Jiang Zemin's mixed triumph in party congress
LONDON: Contrary to the views of most commentators, the Communist Party of China (CPC)'s 15th National Congress on Sept. 12, 1997 was only a mixed triumph for its 71-year-old General Secretary, Jiang Zemin.
Although Jiang ousted his main rival, 72-year-old Qiao Shi, ranked number three in the leadership, he had to accommodate Qiao's key associates in both the 22-member Politburo and its all-important Standing Committee (SC).
Strikingly, Jiang's commitment to reforming the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through shareholding which some observers have generously interpreted as privatization is long on rhetoric and short on the crucial specifics of implementation.
It is not clear, for example, how shares will be offered, nor, in the absence of well-defined property rights, how officials will be prevented from stripping these enterprises of their more profitable assets.
Indeed, it appears that Jiang will rely very much on Zhu Rongji, the 'economic czar', who has risen from fifth to third in the hierarchy, to oversee these reforms.
The Congress was the first since Deng Xiaoping's death on Feb. 19, 1997, and it allowed the CPC's third echelon of leaders to make their mark.
Unlike the previous two generations, headed by Mao Zedong and Deng respectively, this third wave lacks the personal authority associated with the state's founding fathers.
These individuals held senior command positions in the Army as well as in national and party organizations. In comparison, the current generation's training took place in the 1950s, and they rose to the top as bureaucrat politicians who had found favor with their superiors.
As a result, the Congress was less dominated by the dictates of a paramount leader, and its proceedings were characterized by complex maneuvering for position.
Jiang was able to rid himself of his troublesome opponents Qiao and the 81-year-old Gen. Liu Huaqing by holding an enlarged Politburo meeting during the Congress. At this gathering, 85-year-old Bo Yibo, one of the older generation's esteemed survivors, came to Jiang's rescue in a pre-planned move.
Jiang himself offered to resign on the grounds that the 2,000 delegates to the Congress believed that even Politburo members should retire at 70 years of age.
Bo then demanded that 71-year-old Jiang remain in charge to demonstrate continuity and stability, especially as he is due to hold a summit meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton on Oct. 28, 1997.
This left Qiao and Liu with little alternative but to tender their own resignations.
However, Jiang's victory was tempered by his failure to influence the new nominations to the Politburo and its seven- member SC. Of the two new SC participants, Wei Jianxing, the Central Inspection and Discipline Commission's First Secretary, with responsibility for anti-corruption measures, is regarded as close to Qiao. The other appointment, Li Lanqing, whose expertise is in economics and foreign trade, is regarded as an ally of Jiang, although he is not considered a member of Jiang's 'Shanghai faction'.
The new Politburo also reflects a balance between the CPC's different wings. Surprisingly, the Deputy Chairman of the parliament, Tian Jiyun, who famously suggested that the leftists should have their own special economic zone, and who was close to Qiao, was retained.
In contrast, Zeng Qinghong, who had been in charge of Jiang's office, only came into the Politburo as an alternate member.
Nevertheless, at least five participants are thought to belong to the 'Shanghai faction'. In addition, Jiang could probably rely on Generals Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian and on several other members to ensure a majority, but this may well depend upon the issue.
Membership of the Central Committee (CC) has been increased from 189 to 193, with 151 alternate participants. More significantly, only 43 percent of the CC's old members were re- elected, with most of the remainder being excluded because of their age.
But the new CC's standard age of 55.9 is not even six months lower than the previous average at the time of selection. Similarly, the membership remains largely technocratic, with more than 90 percent educated to college standard or above, and the vast majority having bureaucratic experience.
In institutional terms, the Congress highlighted an important shift in civil-military relations and a reaffirmation of the CPC's dominance of Chinese politics.
Most noticeably, there is not a single figure from the armed forces on the SC. Furthermore, the Central Military Commission (CMC) -- the supreme decision-making body in military affairs -- is represented on the SC by its chairman, Jiang Zemin, who has had no experience of the armed forces whatsoever.
However, Gen. Zhang Wannian is one of the CPC Secretariat's seven members, thus ensuring that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is represented in the Party's key organization committee.
Interestingly, all CMC participants have found favor under Jiang's authority. Perhaps the key figure embodying continuity to Deng's leadership is Jiang's close personal adviser, Wang Ruilin.
The result of the Congress would appear to confirm that the CPC has control over the armed forces. In principle, this should also portend a greater professionalisation of the military. This tendency was also fore-shadowed in Jiang's announcement to the Congress that by 2000 the three million-strong armed forces will have been reduced by 500,000 personnel.
The CPC's dominance has also been intensified as a result of Qiao Shi's removal. As head of the National People's Congress (NPC), China's one-party parliament, Qiao said in 1993 that both the CPC and state organizations should be subject to NPC scrutiny and supervision.
With Premier Li Peng expected to take up the NPC chairmanship in March 1998, a different approach is likely. Although Zhu Rongji will probably encourage greater professionalism in government, political reform will not be on the agenda.
The main policy program announced by Jiang was a commitment to tackling the problem of the SOEs. Apart from a core of 512 large strategic establishments, the remaining SOEs are to be taken into 'public ownership' a concept that was not clarified.
Chinese officials denied that this meant privatization, even though it was acknowledged that share floatations would take place. Given that China is officially in the primary stage of socialism, it was argued that a variety of different enterprises could exist provided that public, rather than state, ownership prevailed.
Jiang's plan to reform the SOEs had been signaled in his as yet unpublished, but highly controversial speech to the Central Party School on May 29, 1997. Jiang had apparently overcome ideological objections to his SOE policies from the CPC's leftist remnants.
This was confirmed in an agreement by the Congress to revise the CPC's Constitution to include 'The Theory of Deng Xiaoping' in its ideological guidelines of 'Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought'.
Important as ideology may be to the CPC's identity and legitimacy, the main difficulties in reforming the SOEs may lie elsewhere.
Economically, the SOEs have become a black hole absorbing the bulk of state investment. About two-thirds of them run at a loss, and their overall share of the value of industrial output has declined from more than 90 percent in 1978 to less than 40 percent in 1996.
Although the SOEs receive subsidies that in one form or another account for a third of central revenue expenditure, they are also massively in debt to each other and to the banking sector. Indeed, modernizing the latter has been delayed because of these enormous deficits.
From a social point of view, no way has been found to deal with the tens of millions of redundancies that would follow a proper restructuring of the SOEs. The urban social-security system has long been tied to the SOEs, and no national safety net exists to care for the unemployed, retired workers and their dependents.
The leadership is well aware of the public-order risks that any root-and-branch restructuring may entail. However, an additional reason for caution is the extensive opportunities for corruption that would arise from disposing of SOE assets in the absence of clear laws on property.
As someone who tended to be seen as no more than a stop-gap when he was first appointed as successor to Deng following the Tiananmen Square killings on June 4, 1989, Jiang has proved his staying power.
He has emerged strengthened from the Congress and, as CPC leader, he has reinforced the Party's role. Jiang is determined to confront the most difficult aspect of China's reformist agenda, modernizing the SOEs.
However, the actual job of tackling the SOEs will fall to Zhu Rongji, whose style of politics is markedly different. The CPC's survival and, indeed, China's fate, may well depend on how successfully he carries out the task.