Jiang's visit a start in confidence-building

Jiang's visit a start in confidence-building

By Wang Jisi

Probably most diplomatic specialists in Beijing and
Washington, for different reasons, judged the recent state visit
by Chinese President Jiang Zemin to the United States as a great
success.

President Jiang was the first Chinese to visit the White House
who is both nominally and actually the paramount leader of China.
More significantly to the Chinese, he won all the trappings of
respect from Washington that had been long due to the Beijing
leadership since the political storm in Tiananmen in 1989.

Some strong forces in American political circles still doubt
the legitimacy and stability of the Chinese leadership and
advocate a high-handed China policy. However, they were reminded
by President Bill Clinton a few days before Jiang's arrival that
the only proper and effective way to deal with China is through
dialog and engagement.

In the only public speech ever made by Clinton specifically on
China, he contended that containment or isolation of China "is
unworkable, counter-productive, and potentially dangerous". When
President Jiang was in Washington, he was reassured by Clinton
once again that the U.S. seeks cooperation rather than
confrontation with China in spite of their differences over such
issues as human rights and Tibet.

Two earlier successes for the Chinese leadership in 1997 had
paved the way for a constructive dialog at the Jiang-Clinton
summit. After the smooth transition of Hong Kong's sovereignty to
the mainland in July, few observers cast doubt upon Beijing's
credibility and ability to manage the territory.

The Communist Party's 15th Congress held in September 1997
announced the prevalence of Deng Xiaoping Theory over the
dogmatic understanding of Marxism. Careful readers of Mr. Jiang's
report to the Congress would neglect neither his emphasis on the
irreversibility of economic reform nor the renewed resolve to
carry out political reform.

Elaborating on the measures to expand democracy and improve
the legal system, the Chinese leader called for strenuous efforts
to "respect and safeguard human rights" and "build a socialist
country under the rule of law".

Never before has the political climate in Beijing been more
conducive to the implementation of an open and forward-looking
foreign policy and thus to the amelioration of China-U.S.
relations. During his U.S. visit, President Jiang could therefore
talk to his hosts as well as the American media with remarkable
confidence and composure. He proved his ability to take on the
American press, politicians, and even protesters, smiling all the
way in eight U.S. cities.

The Clinton administration could also claim a success in
conveying to the Chinese guests its concerns about
nonproliferation, regional security, trade deficit with China,
and human rights. The discussions of these issues were known to
be conducted in an improved atmosphere, and there were concrete
results.

To be sure, open debates about China policy in the American
media and among political analysts did not end with the summit.
However, the realization of Jiang's visit, with its positive
results, tended to help the moderate thinkers and pragmatic
officials gain the upper hand over the hardliners.

While the U.S. media predictably focused on the human rights
issue and protesting demonstrations in covering the visit, the
hardliners and human rights activists had few practical policy
proposals to offer besides making noises.

As Henry Kissinger observed in an article for Newsweek,
Clinton did well to resist pressures to turn the summit into a
one-issue meeting on human rights. After all, said Kissinger,
"outrage is not a policy."

The summit produced a momentous, future-oriented joint
statement to record the solid accomplishments, which are aimed at
building a "constructive strategic partnership" between the two
countries towards the 21st century.

Some agreements announced by the statement, like the Beijing-
Washington hotline, are largely symbolic, but are nonetheless
useful for each side to attach importance to the bilateral
relationship.

Others, like the lifting of the U.S. ban on selling nuclear-
power plants to China and, in return, China's pledge to stem the
export of nuclear materials and technology for military use, are
mutually beneficial. Still others, like measures to increase
military-to-military relations, participate in legal exchanges,
and cooperate on environment protection, will strengthen the
bilateral ties in a wide range of issue areas.

To both sides, the areas of their convergence and divergence
have become better defined after the summit. The critical
question is whether the two sides can seize the opportunities
opened by the summit and avoid letting their differences continue
to overshadow their agreements.

On top of all the practical difficulties, such as China's
admission to the World Trade Organization and the growing trade
imbalance, the mutual images of the two great powers remain
basically negative. The success of Clinton's visit to China, to
be scheduled for sometime in 1998, will depend largely on the
degree to which he is willing to prevent the human rights issue
from being pressed to a point that may threaten China-U.S.
cooperation in other fields.

Another challenge to the progress in China-U.S. relations is
the thorny issue of Taiwan. During the summit, the Clinton
administration reassured the Chinese that it does not support a
"two-China" or "one China, one Taiwan" scenario, or the
independence of Taiwan. This position will be tested when the
pro-independence forces on Taiwan step up their activities
reinforced by their allies in the U.S.

Other bilateral problems, including even the human rights
controversy, are somewhat manageable, but any miscalculation over
the Taiwan issue alone might once again derail the China-U.S.
cooperation.

The improvement of China-U.S. bilateral relations is
facilitated by economic dynamism and stability in East Asia. In
turn, it should also serve as a "public good", providing
essential strategic balance and more fruitful multilateral
cooperation in the whole Asia-Pacific region.

The writer is director and senior researcher of the Institute
of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in
Beijing.