Jakarta rights tribunal buries E. Timor atrocities

Jakarta rights tribunal buries E. Timor atrocities

Aboeprijadi Santoso,'Radio Netherlands', Amsterdam

A mere three years' imprisonment was the controversial verdict
for Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri for his role in the 1999 wave of terror
and destruction in East Timor that killed hundreds of people and
caused great suffering. Yet there is more to the violence that
made him a symbol of impunity.

The declaration by the European Union (EU), issued following
the recent conclusion of Indonesia's human rights tribunal on
East Timor, is a welcome change. It deplored that justice has not
been delivered, that the violence during the 1999 referendum was
not accounted for, and that the prosecutors had omitted the
evidence submitted by Indonesia's human rights subcommission
(KPP-HAM) on the roles of the government apparatuses in funding
and training the local militias.

The legal process at the ad hoc tribunal has damaged the
credibility of its verdicts. Finally, the EU declaration called
upon the Indonesian judicial authorities to work in accordance
with international legal standards and the principle of
transparency.

The EU declaration sums up the principal objections against
the process. However, put in the perspective of those countries
that had been better and much earlier informed than anyone else
about past atrocities in East Timor, it sounds like a belated
"correction".

No European states, which had greatly profited from Indonesia
under Soeharto, had publicly protested against past atrocities in
East Timor -- even though these were comparable to the tragedies
in Milosevic's Bosnia and Saddam's Iraq, where the Europeans had
been proactive from the outset. Likewise, they later focused on
Myanmar, but not East Timor.

It was not until the St. Cruz massacres in late 1991 that even
Portugal woke up. One Dutch minister, J.P. Pronk, was discredited
nationwide for his protest regarding East Timor in 1992, only to
regain respect six years later when Soeharto fell.

It is important to recall these facts -- as the Indonesian
tribunal on the 1999 violence in East Timor comes to a close --
for two reasons.

First, the process has ended with great disappointment among
rights activists, as Indonesian officials and politicians have
gotten over the "East Timor syndrome", simply by forgetting it.
It is as if the East Timor tragedy never happened.

Not only has Jakarta never acknowledged the 1975 aggression,
but also, with the exception of former president Abdurrahman
Wahid, none of Jakarta's leaders have offered a mea culpa to the
East Timorese for its past atrocities.

In contrast, all heads-of-state after Soeharto, even military
chiefs, have offered their apologies to the Acehnese for similar
atrocities. With the tribunal on East Timor ended, Jakarta has
buried the past without resolving the problem of the pre-1999
atrocities and the need for reconciliation between military
personnel and their victims.

The violence in 1999 was much less extensive than the
aggressions of the past, in particular the great tragedy in
Matebian, Central East Timor, during the nine-month siege from
1977-1978 that resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths. This
could be said to be the greatest of atrocities committed by the
Indonesian military since the bloody events of 1965-1966 in
response to the failed coup.

Had the international community, including Europe, spoken out
earlier, the catastrophes could perhaps have been limited.

Second, and ironically, as Jakarta wishes to bury its past in
East Timor, the newly established country has just started to
investigate human rights abuses by all sides from 1974 to 1999
and has set in motion a process of national reconciliation.

But it seems unlikely that Dili's Serious Crimes Unit and the
reconciliation commission would be able to fully complete their
task, since no such processes may be expected from Indonesia for
those involved in crimes against humanity in East Timor before
1999. The Dili processes need international support to obtain the
cooperation of Jakarta authorities and those involved in past
abuses.

The EU declaration has thus been useful to remind the world
that, five years after Soeharto, Jakarta has not resolved its
past in East Timor with justice and fairness. The verdict for
Gen. Damiri, the last suspect tried by the tribunal, should
therefore not be the end of the story.

Maj. Gen. Damiri, 54, is the highest-ranking general brought
to court and the most reluctant defendant to do so -- the trial
had been delayed three times because of his absence. As chief of
the Bali-based Udayana command, which included East Timor, he had
worked in tandem with his deputy, Brig. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon.
The two have been identified as the key officers who had close
contact with then military chief and minister of defense Gen.
Wiranto and the intelligence officers at the Coordinating
Ministry for Political and Security Affairs (Polkam) led by Gen.
Feisal Tanjung.

As regional commander, Damiri's position was the very locus
where the formal military command appeared to have intersected
with the covert operational command, managed from Jakarta by
Polkam agents partly disguised as "liaison officers" in East
Timor.

It appeared that both the security affairs ministry and Gen.
Wiranto had maintained links with militia leaders via Adam Damiri
and local officers. Damiri reportedly nurtured contacts with East
Timorese thugs such as Lafaek, while Simbolon sponsored a militia
group named Mahidi.

Tomas Gonzalves, one of the most dedicated pro-integration
figures, referred to these shadowy networks as he spoke about
"intense contacts" that forced him to mobilize the militia in his
district. The degree of threat and secrecy was obvious, as he was
too scared to reveal the fact, even after he had taken refuge in
Macau after deserting the militia (Radio Netherlands, Oct. 6,
1999).

The report Masters of Terror, issued in 2002 (see
www.yayasanhak.minihub.org), so far the most complete profile of
key suspects of the Jakarta-sponsored violence in 1999, appears
to confirm this impression. Some media have also suggested
similar networks based on the conversations between local
officers and militia leaders, as intercepted by Australian
intelligence (Sydney Morning Herald, March 13, 2002).

As the three Polkam "liaison officers" -- Zacky Anwar Makarim,
Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Glen Kairupan -- had extensive experience
with operations in conflict areas, their juniors, Damiri and
Simbolon, were later assigned to Aceh and Papua.

Gen. Damiri's role thus appeared to be key in the greater
picture, marking a regime of impunity that protected army
operations in conflict areas.

If Gen. (ret) Wiranto became the next president of Indonesia,
he would then be the first suspect of human rights crimes to
reach the apex of the republic. The impunity would then come full
circle and he, not Gen. Damiri, would be the symbolic
personification of impunity.