Israel at 50: New strategic challenges in defense

LONDON: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is on the verge of unprecedented change that will have profound implications for its doctrine, equipment and organization, as well as for its relations with Israeli society. Both internal and external, as well as strategic and social, factors are driving this transformation. For instance, a number of developments have altered the balance of power in the Middle East, including:

* the end of the Cold War;

* the signing of peace agreements with neighboring Arab states, especially the September 1993 Israel-Jordan Common Agenda;

* the continuing impasse in the peace process with the Palestinian Authority (PA); and

* the emergence of new long-range threats to Israel from Iran and Iraq.

Israel's current defense doctrine is increasingly unsuited to the challenges now facing the country. Indeed, the IDF's present strategy of responding to security problems with overwhelming force could even prove to be a liability.

Israeli military strategy has traditionally been based on the following principles: taking the war to its adversaries; fighting whenever possible on enemy territory; and bringing any encounter to a satisfactory conclusion within a time-frame of its own choosing. This strategy was essentially in response to necessity, Israel's limited strategic depth, the numerical troop superiority of enemy countries, and the IDF's dependence on mobilizing reserve soldiers.

Israel developed a highly effective armored force that could infiltrate enemy territory, and counter and overwhelm the opposition's mechanized units. The dominance of Israeli air power -- still unrivaled in the region -- and its arms industry's ability to tailor weaponry to the IDF's specific needs, all played a key part in this approach.

The strategic environment has changed dramatically since the Six Day War of 1967. The only 'traditional' military threat currently facing Israel comes from Syrian troops on the Golan Heights. The imbroglio with Hizbollah in Lebanon remains a low- intensity conflict of limited strategic significance.

Israel's security doctrine has failed to keep pace with this transformation. The occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for instance, imposed new policing responsibilities on the armed forces, for which they were unsuited. Moreover, the caustic effects of the occupation upon Israeli society have also had an impact on the IDF.

While the IDF's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories would raise new challenges and potential threats for Israel, the move might contribute towards improving the military's sense of purpose and self-image.

The long-range threat from countries such as Iran and Iraq is raising new strategic dilemmas for Israel. The fact that a future attack might involve biological or chemical weapons, for example, places greater importance on acquiring new means to defend Israeli cities. As a result of the spread of long-range ballistic-missile technology, countries such as Iran and Iraq now pose a direct threat to Israel. The Iraqi Scud attacks during the 1991 Gulf War underlined the concerns of many Israeli citizens.

Key factors that will eventually allow Israel to respond to its security problems in a more defensive -- rather than offensive -- manner include the development of advanced military hardware and the application of information technology to the defense sector.

Israel is investing heavily in both defensive measures, such as the Arrow anti-ballistic-missile system, and its own intelligence-gathering satellites, as well as new offensive capabilities, including advanced U.S. F-15I fighter aircraft. More resources are also being invested in protecting Israel's densely concentrated population centers. For example, all citizens receive gas masks and anti-nerve-gas injections. Most analysts stress, however, that the proliferation of ballistic- missile technology -- while highly emotive -- does not constitute an existential threat to the country.

Israeli defense planners must also contend with the possibility of a second intifada, which is complicated by the danger of a confrontation with the PA's armed police force.

The Army has been trained for missions where it would re-enter areas already handed over to the PA. Given the likely loss of civilian life, and the operation's political costs, this initiative must be seen as contingency planning for a worst-case scenario. But if the Palestinian peace process falters, large- scale violence could erupt, which, like the first intifada, may be caused by local events beyond the PA's control.

Given the diversity of the strategic challenges now facing Israel, new ways will have to be found to square the security circle. Amidst all the changes, some old factors will remain: resource shortages; the importance of maintaining air superiority; and the need to retain significant armored formations to counter the threat from Syria.

However, a new doctrine will drive the IDF's reorganization. Israel is already a world leader in the development of unmanned aerial vehicles, one of the key technologies changing battlefield awareness. The combination of modern information-gathering and command systems, together with precision weaponry and much greater fire-power, could fundamentally alter its approach to defense planning. These developments would allow Israel to adopt a more defensive posture, as well as giving it the ability to disrupt enemy forces on their own territory, without projecting huge armored formations beyond its national frontiers.

Israel's arms sector is ideally suited to produce the technologies that will propel this revolution. However, if the industry is to survive, difficult decisions are going to have to be taken concerning ownership and concentration. Furthermore, although Israeli technology is certainly first class, its fragmented defense sector -- much of which is still owned by the state -- is not structurally prepared to compete for vital export sales with Russian, U.S. and West European companies.

However, Israeli defense manufacturers may benefit significantly from the strategic ties that Israel has recently forged with Turkey. While the Israeli authorities insist that neighboring Arab states should not view the relationship as threatening, intelligence contacts and other ties with Ankara might allow Israel to monitor developments in Syria and, more importantly, in Iran.

Social change is having a significant impact on the military. With a population of approximately six million, Israel is a small country, but it is no longer tiny. Growing affluence and the peace process have created a society that is much more individualistic and critical of national institutions. While this should not necessarily be seen as a sign of weakness, it does imply that a new relationship is emerging between Israeli society and the IDF.

Above all, the divisive nature of the internal political debate on the peace process and the future of the Occupied Territories has fractured national consensus on defense issues. The military has (often unwillingly) been drawn into this highly politicized arena.

Israel has traditionally relied upon conscription to staff its armed forces, supported by significant male and female reserve units. The IDF likes to see itself as a mirror of the society it serves. To some extent this has always been a fiction, since Arab Israelis and ultra-orthodox Jews are generally not recruited by the military. The IDF has recently become even less representative, with immigrants over 18 years old not being drafted for the armed forces.

The issue of military service is now more divisive than unifying. Religious deferments are increasing, the burden of reserve duty is spread extremely unequally, and there is a noticeable drop in the number of young Israelis wishing to serve in elite combat units. According to some estimates, only half of the population will have experienced traditional military service by 2000.

The constant need to reduce military expenditure raises fundamental questions about the future of the conscription system. There is increasing talk of establishing some form of civilian service through which everyone could contribute to the defense of the state.

Although conscription will continue, if only because there is no other way to provide reserve units, human resources will have to be used more efficiently in future. Further advances in military technology may well require that key parts of the Army -- intelligence and communication units, for instance -- become more professional.

The IDF is currently coming under much greater domestic criticism than it has done in the past. While it is still by far the most popular national institution, Israel's older generation is more likely to question the conditions under which their children serve. This factor has already extended into the policy arena, with the much-publicized campaign by a group of mothers pressing for a full military withdrawal from Lebanon. Such criticism, together with the debate surrounding a series of accidents and operational disappointments, has raised questions about the IDF's capabilities.

This contention has a strategic significance, since Israel's much-vaunted military capabilities have always bolstered its deterrent message. Analysts insist that there is no common thread linking the setbacks in Lebanon, for instance, with the doubts being expressed about the role of the armed forces. The debate is not a sign of weakness, but of the maturity of Israeli society. The country has changed dramatically over the past ten years, and while the security dilemmas have to some extent become less pressing, they are currently much more complex, posing fundamental challenges to traditional doctrine.