JP/4/STRAIT

What next after the Taliban?

The Straits Times Asia News Network Singapore

The United States government has not been explicit that it wants the Taliban overthrown, but that, in effect, is the policy it is pursuing in Afghanistan. But what if it half succeeds? What if the Taliban is weakened but clings on to power? What if the country descends into a terrifying civil war as a result, with Pashtuns in the south fighting Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north, and millions of refugees fleeing to Pakistan? Will not international opinion force the U.S. to intervene on the ground?

And which side will it take if it does? How will it navigate between the claims of the different groups -- Pashtuns (50 per cent), Tajiks and Uzbeks (15 per cent each), and various others? How can President George W. Bush avoid mission creep? There are no simple answers to these questions.

Much depends on how the conflict unfolds. If the Taliban falls -- because its leadership is eliminated or because units defect -- that is one thing. But if it does not fall, that is another. Just now, the U.S. is walking a fine line: Supporting the anti- Taliban Northern Alliance just enough, so it can expand its influence; but not supporting it so much that it can conquer Kabul and drive the Taliban out.

Washington seems to have decided that to support the Northern Alliance unreservedly will risk a tribal war, for it derives its support almost wholly from minorities. But this policy risks leaving the Taliban in charge of much of the country, opening the way for a prolonged civil war. The impasse has to be broken -- preferably by a mixture of political and diplomatic moves, in combination with military force.

To prosecute the war effectively, the U.S. and its allies (including Pakistan) should begin to lay the groundwork for a post-Taliban future, as British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell have suggested.

The formation of a loya jirga, or traditional Afghan assembly, should be expedited, with all ethnic groups represented. The inclusion of Pashtuns is especially important, for without their support, the overthrow of the Taliban will be difficult. U.S. military planners expect Pashtun tribes to defect from the Taliban if it is weakened sufficiently, but they are unlikely to do so unless they know a successor government will not exclude them.

That government must be broad-based, including representation from all the different tribes and ethnic groups, and it should be friendly towards Pakistan.

The United Nations, not the U.S., should be at the forefront of efforts to put together such a government, as indeed both Washington and London have indicated will be the case. In addition, it may be that an international peacekeeping force, financed by the Gulf states and industrialized countries, may be necessary once the fighting stops.

If so, such a force should come chiefly, if not wholly, from Muslim countries like Turkey, Bangladesh, Morocco, Egypt, Malaysia, and perhaps even Pakistan (though that is not likely, since it is not trusted by the Northern Alliance). Massive aid will be needed to rebuild the economy and provide basic social services. Rich countries should commit now to such aid to give the Afghan people some hope.

The U.S. has already announced US$320 million (S$583 million) in aid, but that should (and no doubt will) be increased. Having decided to drive out the Taliban and the terrorists it harbors, the U.S. cannot but involve itself in efforts to rebuild the country, precisely the sort of activity Bush scorned before.

Not to do so risks consigning Afghanistan to the category of failed states forever, with the nurturing and export of terrorists its only raison d'etre.