Sun, 04 Jan 1998

Jiang's visit a start in confidence-building

By Wang Jisi

Probably most diplomatic specialists in Beijing and Washington, for different reasons, judged the recent state visit by Chinese President Jiang Zemin to the United States as a great success.

President Jiang was the first Chinese to visit the White House who is both nominally and actually the paramount leader of China. More significantly to the Chinese, he won all the trappings of respect from Washington that had been long due to the Beijing leadership since the political storm in Tiananmen in 1989.

Some strong forces in American political circles still doubt the legitimacy and stability of the Chinese leadership and advocate a high-handed China policy. However, they were reminded by President Bill Clinton a few days before Jiang's arrival that the only proper and effective way to deal with China is through dialog and engagement.

In the only public speech ever made by Clinton specifically on China, he contended that containment or isolation of China "is unworkable, counter-productive, and potentially dangerous". When President Jiang was in Washington, he was reassured by Clinton once again that the U.S. seeks cooperation rather than confrontation with China in spite of their differences over such issues as human rights and Tibet.

Two earlier successes for the Chinese leadership in 1997 had paved the way for a constructive dialog at the Jiang-Clinton summit. After the smooth transition of Hong Kong's sovereignty to the mainland in July, few observers cast doubt upon Beijing's credibility and ability to manage the territory.

The Communist Party's 15th Congress held in September 1997 announced the prevalence of Deng Xiaoping Theory over the dogmatic understanding of Marxism. Careful readers of Mr. Jiang's report to the Congress would neglect neither his emphasis on the irreversibility of economic reform nor the renewed resolve to carry out political reform.

Elaborating on the measures to expand democracy and improve the legal system, the Chinese leader called for strenuous efforts to "respect and safeguard human rights" and "build a socialist country under the rule of law".

Never before has the political climate in Beijing been more conducive to the implementation of an open and forward-looking foreign policy and thus to the amelioration of China-U.S. relations. During his U.S. visit, President Jiang could therefore talk to his hosts as well as the American media with remarkable confidence and composure. He proved his ability to take on the American press, politicians, and even protesters, smiling all the way in eight U.S. cities.

The Clinton administration could also claim a success in conveying to the Chinese guests its concerns about nonproliferation, regional security, trade deficit with China, and human rights. The discussions of these issues were known to be conducted in an improved atmosphere, and there were concrete results.

To be sure, open debates about China policy in the American media and among political analysts did not end with the summit. However, the realization of Jiang's visit, with its positive results, tended to help the moderate thinkers and pragmatic officials gain the upper hand over the hardliners.

While the U.S. media predictably focused on the human rights issue and protesting demonstrations in covering the visit, the hardliners and human rights activists had few practical policy proposals to offer besides making noises.

As Henry Kissinger observed in an article for Newsweek, Clinton did well to resist pressures to turn the summit into a one-issue meeting on human rights. After all, said Kissinger, "outrage is not a policy."

The summit produced a momentous, future-oriented joint statement to record the solid accomplishments, which are aimed at building a "constructive strategic partnership" between the two countries towards the 21st century.

Some agreements announced by the statement, like the Beijing- Washington hotline, are largely symbolic, but are nonetheless useful for each side to attach importance to the bilateral relationship.

Others, like the lifting of the U.S. ban on selling nuclear- power plants to China and, in return, China's pledge to stem the export of nuclear materials and technology for military use, are mutually beneficial. Still others, like measures to increase military-to-military relations, participate in legal exchanges, and cooperate on environment protection, will strengthen the bilateral ties in a wide range of issue areas.

To both sides, the areas of their convergence and divergence have become better defined after the summit. The critical question is whether the two sides can seize the opportunities opened by the summit and avoid letting their differences continue to overshadow their agreements.

On top of all the practical difficulties, such as China's admission to the World Trade Organization and the growing trade imbalance, the mutual images of the two great powers remain basically negative. The success of Clinton's visit to China, to be scheduled for sometime in 1998, will depend largely on the degree to which he is willing to prevent the human rights issue from being pressed to a point that may threaten China-U.S. cooperation in other fields.

Another challenge to the progress in China-U.S. relations is the thorny issue of Taiwan. During the summit, the Clinton administration reassured the Chinese that it does not support a "two-China" or "one China, one Taiwan" scenario, or the independence of Taiwan. This position will be tested when the pro-independence forces on Taiwan step up their activities reinforced by their allies in the U.S.

Other bilateral problems, including even the human rights controversy, are somewhat manageable, but any miscalculation over the Taiwan issue alone might once again derail the China-U.S. cooperation.

The improvement of China-U.S. bilateral relations is facilitated by economic dynamism and stability in East Asia. In turn, it should also serve as a "public good", providing essential strategic balance and more fruitful multilateral cooperation in the whole Asia-Pacific region.

The writer is director and senior researcher of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing.