Japanes: No coalition yet in sight
Immediately after the recent Japanese general election, the Jakarta Post editorialized that "whatever coalition government emerges in Japan in the next few days and weeks it will be shaky at best and very possibly short-lived". Our Asia correspondent Harvey Stockwin reports that this judgment has been borne out by the first week of maneuvers in the smoke-filled backrooms, and analyses the LDP's options as it seeks to obtain a parliamentary majority.
TOKYO (JP): Japanese caretaker Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto is demonstrating a lack of strategic vision and Japan has seemingly moved no nearer to establishing a strong and stable government in the wake of its inconclusive election for the House of Representatives.
After a week of on and off post-election negotiations, there are still no clear signs that Japan's Liberal Democratic Party will be able to turn its modest election gains into a coalition government with a working majority in both Houses of the Diet.
To the contrary, there are some indications that caretaker Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto may go ahead and form a minority government without any firm coalition partners. He can probably do this but whether such a minority government would long endure is extremely doubtful.
So far, in the backroom negotiations, Hashimoto has preferred to take a limited tactical view rather than trying to make a broad strategic gesture to break the impasse. Such a maneuver carries risks -- but doing nothing hardly guarantees longevity either.
To date (Oct. 28th), Hashimoto has only tried to negotiate with the Socialist and Sakigake parties, seeking a resumption of the coalition which has been ruling Japan since mid-1994. Both of these parties, seeing that their association with the LDP was the cause of their severe electoral losses at the last election, have refused to continue as before.
The Socialists, for example, reduced from 70 members after the 1993 election to a mere 15 today, are insisting that the LDP must pay a policy price for any coalition. An end to financial contributions to political parties by business corporations is said to be one Socialist demand. Conditions concerning the continued US military presence in Japan may be another. Obviously the LDP would not be inclined to accept these stipulations.
On the one hand, Socialist Takako Doi is most reluctant to extend the Socialist coalition with the LDP, since she correctly sees it as the main reason for radically reduced public support for the Socialists. Having saved the Socialists from electoral extinction, the tough-minded Ms Doi does not want to resume their march towards oblivion.
On the other hand, Hashimoto himself does not gain all that much from making concessions to the Socialist policy demands. The Socialists can by themselves give the LDP a working majority in the upper House of Councillors but they cannot do the same in the lower House of Representatives.
The 17 seats of the Socialists and Sakigake put together only increase the LDP's total strength to 256 seats, not enough for the coalition to effectively control proceedings in the Diet.
One hazard for Hashimoto is that, if he were primarily dependent upon Socialist support, that assistance could easily be withdrawn, rendering the government liable to defeat on a no- confidence motion. The Prime Minister could try to win over the nine independents but they, too, might not be wholly reliable.
Another hazard for Hashimoto, to which he so far seems oblivious, is that by pursuing the resurrection of the old stale coalition, he exudes the image of a status quo politician. Such an image is unlikely to captivate an increasingly disenchanted electorate.
Apart from anything else, the voters implicitly rejected the old coalition, with the drubbing they handed out to the Socialists and Sakigake. The ambiguity of the election result lies in the fact that the electorate did not trust the LDP to rule on its own -- but left it free to decided how to construct a new and fresh coalition.
Thus if the LDP is to make the best of the inconclusive election result Hashimoto will have to pursue one or other of three strategic options.
The first option is that Hashimoto could try to persuade the Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan), with 52 seats, to back his coalition.
A second possibility would be to make a determined effort to persuade a whole faction within the Shinshinto (New Frontier Party) to defect to the LDP.
A third option would be to seek a grand alliance between the two basically conservative parties, the LDP and Shinshinto (156 seats).
To date, there is no clear evidence that Hashimoto is pursuing any of these choices.
Minshuto, whose parliamentary strength is composed mainly of defectors from the Socialists and Sakigake, has currently set its face against any additional defection. Minshuto could not give Hashimoto a majority in the upper house.
But there is clearly some division in the top Minshuto leadership between those who feel the party can only prosper by sustaining itself in an opposition role --- and those who feel that a coalition would be worth thinking about if Hashimoto gave the party a ministerial post with control over a substantive program of administrative reform. But this would require of the Prime Minister the kind of bold move which he is currently avoiding.
Apart from a handful of disaffected members, Shinshinto appears to have patched over its post-election discord and therefore no one faction is probably available right now. The time for this option was last week but, as far as can be seen, Hashimoto did not try and up the ante for Shinshinto leader Ichiro Ozawa by enticing former Prime Ministers Morohiro Hosokawa and Tsutomu Hata to jump ship.
The third option, of a grand alliance, has long been advocated by some influential senior members of the LDP, such as former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. But there is no sign yet that Hashimoto accepts this advice, or how Shinshinto would react if such a proposal were made. Presumably, protracted negotiations would be required before any such coalition could be consummated.
This option carries very real risks for both Ozawa and Hashimoto. The alliance, covering far too broad a segment of the political spectrum, might quickly provoke another major round of what the Japanese refer to as "political realignment". Liberals in both the LDP and in Shinshinto, feeling isolated within the conservative alliance, might, for example, defect en masse to Minshuto. It is possible to dream that, at a single stroke, a huge leap forward would be taken towards a meaningful two-party system in Japan.
Whether either Hashimoto or Ozawa would want such a leap to be undertaken remains in doubt. They may favor a two-party system in theory -- but in practice a major realignment could deprive them of both their respective parties and their leadership positions.
Beyond this calculation, there is a more fundamental and immediate roadblock to option three. Hashimoto increasingly comes across as a traditional, cautious conservative who is inclined to leave things as they are. Ozawa is a more thoughtful, even radical, conservative who finds it hard to shake his authoritarian habits. Hashimoto justifies Japan as it was. Ozawa can see the outline of Japan as it should be. This contrast is hardly the raw material for a grand alliance, unless Nakasone bangs some heads together.
Meanwhile, if the backroom intrigues fail to produce a new coalition before November 7th, when the lower house is due to meet, Hashimoto can still count on being elected as the new Prime Minister. This is because the Japan Communist Party (JCP), with 26 seats, will not support any other party or coalition.
This effectively means that the LDP has to be sure of getting a majority of 474 seats, or 138 votes. If it musters its full strength it can do this, with one vote to spare.
But that does not alter the fact that any government so formed will be fundamentally unstable, subject at any time to a no- confidence vote, when the communists would vote with the other opposition parties to bring the government down.
Meanwhile, as the machinations in the smoke-filled backrooms proceed, the weakness of all the parties in terms of popular support is superbly illustrated by setting the total votes obtained as a percentage of the total Japanese electorate. These figures (see Table), thoughtfully provided by Nikkei Weekly, emphasize that no Japanese political party is anywhere near a real majority. These statistics should promote thoughts of taking option three, or at least hastening realignment -- but it is unlikely that they will.
Put another way, the unformed "party" called "Did Not Vote" won a landslide victory in the Japanese general election of 1996.
Table: Japanese election Oct. 20th, 1996.
House of Representatives
Extent of voter apathy: Votes obtained in relation to total eligible voters
Voting in Proportional
Constituencies representation ---------------------------------------------------- Party % of votes % of votes
cast cast ---------------------------------------------------- Liberal Democratic 22.35 18.63 Party (LDP) Shinshinto (New 16.18 15.94 Frontier Party) Minshuto (Democratic 6.14 9.16 Party of Japan DPJ) Japan Communist Party 7.26 7.44 (JCP) Social Democratic 1.27 3.63 Party of Japan (SDPJ) Sakigake (New 0.74 0.59 Pioneer Party) Other Parties 5.70 4.23 Did not vote 40.36 40.38 ____________________________________________ Total 100.00 100.00
Source: Nikkei Weekly
Window A: "Hashimoto has preferred to take a limited tactical view of coalition-building rather than trying to make a broad strategic gesture to break the impasse. Such a maneuver carries risks -- but doing nothing hardly guarantees longevity either."
Window B: "Having saved the Socialists from electoral extinction, the tough-minded Ms Takako Doi does not want to resume their march towards oblivion."