Islamic groups and the student movement

Islamic groups and the student movement

By Muhammad Qodari

JAKARTA (JP): There is a small, but interesting detail about
the student movement since it first toppled Soeharto from the
presidency in 1998.

The students against both Soeharto and his predecessor B.J.
Habibie used to use the Atamajaya Catholic University as their
base. The reason was simple: the campus was near Senayan, the
location of the highest bodies of the House of Representatives
and the People's Consultative Assembly, which were centers of
student rallies.

Nowadays the campus is no longer used by groups who advocate
that President Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur, resign. Those
grouped against Gus Dur are in the student councils of state
universities in Java or Sumatra.

Atmajaya is no longer used because it is Catholic; while the
alliance of student council activists and those wanting Gus Dur
to resign largely comprise of Islamic activists.

The rhetoric of neutrality of student movements begs a closer
look. So far those demanding Gus Dur's resignation claim they are
only rallying for six reform agendas: an end to the dual function
of the military and police, the amendment to the 1945
Constitution, implementation of regional autonomy, law
enforcement, democracy and trial for Soeharto and his cronies.

What they are not openly revealing to the public is the
interests of Islamic groups behind demands that Gus Dur resign.

Student movements demanding that Gus Dur quit have led to the
temporary alliance of activists of the Indonesian Muslim
Students' Action Front (KAMMI), and the Association of Islamic
Students (HMI).

The alliance is merely temporary because the two organizations
are reportedly in tight competition over important posts in
formal university organizations.

In the past five to 10 years activists who are now in KAMMI
have gradually controlled all student organizations on various
campuses, in place of the formerly dominant HMI members. For now
they have one enemy: Gus Dur.

Officially KAMMI was born in 1998 following the rallies which
eventually toppled Soeharto. The movement developed in Indonesia
in the 1980s, with bases on campuses and high schools mainly on
Java and Sumatra.

The movement was not as explicit as conventional organizations
identified on religious lines such as the older HMI and the
Nahdlatul Ulama-affiliated Indonesian Muslim Students' Movement
(PMII).

The structure of KAMMI embryos were in the form of cell
networks. Their ideology is heavily influenced by leading figures
of the Egypt-based Ikhwanul Muslimin organization such as Hasan
Al-Banna, Sayyid Quthb, Muhammad Quthb, and Yusuf Qhardawi.

The teachings, dubbed neo-revivalism of Islam by some
observers, strongly tends to reject secular, "contemporary
-isms". Devotees believe that Islam fell from its golden age
because believers no longer held on to "pure" teachings. Islam is
believed to be the most comprehensive "ism", being the teachings
of Allah.

Proponents of KAMMI, who are largely supporters of the Justice
Party, have never seen Gus Dur as their idol.

They have never even seen the Nahdlatul Ulama as a "truly
Islamic" organization either. Gus Dur is seen as an Islamic
leader with little, if any, accommodation to issues considered
important to this neo-revivalist group.

Actions of Gus Dur considered by them to give offense included
the opening of trade ties with Israel, the perceived lack of his
support towards Palestine and his proposal to lift the ban on
communism. His remarks regarding those guilty in Ambon and North
Jakarta and his recent statement that the Ajinomoto seasoner was
'halal,' have been other issues offending many Muslims of these
"neo-revivalist" groups.

In the competition for positions on campus such groups used
religion as an issue, known as "green-non green" (green
identified with Islam) while others were not so explicit.

Other students rejected these sectarian issues and opposed
being labeled secular or non Islam. However in the midst of
student politics of the 1990s and given a strong commando-like
structure in their organization, the neo-revivalists managed to
take over strategic posts in student university organizations.

When B.J. Habibie replaced Soeharto, student bodies of KAMMI,
HMI, or the University of Indonesia student executive body (BEM)
were not among those who demonstrated, demanding that the
transitional president step down.

Habibie was considered a figure representing Islamic
interests; he was not perceived as part of the rotten New Order
versus the reform movement.

Gus Dur is seen more as an "enemy" of Islam as opposed to the
"friends" of Islam.

There are now fears that the anti-Gus Dur movement could be
used by New Order elements seeking to take advantage of the
current situation.

It is regrettable that the political paradigm of the new
Indonesian generation is still restricted to the above "Islamic
interests versus secular interests".

Toward the end of his 32-year period in office, Soeharto
appealed to Islamic sentiment to seek support from Islamic
interest groups, following cracks in the formerly solid military.

The effect of this manipulation was that the attitude of many
of these Islamic groups became set against pro-democracy
movements, which were identified with "secular forces."

They could not see that the pro-democracy movement was not
against Soeharto, the promoter of Islamic interests; the movement
was against Soeharto as an authoritarian leader whose style of
government was a major cause of the suffering of many in society.

The writer is a researcher at the Jakarta-based Institute for
the Study of Flow of Information, and chaired the Eka Prasetya
study group from 1995 to 1996 at the University of Indonesia.