Japan's new role in Asia-Pacific

Japan's new role in Asia-Pacific

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): Now that Japan has overcome its economic
recession and laid the foundations for political reform -- albeit
these developments are proceeding slowly -- it is time for the
country to re-examine its regional and global role.

It is obvious that Japan's economic role will be more
pronounced because it has always placed great emphasis on this
sphere. And its presence has certainly been welcomed both
regionally and internationally. This is especially true as other
developed countries, except some smaller European communities,
have been suffering from a strong bout of aid fatigue.

To Japan, development assistance is seen as a substitute for
the provision of political security, a role it has always been
reluctant to play. Hence its economic role has also been its main
political instrument. Since this task is non-controversial and
acceptable it will remain Japan's primary focus for a long time.

Since the Gulf War in 1991, it became obvious to Japan that an
economic role, while acceptable, would not be enough, especially
in the U.S. public opinion stakes.

The alliance between Japan and the U.S. will not survive a
crisis in the Asia Pacific region, if U.S. troops are committed
but the Japanese act only as financiers.

The fragile situation in Korea will be the ultimate test for
the alliance, although other contingencies and crises in the
region should not be overlooked.

Strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance was the main objective
of the Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration of April 1996. It
involved a review of and adjustments to the alliance and
guaranteed Self Defense Forces (SDF) support in future crises in
the Asia Pacific. For the U.S. public, in particular, those
adjustments helped bolster support for the alliance.

ASEAN has accepted the stronger alliance because it helps
fortify the U.S. presence in the Western Pacific. While the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations views the U.S. as a
Pacific power in its own right, the nation's military presence is
vital to the region's stability and peace.

In addition, the idea of establishing a regional order and
building an Asia Pacific community has just started to take
shape. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation process began in
1989 and the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1993. ASEAN has played an
important role in initiating these processes and Japan has
supported them from the beginning.

But there are some hurdles to be jumped before an Asia Pacific
community becomes a reality.

China will balk if the Japanese SDF's supporting role is
perceived to be aimed at China, especially in the context of
Taiwan's reunification. China may still use force to resolve this
situation.

The crisis in the Taiwan Strait, early last year, demonstrated
that such an emergency was not a remote possibility. In reaction
to China's military exercises and pressure during the
presidential elections in Taiwan, the U.S. sent its naval fleet
into the vicinity of the strait. The move was a warning to China
that the U.S. will not be indifferent if China invades Taiwan.

Although the primary crisis looming in the region is on the
Korean Peninsula, a flare up in the Taiwan Strait has not been
ruled out.

Koichi Kato, an important politician from the LDP and perhaps
the next prime minister of Japan, talked about the volatile
situation in the strait when he visited China last July. Seiroku
Kajiyama, the cabinet secretary and main spokesman for the
Hashimoto Government, also mentioned an emergency in the Taiwan
Strait as another possibility where Japan's logistic support
could be given to U.S. forces. However, SDF will not be directly
involved in the strait.

In addition to its transparency, the Clinton-Hashimoto
Declaration should be explained to the Chinese in a
straightforward and detailed manner to prevent any
misunderstandings.

ASEAN understands China's concerns about its most important
irredentist territory, whose government faces real pressure for
independence. The idea of Japan supporting U.S. troops in an
emergency in the Taiwan Strait, however limited the support, will
be strongly opposed by China.

It has to be understood that its acceptance of an American
military presence in the Western Pacific is for a limited period
and the alliance with Japan has been accepted as a means to an
end. It could be argued that China could accept the review and
the support of the Japanese SDF in a Korean Peninsula crisis, but
even a limited role in the strait would be unacceptable.

History is another reason for China's rejection of a regional
role for SDF. China, as well as Korea, think that Japan has not
done enough to atone for its atrocities in World War II, the way
the Germans have, to prevent a repeat of Japanese militarism in
the future.

There are several things that Japan and also the U.S. can do
to overcome these objections. First, make it unnecessary for the
SDF to assist U.S. military involvement in a Taiwan Strait crisis
in the future. If that is impossible to prevent, for the
credibility of the review, then the U.S. and Japan have to do a
lot more to convince the Chinese.

Although the Koreans are receptive to the idea of a review
that allows for limited Japanese support in the Korean crisis,
support should be limited to providing assistance outside the
Korean territories.

A fundamental effort is to strengthen the strategic relations
between Japan and China as well as between the U.S. and China. Of
equal importance are efforts to promote a better mutual
understanding of the Taiwan question in respect to China as well
as the U.S. and Japan.

It has to be understood that force will not be used lightly by
China, but it needs an assurance that the U.S. and Japan would
not encourage or give the wrong signals to the Taiwanese
independence movement.

Furthermore, transparency and specificity about the SDF's
involvement must be made clear to others in the region,
especially China. This includes the circumstances and crises
under which the SDF will become involved. Also, the measures that
Japan should take to balance U.S. unilateral reactions due to
pressure from the U.S. public and congress.

Last, but not least, support from the great powers for
promoting multilateralism in the region, especially to get the
ARF off the ground, will help convince China that the efforts for
a regional order and an Asia Pacific community are real. Also, it
will send the message that China has an important role to play in
these efforts.

These multilateral activities could also provide the necessary
balance to U.S. unilateralism and prevent any review of the
alliance from becoming an anti-China policy.

These activities are also very important for the region
because a misunderstanding between the U.S. and China, and
between China and Japan, will not engender peace and stability.

Any assistance from ASEAN to help these nations overcome such
hurdles would be highly valuable.

The writer is Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Centre
for Strategic and International Studies.