Japan's security initiatives in line with ARF
By A.K.P. Mochtan
JAKARTA (JP): Japan, the quiet but economically powerful force of Asia, is charting a more defined role and position vis-a-vis strategic and security configurations in Asia. Confined almost always to the modest role of being a supporter -- albeit a reliable and rich one -- fresh security initiatives from Tokyo are likely to improve the country's standing in and contributions to cooperative security efforts in the Asia-Pacific region.
The refined and newly released Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation is an important cornerstone of Tokyo's security initiative. Essentially an update outlining a more detailed arrangement and coordination of defense-related matters between Japan and the U.S., the new guidelines provide a clearer picture of the role of the Japanese Self Defense Forces, including in crisis situations.
This is useful to promote transparency in the East and Southeast Asian region, as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) intends to fulfill. In addition to this, a new clause governing "cooperation activities initiated by either government" contains a number of operational guidelines that are relevant to the ARF.
Specifically, newly inserted operational guidelines "to deal with refugees, search and rescue, and non-combatant evacuation operations" are all promising area of activities that could be expanded and incorporated into ARF activities and processes, as part of the ARF's comprehensive security and confidence building scheme. In sum, the new guidelines provide Tokyo with a solid platform to complement and strengthen ARF's on-going efforts.
Southeast Asia and ASEAN members are likely to welcome the new Japanese initiatives at least for two reasons. First, it has a built-in control to restrict Japanese actions, namely due to the centrality of the U.S. position within the alliance. Second, while relatively restricted, the increased responsibility and involvement of the Japanese Self Defense Forces are crucially important to sustain the American presence in the Asia-Pacific.
In other words, as long as it is firmly placed within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, an expansion in role, responsibilities and initiatives by Tokyo is welcome, in fact indispensable. The one thing that Tokyo must ensure is the transparency of the process, which can easily be met through various measures such as prior consultations.
Reaction from Beijing is another important consideration that Japan must take into account. As it is now, the new guidelines contain a number of caveats which would warrant strong and legitimate reactions from the Chinese. Ambiguous references such as "areas surrounding Japan" which are "not geographic but situational" must be clarified.
The bottom line is that Japan -- and also the U.S. -- must be able to soothe Chinese security concerns persuasively and thoroughly. As the triangular China, Japan and U.S. relationship is of utmost importance to the strategic and security equations in the Asia-Pacific region, a "trialogue" among these countries is an inescapable and urgent necessity.
Japan should strive to materialize this trialogue mechanism soon. For this purpose, Tokyo must first and foremost remind its ally, the Americans, about the region's perpetual sensitivities and wariness over Tokyo's security initiatives and actions. Of particular importance is to convince Japan's neighbors of the significance and benefit of Japan-U.S. joint actions for the region as a whole, and not simply as an extension of Washington interests or pressure.
Second, to lessen Chinese sensitivities, Tokyo may want to try to facilitate formation of the aforementioned trialogue through the good offices of the ARF or, if appropriate, through the services of another forum, such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.
Whichever forum is used, the main objective is clear -- namely to minimize suspicions and improve understandings, particularly on the Chinese side. If Japan fails to do this, then Tokyo's new and promising security initiatives would be meaningless for the Asia-Pacific region -- in fact detrimental to ARF cooperative security activities.
The writer is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.