It's a cover-up

A special committee of the House of Representatives reopened on Thursday the investigation into the death of four students of the privately run Trisakti University in Jakarta nearly three years ago. "Who shot the students?" and "Why?" are the two questions that have haunted the nation since the May 12, 1998 tragic deaths of Heri Hartanto, Elang Mulya Lesmana, Hafidin Royan and Hendriawan Sie on their campus.

The nation needs to find the answers, not only for the sake of justice and to bring those responsible to account, but also because the deaths could explain the mystery about one of the major turning points in the history of this country.

Their deaths precipitated widespread street violence in Jakarta, and prompted thousands of students to occupy the House of Representatives building in protest against the tyrannical regime of president Soeharto. The end result was the resignation of Soeharto on May 21, 1998. Finding answers about their deaths would go a long way in explaining the collapse of the regime.

We have learned from the police investigation that the students were shot by snipers, and that the bullets removed from their bodies came from military-issue rifles. From the beginning, all facts have pointed to the military, the only organization with the capability to mount such an operation without leaving any trail.

The Indonesian Military as an institution may not have been involved, but it at least has a responsibility to help discover the identity of the snipers and the unit they belong to. But with the military leadership, both past and present, not fully cooperating with the investigations, these perplexing questions remain unanswered.

The military's attitude has further reaffirmed suspicions of a conspiracy at the highest level. Going by the end result of the shooting of students, the theory suggests a conspiracy to bring down the Soeharto government. The military's silence, or refusal to cooperate, further suggests a cover-up.

This is not unlike the killing of six Army generals in September 1965 which precipitated massive violence that led to the downfall of president Sukarno six months later. While the killing was widely blamed on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), theories still abound about who the real perpetrators were and their motive, especially since the main beneficiary of these events was the Army leadership itself. Like the events surrounding the power struggle in 1965/1966, we have yet to hear the last word about the events surrounding Soeharto's downfall.

The House's special committee on Thursday heard the testimony of Gen. (ret) Wiranto, the man who as chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces at the time was responsible for the security of the country. His response on Thursday, as expected, was to entirely wash his hands of the matter. He also refused to shed any light on which unit might have been responsible for the shooting, or to name the field commander who should have been held responsible.

His well-rehearsed line of defense, that the antigovernment protests by students were becoming increasingly violent as the reason for the clashes with security officers, fell flat because there was no suggestion that the particular demonstration by the Trisakti students on that day would turn violent. In fact, the shooting took place just as the students were retreating into their campus after their passage to the street to rally was blocked by security personnel.

The military leadership may think that it can continue to play this game of covering up and protecting its officers, but this show of solidarity is increasingly coming at the expense of the military's credibility and reputation. We have seen the devastating impact of this show of solidarity in protecting officers against investigations of human rights atrocities in East Timor and Aceh. This policy is only doing irreparable damage to the military's already low public standing.

Someone in the military must know the answer to these questions. The House's special committee should draw them out, such as by offering a reward and/or legal protection for those who come forward and tell the truth about these events, and to testify against their seniors or colleagues. Ultimately, however, it is those in the military leadership who should realize that it would be in their own long-term best interest to come clean, and to cooperate with all the investigations into errant officers.