Japan offers counter-piracy program

Japan offers counter-piracy program

By Santo Darmosumarto

JAKARTA (JP): Reports of piracy in the Asia-Pacific region
denote the phenomenon's continued security threat to regional
waterways, which comprise some of the busiest shipping lanes in
the world.

Faced with immense difficulties in finding solutions to the
problem, Asian governments are now pondering Japan's offer to
sponsor a joint counter-piracy program involving its coast
guards.

If this proposal is accepted, it will be the first time since
the end of World War II that Japan's maritime forces are deployed
beyond their limited, self-defense scope.

Although the plan provides an admirable attempt at boosting
regional cooperation in the long run, its success could prove to
be challenging, as opposition is strong within Japan as well as
among some countries in the region, especially China.

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi revealed the proposal at
a regional summit in Manila last year, where it received positive
responses from countries in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN).

Some even claim that the idea may have originally come from
Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, whose archipelagic
country hosts the highest number of piracy attacks in the world.
Yet officials either in Jakarta or Tokyo have not confirmed this.

Despite viewing it as an important foreign policy item, Japan
intends on keeping a low profile on the issue for fear of raising
alarm over the possibility of increased Japanese involvement in
regional security. Further discussions on the proposal are set
for late April in Tokyo.

Japan's suggestion comes at an opportune time as piracy
statistics continue to rise and coordinated relief efforts among
Asian governments remain severely lacking.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) claims that there were
217 reported piracy attacks worldwide last year. This figure is
nearly 40 percent higher compared with that of 1998 and is almost
triple that of 1991.

A vast proportion of these attacks occurred in Southeast Asia,
with those occurring in Indonesian waters almost double that of
last year.

The trend of violence also gives greater reasons for concern,
as easier access to small arms has allowed pirates to conduct
their crimes more "effectively".

The IMB claims that piracy trends have demonstrated record
levels of violence, with more sailors murdered, injured or taken
hostage during attacks. Sustained levels of piracy threaten not
only merchant sailors' lives, but also, as experts have
elaborated, the region's trade patterns and marine environment.

Japan's proposal follows the 1995 National Defense Program
Outline (NDPO), which envisages an increased military role in
responding to unconventional security threats such as natural
disasters, terrorism and maritime piracy.

And to meet this new challenge, the NDPO also addresses the
need to develop more streamlined, efficient and flexible maritime
capabilities.

Along with its growing participation in United Nations
peacekeeping efforts, joint regional counter-piracy is regarded
as another way in which Japan can contribute to the maintenance
of international peace and stability.

For over half a decade, the Americans have been primarily
responsible for guaranteeing Japan's defense; the latter's
participation in international affairs became largely confined to
matters concerning economics and development issues.

However, the United States' involvement in Asia-Pacific
security is entering an uncertain chapter in this new millennium.
Although it rhetorically remains committed to the region's
security concerns, the United States has gradually been reducing
its physical presence over the last decade.

The growing interest among some Japanese strategists to
reestablish the country's status as a "normal" state then comes
as no surprise.

In 1997, revisions were made to the 1978 US-Japan Defense
Cooperation to give the Japanese a larger role within the
alliance.

This was seen as in anticipation to further diminished
American involvement in the region. The revised guidelines' most
controversial issue relates to the increased function of the
Maritime Self-Defense Force "in situations in areas surrounding
Japan that will have an important influence on (its) peace and
security".

The occasion certainly did not go unnoticed, as Beijing was
the loudest in raising the alarm by stressing the possible
revival of Japanese militarism. China claims that the agreement's
ambiguous wording could provide Japan with a pretext to meddling
in -- and further complicating -- the region's already precarious
security climate.

The Chinese are not the only ones voicing their opposition;
many Japanese do not like the idea of expanding their military's
role beyond its self-defense scope for fear of repeating World
War II experiences.

Furthermore, deploying forces overseas is a breach of Japan's
Constitution, specifically Article 9. And even though amending
this document is certainly not out of the question, such an
effort is unpopular among the domestic public, who have benefited
economically from maintaining a military sufficient only for
self-defense purposes for more than five decades.

To get around the problem, Tokyo has suggested that its
participation be limited to its coast guards and the Maritime
Safety Agency (JMSA), which exists outside of Japan's military
structure. The capacity of the 12,000-strong JMSA, however,
should not be easily underestimated, as it is well equipped with
fast, high-tech coastal and offshore vessels.

Additionally, its maritime surveillance capabilities, which
consist of sophisticated helicopters and planes, probably dwarves
even those employed by some navies in the region. Transition
toward an expanded scope should not pose a seriously difficult
challenge considering the agency's successful role in securing
Japan's territorial waters from piracy and other forms of
unconventional maritime threats.

Warm responses from ASEAN members, especially Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore, probably spring from a realization of the
severity of Asia-Pacific piracy problem.

These three countries recognize the merit of joint counter-
piracy operations because they have carried out similar efforts
in the Malacca Strait with relative success.

Also, Japan's proposal fits perfectly within ASEAN's latest
agenda, which emphasizes tackling issues related to
unconventional ("human") security.

Nevertheless, realizing this plan needs the involvement of
Beijing, which has persistently resorted to accounts of the
country's militaristic past to warn about what it perceives as
Japanese remilitarization.

Most importantly, the inclusion of China is crucial,
considering that many piracy attacks are committed by Chinese
nationals, and/or coming from ports in southern China.

Because the Chinese play an influential role in regional
security, the overall success of Japan's proposal will be
somewhat limited without the consent and collaboration of the
former.

Persuading Beijing will indeed be difficult; however, it is
not impossible, especially if the issue is addressed as a "human"
security concern.

The talks in Tokyo this month are unlikely to result in an
immediate region-wide acceptance of the joint counter-piracy
suggestion. Many technical issues still require extensive
elaboration; a strategy has also to be developed to get China
interested in the effort.

Nevertheless, in general, this proposal demonstrates a greater
understanding of the piracy security threat and a genuine desire
to systematically end the region's most feared maritime menace.

The writer is a Jakarta-based researcher and an analyst of
Southeast Asian security issues.