Islamic radical movements in Indonesia

Islamic radical movements in Indonesia

Azyumardi Azra
Jakarta

The root causes of radicalism among Muslims in modern times
are very complex. This complexity has become even greater lately
because of the numerous driving factors that are working to
influence the socio-historical course of Muslim societies as a
whole.

Looking at the whole history of radicalism among Muslims, I
would argue that radicalism among Muslims is more political than
religious. In some instances, the original motive may have been
religious, but it soon became very political.

The idea of establishing an Islamic state (dawlah al-
Islamiyyah) is one of the most crucial issues that is on and off
among certain groups of Muslims in Indonesia. Certain groups
among the moderates, such as the Masjumi party under the
leadership of Mohammad Natsir, for instance, have also attempted
to transform Indonesia into a dawlah al-Islamiyyah.

It is important to point out that the attempts were carried
out through legal and constitutional means, more precisely,
through the legislature. But the idea failed to materialize,
mainly because Islamic parties had been involved in quarrels and
conflicts among themselves.

At the same time, however, there remain individuals and Muslim
groups who are keeping alive the idea of establishing an Islamic
state here. Depending on the political situation, these people
can operate underground or openly in trying to achieve their
goal. They may also collaborate with certain elements of unhappy
military officers or even with other radical groups which, in
terms of ideology, would seem to be incompatible; this awkward
collaboration can be called a "marriage for convenience".

Therefore, one should be very careful in his/her analysis and
perspective of radical groups; some of them could be genuine,
motivated mostly by religious reasons, but some others could be
"engineered" radicals sponsored by certain individuals and groups
of people for their own political ends.

The fall of president Soeharto after more than three decades
of power unleashed the then idle Muslim radicals. The euphoria of
newly found democracy, and the lifting of the "anti-subversive
law" by president BJ Habibie, provided very good ground for the
radicals to express their extremism and radical ideas and
activities in a more visible manner. The lack of law enforcement
because of the demoralization of the National Police and the
Indonesian Military (TNI) created a kind of legal vacuum that has
been used by the radical groups to take the law into their own
hands.

Some of the most important radical groups should be mentioned
in this account. They are the Lasykar Jihad, formed by the Forum
Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wa al-Jamaah under the leadership of
Ja`far Umar Thalib; the Front Pembela Islam (FPI/Islam Defenders
Front) led by Habib Rizq Shihab; the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
(MMI/Council of Indonesian Jihad Fighters) led by Abu Bakar
Baasyir; Jamaah Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia (JAMI) led by Habib
Husein al-Habsyi; and Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI/Indonesian
Party of Liberation).

It is important that some of these groups have been either
disbanded by their own leaders -- like Lasykar Jihad -- or have
been idle or have been lying low after the arrests and trials of
a number of the perpetrators of the Bali and Marriott Hotel
bombings.

It is important to make clear, however, that though these
radical groups, to a certain degree, tend to be violent, there is
no clear evidence that they have also been involved in terrorism.
Most of -- if not all -- terrorist activities in Indonesia have
been conducted by individuals or groups of individuals that in
one way or another have a certain connection or links with
Azahari and Noordin M. Top.

It is clear that all of these radical groups mentioned above
are independent and have no connection with established
organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and the
like; nor are they affiliated with Islamic political parties.
This indicates that the radical groups do not trust other
established Muslim organizations, either socio-religious or
political in nature.

There are at least two categories for these radical groups:
the first is radical groups that are basically homegrown,
including Lasykar Jihad, the FPI and some other smaller groups.

The second category is Middle Eastern-affiliated or oriented
groups, like JAMI, which has its origin in al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun
in Egypt, and Hibz al-Tahrir, which was initially founded in
Jordan by Syaikh Taqi al-Din Nabhani in the 1950s.

Despite this distinction, all of these radical groups have a
very strong Middle Eastern-oriented ideology, which they believe
to be the most genuinely Islamic worldview.

A series of terrorist bombings in Indonesia, beginning in
Legian, Bali, in October 2002, followed by the Marriott Hotel in
Jakarta in 2003, the bombing near the Australian Embassy in
Jakarta (Sept. 9, 2004), and most recently the second Bali
bombings, is certainly a sad human tragedy in contemporary
Indonesia. In fact, the bombings reflect a new phase of violence
and terror in the country.

Worse is the fact that the perpetrators of the Australian
Embassy and the second Bali bombings were suicide attackers,
reminding one of the Palestinian suicide bombers. It is difficult
for Indonesian people in general to believe that individuals
among them are increasingly becoming so ruthless and inhumane in
the name of jihad.

But now, after intensive police investigation, the first Bali,
Marriott Hotel, Australian Embassy and second Bali bombings, for
several reasons, could be seen as a "blessing a disguise".

First, police have been able not only to catch the alleged
perpetrators of the bombings, but also to uncover some fresh
evidence on the networks of terrorists in Indonesia and Southeast
Asia in general. The revelation of the networks has been crucial
for establishing the fact that networks of radicals have been
working in Southeast Asia.

Second, the revelation of the terrorist networks by the police
in so convincing a manner has silenced most of the skeptics, who
from the first Bali blasts have maintained that the bombings were
simply a Western plot to discredit Islam and destroy the image of
Muslims in the country.

The disclosure of networks of radicals has apparently showed
people that this "conspiracy theory" does not ring true. The
statements by Amrozi, Imam Samudra and their accomplices,
involved in the Bali and other bombings, make it clear that the
bombings were motivated both by "genuine" radicalism and hatred
against the U.S. and other Western powers. The fact that the
perpetrators have shown no remorse for the innocent victims has
further strengthened the idea that they were motivated by their
own terrorist ideology rather than by anything else.

Third, the revelation of the terrorist networks points to the
fact that there are indeed terrorists among Indonesians, who
happen to be Muslims and who are more than happy to use violent
means to achieve their ends. Before the police disclosure, there
had been widespread reluctance among Indonesia's Muslim leaders
to admit there were Islamic terrorists here misusing the
teachings of Islam to justify their terrorist activities.

The events following the second Bali bombings, however, have
seen some shift in the attitude of Muslim leaders. They agree
that the bombings were not part of a legitimate jihad, as
asserted by the suicide bombers, and that it is prohibited to
conduct jihad in such a way and, similarly, it is also prohibited
to be a suicide bomber.

Furthermore, Muslim leaders agreed to disseminate, on a large
scale, the teachings of true jihad among Muslims across Indonesia
in an effort to help prevent terrorist groups from recruiting new
members and carrying out attacks and suicide bombings. They also
acknowledged that terrorism was being carried out by Muslims
using heretical Islamic teachings.

There is no doubt now is the time for Muslim leaders in
Indonesia and Southeast Asia, the majority of whom are moderate,
to sincerely admit that there is a serious problem of radicalism,
not to mention terrorism, among certain Muslim individuals and
groups.

Therefore, it is time for moderate Muslim leaders to make more
clear that a literal interpretation of Islam will only lead to
extremism, which is unacceptable to Islam, and that Islam cannot
condone, let alone justify, any kind of violent or terrorist act.

Furthermore, moderate Muslim leaders should not be misled by
the claims and assertions of the radicals. The radicals are
shrewd not only in abusing Islamic doctrines for their own ends,
but also in manipulating Muslim sentiment through the abuse and
manipulation of the media, particularly television. The claims
that the arrests of certain radical leaders means the suppression
of Islam and the "ulema" (Muslim religious scholars) are very
misleading.

Similarly, the claims that police investigations in Indonesia
of certain pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) in the search of
the perpetrators of the bombings is the initial step toward
hostility and suspicion of all pesantren are even more
misleading.

I suggest that one of the most important root causes of
violence and terrorism in present-day Indonesia is the almost
complete absence of law enforcement and, worse still, impunity.
In fact, the law enforcement vacuum has been an important raison
d'etre for certain radical groups to take the law into their own
hands through unlawful activities such as raids on discotheques,
nightclubs and other places the radicals believe cause social
ills.

Above all, the future of moderate and peaceful Indonesian
Islam is dependent on the fair, objective, proactive attitude of
the moderate majority to respond to any developments among
Muslims in the region. A reactionary and defensive attitude is
not going to help in the efforts to show to the world that Islam
is a peaceful religion and that Muslims are peace loving people.

Again, it is time for the moderates to be more assertive and
lead the way to reestablish the peaceful nature of Islam in
Indonesia and Southeast Asia in general.

The writer is a professor of history and rector of
Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta. This
article is an excerpt of a paper presented at the 17th Asia
Pacific Roundtable on Confidence Building and Conflict Resolution
in Jakarta.