Thu, 23 Dec 1999

Islamic values and civil society

By Komaruddin Hidayat

JAKARTA (JP): All the major religions of the world, such as Hinduism, the Jewish religion, Christianity and Islam, did not rely on bureaucratic and institutional power in the early days of their movement, but rather on the power of the founders, who offered freedom from the tyranny oppressing the people.

These figures were usually supported by alternative and visionary ideas so that at their inception all religious movements could easily win militant support from the oppressed. However, when a religious movement developed with a large body of followers and gave birth to political institutions with religious characteristics, various deviations and betrayals of the underlying message of the religion in question began.

While a religion was originally very much concerned with the struggle for human rights, justice and the principles of democracy, a religion-based political institution was frequently the other way around. This phenomenon is evident throughout history, in which dynasties and forces with religious characteristics often resorted to authoritarian and feudalistic political practices, hiding behind the authority of clerics coalescing with dynastic rulers. At this point a religious authority collaborated with a political authority in such a way that a culture of criticism could hardly develop.

If we observe the history of political development in Islam it would be no exaggeration to conclude that the Islamic world is in fact still devoid of a tradition of a civil society in the understanding and context of Western society. Although the term masyarakat madani (the Indonesian equivalent to "civil society") is gaining popularity today, historically and conceptually there is a fundamental difference between the civil society as known in the West and what is termed here as masyarakat madani.

The genealogy of Western civil society came into being out of historic-empirical experiences which placed religion outside politics. The teaching of the church "to leave religion to the church and politics to the state" contributed to the theological legitimacy of a secular-humanistic civil society in the West.

In the history of Islam, the concept of a civil society came about as a legacy of the Prophet Muhammad, the messenger and the founder of the Islamic movement. The model of society in Madinah in Saudi Arabia, which was the greatest legacy of Muhammad, was maintained and continued by his successors. Unfortunately, the Islamic political tradition and structure which was originally highly egalitarian, underwent great deviation when it fell to dynastic powers. The long history of Islam is one of the ups and downs of various dynasties relying upon ulema and blue blood descendants. This is why, toward a modern era stressing democracy, justice, egalitarianism, human rights and transparency, the political tradition of the Islamic world began to look bleak and needed reform.

In the Indonesian context, since its inception, this nation has, theoretically, progressed ahead of others in the Islamic world. The choice of a republic and of Pancasila as its ideology meant the application of the principles of a civil society in a modern sense, despite the fact that the majority of the population is Muslim. The seedlings and legacy of Islam have been fostered here together with those of modernity from the West. Not surprisingly, widely accepted politicians and scientists who are known to be critical are those who inherited the Islamic tradition and have also acquired modern Western education.

The spirit of Islam and modernity grows on Indonesian soil, which in turn will give birth to what has been termed the "modern-Indo-Muslim." What has been imagined of Indonesian society is an ideal and an image marked by, among other things, religious pluralism and democracy, the realization of which must still be fought for together.

In a traditional community, religious institutions and figures can easily be used to attain political power, but in a democratic era this will no longer be effective and acceptable. Even if Indonesia refuses to be dubbed a secular state, a number of basic elements of the system of a secular state have already taken shape, as indicated by the strengthening of democracy and a multi-party system here. To reach political power one must be elected by the public, and can no longer rely on religious authority.

Interestingly in the previous general election religious- oriented political parties lost, and those with a nationalistic ideology won more votes. This reality reinforces the emergence of democratic and pluralistic Indonesia, leading to a significant shift in the traditional role of religion.

It is true that in the election, religious figures and symbols still exerted great influence in order to gain votes. But future public demand of political actors will shift to quality, professionalism and morality instead of religious figures depending on their established ties and emotional loyalties of potential voters. However, we have to be ready for disappointment in view of the development of political culture here which has yet to become rational. Suspicions, intrigues and political maneuvers based on ideology still seem strong enough to stay. In the tradition of Western society, the term "ideology" has a negative connotation because an ideological power relies more on emotional strength, simplification of problems and manipulation of the masses; it always assumes there is an enemy to be conquered, leading to constraints in a win-win solution in view of such an exclusive character.

Yet, in Indonesia, the term and power of ideology is apparently still strong and is being preserved because of its association with religious militancy and ethnic identity.

In this transitional period, in which political and economic stability is yet to be seen, it is highly likely that ideological forces based on religious and ethnic sentiments will be reinforced. The final target of reform -- upholding supremacy of the law and the creation of a democratic political climate -- would suffer a setback.

Support for our foreign policies under President Abdurrahman Wahid would be useless unless followed by domestic restructuring of politics and the economy. The trouble is that the forces of interest groups, and ethnic and religious groups, have indicated mutual suspicion and efforts of disrupting each other instead of closing their ranks to solve the nation's acute problems. While in continental Europe there is a centripetal movement in which small states formerly embroiled in disputes are now approaching one another, in Indonesia our unity is instead threatened by centrifugal motions.

Ironically, the military so far considers these forces to be a unifying one for the nation and was the disintegrating factor under former president Soeharto since its role was coopted by rulers' political adventures. This led to various human rights violations leading to the emergence of these centrifugal motions.

The writer is chairman of the Paramadina Foundation which pursues Islamic studies and is also a professor of philosophy.