JP/6/LA19

Which path for East Asia?

Hilton L. Root Former Senior Adviser U.S. Department of the Treasury

The Washington Post

Secretary of State Colin Powell's recent visit to Asia aimed to reassure countries assisting the U.S. anti-terror effort, but it may have had the opposite effect by highlighting how much U.S. interests have diverged from the priorities of that region.

In emphasizing the anti-terrorist theme for both South and East Asia, the administration seems to underestimate the continuing effect of the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia. A one-dimensional approach would be unfortunate in a region that welcomes broad U.S. engagement and cannot imagine its future without a strong U.S. role. It would also facilitate China's expanding leadership in the region.

A comparison of East Asia with the Middle East shows why the Bush administration should recognize the need for nuances in its foreign policy. While Middle Eastern and South Asian leaders sacrificed their nations' well-being to pursue geopolitical agendas, East Asia's leaders emphasized growth with equity, grounding their claims to political legitimacy on their economic success.

Their governments are pursuing structural changes to ensure healthy growth -- including steps to open labor markets, protect intellectual property, contain corruption, improve bidding and contract terms on infrastructure projects, and attract new investment in high-value-added industries.

China is now imitating this formula and emerging as the region's economic anchor, leading many Asian business leaders to consider China a more reliable player in regional security than Japan. By not addressing regional economic stability vigorously, the U.S. invites more active regional leadership by China.

U.S. policymakers should understand that Japan's leadership role is one of the region's most troubling uncertainties, and that the 1997 crisis began a quiet shift in the regional balance of power. East Asian leaders recall that Japanese banks withdrew significant amounts of capital from the region, exacerbating the 1997 crisis.

Tokyo has also conceded that, if necessary, it will defend Japanese economic interests before addressing regional needs, even undertaking radical devaluations of the yen.

Meanwhile, China is filling the leadership vacuum. It acted as the responsible party in the 1997 crisis, refusing to devalue and thereby helping prevent a cycle of competitive devaluations. Today, as sponsor of regional free-trade discussions, Beijing continues at every possible opportunity to link itself to the region's future growth.

U.S. policymakers preoccupied with the impact on U.S. trade of China's accession to the World Trade Organization often ignore the influence it will have on interregional trade: making the region more dependent on China.

Moreover, the region's business leaders play down China's territorial ambitions because many believe China's leaders need growth -- and therefore stable political relations with their neighbors -- to maintain their grip on power.

While the percentage of trade between the region and Japan has been stable, China's share has grown dramatically. Investments in the natural resource sector in Indonesia, and in Taiwan's semiconductor industry, will further increase China's influence.

By contrast, Japan's prosperity depends more on shifts among the Group of Seven than on the Asian economies. Japan's cumulative foreign investment is more focused in Europe and North America, its share of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) exports is smaller than the U.S.' share, and its overseas production ratios are lower than those of the U.S. or Germany.

Many would suggest that an ascendant China might jeopardize the region's democratic aspirations, but Japan itself has been ambiguous in its support of regional democracy. Unconvinced of any link between strong democratic institutions and future peace and prosperity, Tokyo, in its overseas assistance, places little emphasis on building strong civil institutions.

Meanwhile, China is subtly moving toward a kind of capitalism that depends more on corporate governance and shareholder rights than does Japan's system and that also seems more willing than Japan's to open its economy to foreign investment.

U.S. policy will be more effective if it becomes more sensitive to the structural economic changes in East Asia. If Chinese leaders understand that smooth integration into the global trading system will be the key to ensuring future economic stability and job growth, then a central objective of U.S. policy must be a responsible China committed to, and benefiting from, strong international economic organizations.

This does not mean abandoning Japan in favor of China. East Asia will find most comfort if the U.S. sits down with China and Japan to work out the basis for trilateral cooperation that will provide the bedrock for future security and growth in the region.