Japan offers counter-piracy program

By Santo Darmosumarto

JAKARTA (JP): Reports of piracy in the Asia-Pacific region denote the phenomenon's continued security threat to regional waterways, which comprise some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.

Faced with immense difficulties in finding solutions to the problem, Asian governments are now pondering Japan's offer to sponsor a joint counter-piracy program involving its coast guards.

If this proposal is accepted, it will be the first time since the end of World War II that Japan's maritime forces are deployed beyond their limited, self-defense scope.

Although the plan provides an admirable attempt at boosting regional cooperation in the long run, its success could prove to be challenging, as opposition is strong within Japan as well as among some countries in the region, especially China.

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi revealed the proposal at a regional summit in Manila last year, where it received positive responses from countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Some even claim that the idea may have originally come from Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, whose archipelagic country hosts the highest number of piracy attacks in the world. Yet officials either in Jakarta or Tokyo have not confirmed this.

Despite viewing it as an important foreign policy item, Japan intends on keeping a low profile on the issue for fear of raising alarm over the possibility of increased Japanese involvement in regional security. Further discussions on the proposal are set for late April in Tokyo.

Japan's suggestion comes at an opportune time as piracy statistics continue to rise and coordinated relief efforts among Asian governments remain severely lacking.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) claims that there were 217 reported piracy attacks worldwide last year. This figure is nearly 40 percent higher compared with that of 1998 and is almost triple that of 1991.

A vast proportion of these attacks occurred in Southeast Asia, with those occurring in Indonesian waters almost double that of last year.

The trend of violence also gives greater reasons for concern, as easier access to small arms has allowed pirates to conduct their crimes more "effectively".

The IMB claims that piracy trends have demonstrated record levels of violence, with more sailors murdered, injured or taken hostage during attacks. Sustained levels of piracy threaten not only merchant sailors' lives, but also, as experts have elaborated, the region's trade patterns and marine environment.

Japan's proposal follows the 1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), which envisages an increased military role in responding to unconventional security threats such as natural disasters, terrorism and maritime piracy.

And to meet this new challenge, the NDPO also addresses the need to develop more streamlined, efficient and flexible maritime capabilities.

Along with its growing participation in United Nations peacekeeping efforts, joint regional counter-piracy is regarded as another way in which Japan can contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability.

For over half a decade, the Americans have been primarily responsible for guaranteeing Japan's defense; the latter's participation in international affairs became largely confined to matters concerning economics and development issues.

However, the United States' involvement in Asia-Pacific security is entering an uncertain chapter in this new millennium. Although it rhetorically remains committed to the region's security concerns, the United States has gradually been reducing its physical presence over the last decade.

The growing interest among some Japanese strategists to reestablish the country's status as a "normal" state then comes as no surprise.

In 1997, revisions were made to the 1978 US-Japan Defense Cooperation to give the Japanese a larger role within the alliance.

This was seen as in anticipation to further diminished American involvement in the region. The revised guidelines' most controversial issue relates to the increased function of the Maritime Self-Defense Force "in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on (its) peace and security".

The occasion certainly did not go unnoticed, as Beijing was the loudest in raising the alarm by stressing the possible revival of Japanese militarism. China claims that the agreement's ambiguous wording could provide Japan with a pretext to meddling in -- and further complicating -- the region's already precarious security climate.

The Chinese are not the only ones voicing their opposition; many Japanese do not like the idea of expanding their military's role beyond its self-defense scope for fear of repeating World War II experiences.

Furthermore, deploying forces overseas is a breach of Japan's Constitution, specifically Article 9. And even though amending this document is certainly not out of the question, such an effort is unpopular among the domestic public, who have benefited economically from maintaining a military sufficient only for self-defense purposes for more than five decades.

To get around the problem, Tokyo has suggested that its participation be limited to its coast guards and the Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA), which exists outside of Japan's military structure. The capacity of the 12,000-strong JMSA, however, should not be easily underestimated, as it is well equipped with fast, high-tech coastal and offshore vessels.

Additionally, its maritime surveillance capabilities, which consist of sophisticated helicopters and planes, probably dwarves even those employed by some navies in the region. Transition toward an expanded scope should not pose a seriously difficult challenge considering the agency's successful role in securing Japan's territorial waters from piracy and other forms of unconventional maritime threats.

Warm responses from ASEAN members, especially Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, probably spring from a realization of the severity of Asia-Pacific piracy problem.

These three countries recognize the merit of joint counter- piracy operations because they have carried out similar efforts in the Malacca Strait with relative success.

Also, Japan's proposal fits perfectly within ASEAN's latest agenda, which emphasizes tackling issues related to unconventional ("human") security.

Nevertheless, realizing this plan needs the involvement of Beijing, which has persistently resorted to accounts of the country's militaristic past to warn about what it perceives as Japanese remilitarization.

Most importantly, the inclusion of China is crucial, considering that many piracy attacks are committed by Chinese nationals, and/or coming from ports in southern China.

Because the Chinese play an influential role in regional security, the overall success of Japan's proposal will be somewhat limited without the consent and collaboration of the former.

Persuading Beijing will indeed be difficult; however, it is not impossible, especially if the issue is addressed as a "human" security concern.

The talks in Tokyo this month are unlikely to result in an immediate region-wide acceptance of the joint counter-piracy suggestion. Many technical issues still require extensive elaboration; a strategy has also to be developed to get China interested in the effort.

Nevertheless, in general, this proposal demonstrates a greater understanding of the piracy security threat and a genuine desire to systematically end the region's most feared maritime menace.

The writer is a Jakarta-based researcher and an analyst of Southeast Asian security issues.