and Jakarta. In response to polls showing her declining popularity and the possibility of defeat in next year's presidential elections, she assures her advisers that changes in campaign strategy are unnecessary.

Despite her weaknesses, which are legion by all accounts, Megawati deserves a higher grade for her presidential performance. In three critical policy areas -- the economy, center-region relations, and relations with the United States -- she has done better than her recent predecessors.

Most important, she is the first president of Indonesia's fledgling democracy to behave like a normal democratic politician. As such, she is steering her country away from the instability and unpredictability of the post-Soeharto transition and toward a consolidated presidential-style democracy.

In economic policy, she appointed two widely-respected senior officials, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti and Finance Minister Boediono, and has by and large allowed them to make key decisions.

In recent months, Ministers Dorodjatun and Boediono skilfully finessed the politically controversial transition to independence from the conditionality of the International Monetary Fund imposed on the government since 1998.

These achievements compare favorably with those of her immediate predecessor, Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), whose protectionist economics minister was constantly at war with the IMF and World Bank.

Both institutions had earlier frozen relations with Abdurrahman's predecessor, B. J. Habibie (1998-1999), who was involved in a massive banking scandal.

Relations between the central and local governments are a continuing problem in a developing country as large and diverse as Indonesia. The pendulum has arguably swung too far from the extreme centralism of Soeharto's authoritarian New Order (1966- 1998) toward autonomous districts and municipalities incapable of coping with the new responsibilities handed to them by Habibie- era laws.

Megawati's minister of home affairs is attempting to construct a new balance that will maintain local autonomy but also preserve the common legal and administrative foundation crucial for restoring economic growth.

In two provinces, Aceh in the far northwest and and Papua in the far southeast, dissidents are demanding independence. Unlike president Habibie, who was startled by the regions' demands, and president Abdurrahman, whose policies were indecisive and contradictory, Megawati has reaffirmed and acted upon the commitment to national unity shared by her father and President Suharto.

She has sent troops to Aceh and moved forward with plans to divide Papua into several provinces, despite a special autonomy law that appears to guarantee Papua's integrity as a single province. Both moves are popular with the Indonesian political public, and may in fact be necessary steps to keep the nation- state from disintegrating.

In foreign policy, Megawati has walked a fine line between sensitivity to the demands of the world's only superpower and domestic pressure to stand up to Leviathan. She is dependent on the U.S. for investment, markets, and much else, but she is also vulnerable to criticism from popular nationalist and religious groups who oppose many aspects of American foreign policy.

Indeed, Megawati is herself a true-believing nationalist. Since the Bali bombing in October 2002, her wake-up call, security cooperation with the Bush Administration has much improved.

Megawati's greatest contribution to her country, however, may be in her very normalcy as a working politician in a functioning democracy. More than 40 years ago, her father, in alliance with the army, destroyed Indonesia's first democracy. Sukarno was overthrown by Maj. Gen. Soeharto, who ruled as a dictator for more than 30 years.

Habibie's tenure was brief. As Soeharto's vice president, he had no initial legitimacy and was unable to develop any in time for the 1999 presidential election. Abdurrahman, Indonesia's first democratically elected president, threw away his legitimacy in a series of erratic policy and personnel decisions.

Megawati, by contrast, has been a model of democratic sense. She may not have moved to reform the judicial sector, arguably Indonesia's most pressing 21st century need if it is to become a modern nation. Moreover, army leaders, with her blessing, have begun to reassert a political role for themselves, stalling if not reversing the post-Soeharto trend toward civilian supremacy, another necessary pillar of a modern nation.

Megawati's accomplishment has been more fundamental: To create a democratically-elected government that can actually govern the country, formulate and implement policies and respond to domestic and international events.

Her initial strategy was to put together a rainbow coalition of cabinet ministers (plus the vice-president) inclusive of nearly all major political groups in the legislature, including Muslim and secular forces. She has since been determined to maintain her coalition intact. As a result, ministers have been able to develop policies and programs and other players have learned what to expect from her government.

Not least important, her presidency has been secure from challenge by the leaders of disaffected parties.

Finally, Megawati has successfully (so far) administered the constitutional transition to a presidential democracy in which, for the first time in Indonesian history, the president and vice- president will be directly elected by the voters in 2004.

Megawati did not lead the process of amending the constitution. She appears to have opposed key reforms as they were being debated in the People's Consultative Assembly. But she has never questioned the Assembly's right to amend the constitution or her responsibility to implement its decisions.

Such a commitment is basic, to be expected of any president in a democracy, but highly unusual in her country's history. If she stays the course, she will have contributed significantly to the consolidation of Indonesian democracy.