JP/6/DJATI1

JP/6/DJATI1

2004 ELECTION & THE REFORM PROCESS: In Search of a Leader

Part 1 of 2

J. Soedjati Djiwandono
Political Analyst
Jakarta

Under Soeharto's "New Order" regime a general election was
held every five years from 1971, the last being the general
election of 1997. It resulted in the People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR), the supreme governing body based on the 1945
Constitution, which, in turn, elected Soeharto president
consecutively for the seventh time, each time as sole candidate.

But for his resignation in May the following year, thereby
completing his 32 years of dictatorial rule, the 1999 elections
would not have been held. This was the first general election
during the "era of reform"; the next general election in 2004
will be the second.

In terms of reform in the sense of a change within and through
the existing system, the 1999 elections may be regarded as the
beginning of reform toward democratization.

Indeed, the drastic, if excessive, increase in the number of
political parties contesting the elections, from three for most
of the New Order period to over 40, clearly indicated the degree
of freedom of expression and association enjoyed by the people.

No less important, if equally excessive, was the number of
presidential candidates nominated by the political parties.
The election of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) to the presidency was
an interesting phenomenon. He was, indeed, the most
democratically elected president in the history of independent
Indonesia until then, at least within the context of the 1945
Constitution.

Nevertheless, for one thing, Gus Dur's election clearly
indicated not only one of the fundamental defects of the 1945
Constitution, as it was also a mockery of democratic ideals,
particularly the principle of equality. A direct presidential
election was unknown to the 1945 Constitution. The president and
vice president were to be elected by the MPR.

That was, in a way, ironic. Megawati won a majority in the
general election, if not a single majority vote. But because many
of the members of the Islamic-based political parties, which
after the elections formed the "central axis" in the MPR, were
against the election of a woman president, she had to accept the
post of vice president.

In addition, while Gus Dur was elected president by the MPR on
the basis of a majority vote by the MPR, he was a representative
of the ill-defined "functional group", whose membership in the
MPR was by government appointment; thus he was chosen without
contesting the election. This was a mockery of the election.

Therefore, Gus Dur could not but be indebted for his
presidency to his supporters in the MPR, particularly the central
axis forces and the Golkar party, rather than to voters at the
election. It was reflected in the membership of the cabinet he
formed, which looked more like than a parliamentary one within a
multiparty system, than a presidential cabinet, as required by
the Constitution.

As he honestly admitted, his cabinet was not just a compromise
cabinet or a "thank-you cabinet", but also a "salad cabinet". The
1945 Constitution created the distinction between election
politics and MPR politics.

Nevertheless, the new government under Abdurrahman Wahid and
Megawati Soekarnoputri was, in fact, a blessing in disguise. It
was the best for national unity, in that the election of both Gus
Dur and Megawati saved the nation from serious conflict.

In fact, the new government appropriately called itself the
"Cabinet of National Unity", which served to indicate the right
priority of the government's overall policy. One of the most
serious consequences of the country's multidimensional crisis was
the danger of national disintegration.

Unfortunately, the political elite, particularly legislators,
seemed to enjoy to the full their newly won freedom. Under Gus
Dur's presidency, continuous bickering among politicians, arguing
on legal and constitutional matters, particularly a tug-of-war
between the legislature and the president, marked Indonesian
politics.

The DPR would resort to the Constitution in its action against
the president. In turn, the president would challenge the DPR,
and then the MPR, also by using the very same Constitution as the
basis of his arguments.

Indeed, since the 1999 election, Indonesians have been
watching an increasingly chaotic ball game without an umpire. The
president seemed to hope that the involvement of the Supreme
Court would help him win the match.

Unfortunately, the president's opponents questioned the
authority of the Supreme Court, and thus the effectiveness of its
intervention. Ideally, the Supreme Court should have been in a
position to act as umpire, for the ball of the politicians' game
was the 1945 Constitution, which was supposed to provide the
rules of the game.

In this country, however, in the new ball game between
politicians, it is not a question of the rules of the game that
matters, for it is precisely a game of the rules. Unfortunately,
without an institution vested with the power of judicial review,
the bickering between Indonesian politicians was like a football
game without an umpire.

If Sukarno's "guided democracy", as well as Soeharto's New
Order regime, became in effect a dictatorship, since then
Indonesia seems to have developed into a "parliamentary
dictatorship".

The 1945 Constitution as practiced in this country for over
half a century has been in force merely on the basis of Sukarno's
decree of July 5, 1959, not on a decision by democratically
elected people's representatives.

It provides for no effective control mechanism, because it
does not provide the principle of separation of powers in a
system of checks and balances, thereby rendering it vulnerable to
manipulation by whichever branch of government happens to be the
dominant power.

It seems doubtful if today's politicians are aware of that
delicate aspect of the country's current system of government. In
fact, the 1945 Constitution was never meant to be final and
permanent.

Yet, most of them seem to understand that constitutional
reform should not only be limited to amendments -- thereby not
resulting in a change to the constitution itself -- but also
understand that constitutional amendments do not apply to the
preamble of the Constitution containing the five principles of
the state ideology Pancasila, which they consider to be
sacrosanct.

;JP;ANR;
ANPAk..r..
elections-reform

Part 2 checked
JP/6/DJATI

Part 2 of 2

2004 ELECTION & THE REFORM PROCESS: In Search of a Leader

J. Soedjati Djiwandono
Political Analyst
Jakarta

The 1945 Constitution is one of ambivalence and
ambiguity, subject to conflicting interpretations, right from the
preamble. This has resulted in contradictory legislation that is
contrary to the Constitution. At the very least, it may result in
endless legal and constitutional wrangling.
Yet, it would be dangerous to have a mechanism for
judicial review unless and until Indonesians reach a consensus on
certain core (common universal, human) values that bind the
people together as a nation, as expressed in human rights and
democratic ideals. These might be possible if Indonesians were
committed to the principle of a separation between state and
religion.
This is the essence of secularization, which is by no
means opposed to religion, but definitely against state
intervention in religion and religious matters -- matters that
relate to human conscience -- such as reflected in the marriage
law and the law on the national system of education, as well as
the current bill to replace the latter.
Unfortunately, Indonesians tend to revel in ambivalence
and ambiguity, which make apparent consensus seem possible, but
which also make it possible for every group to take advantage of
their different interpretations. Pancasila is a clear case in
point, particularly its first principle.
Without a complete change to the Constitution, on the
pretext that "the people are not ready", that "they do not want
to betray our founding fathers", or some other senseless
argument, we are likely to get another form of dictatorship --
whoever may happen to be president -- in which the incumbent
would be capable of manipulating this ambiguity or ambivalence.
Hence the reform process is at a crossroads.
What, then, could we expect from the 2004 election and
the reform process thereafter? The most important aspect of the
2004 election is the direct election of the president, the first
since Indonesia's independence.
Indonesia is now going through the worst stages of a
leadership crisis since the resignation of president Soeharto,
the onset of the "era of reform".
Since the monetary crisis in 1997, which has developed
into an ever-worsening multidimensional crisis, there seems to
have been little, if any, serious sense of crisis or sense of
urgency on the part of any of the leaders, from Soeharto to
Megawati Soekarnoputri.
The leadership crisis also lies behind the current legal
confusion and uncertainty and the increasing tendency toward
lawlessness. It is important to note that, despite the increasing
antiwar protests against the U.S. invasion of Iraq barely three
weeks ago, demonstrations demanding the resignation of President
Megawati and Vice President Hamzah Haz -- which had begun
earlier, particularly since increases in the price of fuel,
electricity and telephone calls, and, before that, over the issue
of illegal Indonesian migrant workers, particularly to Malaysia
-- have continued to this day across the nation.
The nation clearly needs and demands a new leader, who
will carry on and determine the direction of the reform process.
It is clear that not only the present leader, but also the
present generation of political leaders and politicians, have
been losing credibility and confidence, at home and abroad.
Unfortunately, the crisis of leadership also means a
scarcity of potential leaders who are likely to meet the needs,
requirements and aspirations of the people in many respects: a
person who will be regarded as being genuinely concerned about
the public interest, particularly that of the poor, alienated and
downtrodden, and who will therefore enjoy public trust and
confidence.
The question is whether the 2004 general election,
particularly the direct election of the president and vice
president, will resolve the leadership crisis.
The main obstacle would be a condition set by the
election law that only political parties that had previously won
a certain percentage of the seats in the legislature (DPR) -- a
"threshold" -- could nominate presidential and vice presidential
candidates. That, at least, is the issue now in the DPR in the
debate on the election bill on the presidential election, yet to
be enacted.
Given the possibility, even the probability, that the
major parties of 2004 will more or less be the same as today's
major parties in terms of the result of the 1999 general
election, then the "new" leaders after the next election in 2004,
even with a direct presidential election, will most likely come
from these same large parties.
Unfortunately, our electoral law does not provide for
independent (nonparty) candidates to contest the election. People
have mostly lost confidence in most -- if not all -- existing
political leaders.
However, a potentially good leader is almost definitely
to be found outside the party system. This would give us some
hope. The question is, in the light of the electoral law,
particularly that relating to the direct election of the
president and vice president, will there be a political party, or
at least a coalition or alliance of parties, large or small,
ready and willing to nominate their candidates for president and
vice president from outside any of the existing political
parties?
Such candidates, however, must be willing to join a
political party, or one of the political parties in a coalition.
Indonesia can learn from the experience in the U.S., where, upon
retirement, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower eventually chose to be
nominated for president by the Republican Party and won the
presidential election in 1952.
There may be a setback, however, as regards the election
of politicians to membership of the DPR from an open list or an
open, proportional system. Indeed, through such an open list,
members of the legislature would be more representative of the
people than of their respective political parties.
But with the spirit of "regional autonomy" tending to
become "ethnic autonomy", not only the election of provincial
governors -- as has been the case with some provinces -- but also
that of representatives of the people at the national level, may
in part be heavily and adversely affected by ethnic or sectarian
orientation.
Still, the election of a good president and vice
president will be of greater importance, in that they would
likely be more decisive on matters of national policy, and thus
of the reform process as a whole.