Japan's new role in Asia-Pacific

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): Now that Japan has overcome its economic recession and laid the foundations for political reform -- albeit these developments are proceeding slowly -- it is time for the country to re-examine its regional and global role.

It is obvious that Japan's economic role will be more pronounced because it has always placed great emphasis on this sphere. And its presence has certainly been welcomed both regionally and internationally. This is especially true as other developed countries, except some smaller European communities, have been suffering from a strong bout of aid fatigue.

To Japan, development assistance is seen as a substitute for the provision of political security, a role it has always been reluctant to play. Hence its economic role has also been its main political instrument. Since this task is non-controversial and acceptable it will remain Japan's primary focus for a long time.

Since the Gulf War in 1991, it became obvious to Japan that an economic role, while acceptable, would not be enough, especially in the U.S. public opinion stakes.

The alliance between Japan and the U.S. will not survive a crisis in the Asia Pacific region, if U.S. troops are committed but the Japanese act only as financiers.

The fragile situation in Korea will be the ultimate test for the alliance, although other contingencies and crises in the region should not be overlooked.

Strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance was the main objective of the Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration of April 1996. It involved a review of and adjustments to the alliance and guaranteed Self Defense Forces (SDF) support in future crises in the Asia Pacific. For the U.S. public, in particular, those adjustments helped bolster support for the alliance.

ASEAN has accepted the stronger alliance because it helps fortify the U.S. presence in the Western Pacific. While the Association of Southeast Asian Nations views the U.S. as a Pacific power in its own right, the nation's military presence is vital to the region's stability and peace.

In addition, the idea of establishing a regional order and building an Asia Pacific community has just started to take shape. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation process began in 1989 and the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1993. ASEAN has played an important role in initiating these processes and Japan has supported them from the beginning.

But there are some hurdles to be jumped before an Asia Pacific community becomes a reality.

China will balk if the Japanese SDF's supporting role is perceived to be aimed at China, especially in the context of Taiwan's reunification. China may still use force to resolve this situation.

The crisis in the Taiwan Strait, early last year, demonstrated that such an emergency was not a remote possibility. In reaction to China's military exercises and pressure during the presidential elections in Taiwan, the U.S. sent its naval fleet into the vicinity of the strait. The move was a warning to China that the U.S. will not be indifferent if China invades Taiwan.

Although the primary crisis looming in the region is on the Korean Peninsula, a flare up in the Taiwan Strait has not been ruled out.

Koichi Kato, an important politician from the LDP and perhaps the next prime minister of Japan, talked about the volatile situation in the strait when he visited China last July. Seiroku Kajiyama, the cabinet secretary and main spokesman for the Hashimoto Government, also mentioned an emergency in the Taiwan Strait as another possibility where Japan's logistic support could be given to U.S. forces. However, SDF will not be directly involved in the strait.

In addition to its transparency, the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration should be explained to the Chinese in a straightforward and detailed manner to prevent any misunderstandings.

ASEAN understands China's concerns about its most important irredentist territory, whose government faces real pressure for independence. The idea of Japan supporting U.S. troops in an emergency in the Taiwan Strait, however limited the support, will be strongly opposed by China.

It has to be understood that its acceptance of an American military presence in the Western Pacific is for a limited period and the alliance with Japan has been accepted as a means to an end. It could be argued that China could accept the review and the support of the Japanese SDF in a Korean Peninsula crisis, but even a limited role in the strait would be unacceptable.

History is another reason for China's rejection of a regional role for SDF. China, as well as Korea, think that Japan has not done enough to atone for its atrocities in World War II, the way the Germans have, to prevent a repeat of Japanese militarism in the future.

There are several things that Japan and also the U.S. can do to overcome these objections. First, make it unnecessary for the SDF to assist U.S. military involvement in a Taiwan Strait crisis in the future. If that is impossible to prevent, for the credibility of the review, then the U.S. and Japan have to do a lot more to convince the Chinese.

Although the Koreans are receptive to the idea of a review that allows for limited Japanese support in the Korean crisis, support should be limited to providing assistance outside the Korean territories.

A fundamental effort is to strengthen the strategic relations between Japan and China as well as between the U.S. and China. Of equal importance are efforts to promote a better mutual understanding of the Taiwan question in respect to China as well as the U.S. and Japan.

It has to be understood that force will not be used lightly by China, but it needs an assurance that the U.S. and Japan would not encourage or give the wrong signals to the Taiwanese independence movement.

Furthermore, transparency and specificity about the SDF's involvement must be made clear to others in the region, especially China. This includes the circumstances and crises under which the SDF will become involved. Also, the measures that Japan should take to balance U.S. unilateral reactions due to pressure from the U.S. public and congress.

Last, but not least, support from the great powers for promoting multilateralism in the region, especially to get the ARF off the ground, will help convince China that the efforts for a regional order and an Asia Pacific community are real. Also, it will send the message that China has an important role to play in these efforts.

These multilateral activities could also provide the necessary balance to U.S. unilateralism and prevent any review of the alliance from becoming an anti-China policy.

These activities are also very important for the region because a misunderstanding between the U.S. and China, and between China and Japan, will not engender peace and stability.

Any assistance from ASEAN to help these nations overcome such hurdles would be highly valuable.

The writer is Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.