Islamic groups and the student movement

By Muhammad Qodari

JAKARTA (JP): There is a small, but interesting detail about the student movement since it first toppled Soeharto from the presidency in 1998.

The students against both Soeharto and his predecessor B.J. Habibie used to use the Atamajaya Catholic University as their base. The reason was simple: the campus was near Senayan, the location of the highest bodies of the House of Representatives and the People's Consultative Assembly, which were centers of student rallies.

Nowadays the campus is no longer used by groups who advocate that President Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur, resign. Those grouped against Gus Dur are in the student councils of state universities in Java or Sumatra.

Atmajaya is no longer used because it is Catholic; while the alliance of student council activists and those wanting Gus Dur to resign largely comprise of Islamic activists.

The rhetoric of neutrality of student movements begs a closer look. So far those demanding Gus Dur's resignation claim they are only rallying for six reform agendas: an end to the dual function of the military and police, the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, implementation of regional autonomy, law enforcement, democracy and trial for Soeharto and his cronies.

What they are not openly revealing to the public is the interests of Islamic groups behind demands that Gus Dur resign.

Student movements demanding that Gus Dur quit have led to the temporary alliance of activists of the Indonesian Muslim Students' Action Front (KAMMI), and the Association of Islamic Students (HMI).

The alliance is merely temporary because the two organizations are reportedly in tight competition over important posts in formal university organizations.

In the past five to 10 years activists who are now in KAMMI have gradually controlled all student organizations on various campuses, in place of the formerly dominant HMI members. For now they have one enemy: Gus Dur.

Officially KAMMI was born in 1998 following the rallies which eventually toppled Soeharto. The movement developed in Indonesia in the 1980s, with bases on campuses and high schools mainly on Java and Sumatra.

The movement was not as explicit as conventional organizations identified on religious lines such as the older HMI and the Nahdlatul Ulama-affiliated Indonesian Muslim Students' Movement (PMII).

The structure of KAMMI embryos were in the form of cell networks. Their ideology is heavily influenced by leading figures of the Egypt-based Ikhwanul Muslimin organization such as Hasan Al-Banna, Sayyid Quthb, Muhammad Quthb, and Yusuf Qhardawi.

The teachings, dubbed neo-revivalism of Islam by some observers, strongly tends to reject secular, "contemporary -isms". Devotees believe that Islam fell from its golden age because believers no longer held on to "pure" teachings. Islam is believed to be the most comprehensive "ism", being the teachings of Allah.

Proponents of KAMMI, who are largely supporters of the Justice Party, have never seen Gus Dur as their idol.

They have never even seen the Nahdlatul Ulama as a "truly Islamic" organization either. Gus Dur is seen as an Islamic leader with little, if any, accommodation to issues considered important to this neo-revivalist group.

Actions of Gus Dur considered by them to give offense included the opening of trade ties with Israel, the perceived lack of his support towards Palestine and his proposal to lift the ban on communism. His remarks regarding those guilty in Ambon and North Jakarta and his recent statement that the Ajinomoto seasoner was 'halal,' have been other issues offending many Muslims of these "neo-revivalist" groups.

In the competition for positions on campus such groups used religion as an issue, known as "green-non green" (green identified with Islam) while others were not so explicit.

Other students rejected these sectarian issues and opposed being labeled secular or non Islam. However in the midst of student politics of the 1990s and given a strong commando-like structure in their organization, the neo-revivalists managed to take over strategic posts in student university organizations.

When B.J. Habibie replaced Soeharto, student bodies of KAMMI, HMI, or the University of Indonesia student executive body (BEM) were not among those who demonstrated, demanding that the transitional president step down.

Habibie was considered a figure representing Islamic interests; he was not perceived as part of the rotten New Order versus the reform movement.

Gus Dur is seen more as an "enemy" of Islam as opposed to the "friends" of Islam.

There are now fears that the anti-Gus Dur movement could be used by New Order elements seeking to take advantage of the current situation.

It is regrettable that the political paradigm of the new Indonesian generation is still restricted to the above "Islamic interests versus secular interests".

Toward the end of his 32-year period in office, Soeharto appealed to Islamic sentiment to seek support from Islamic interest groups, following cracks in the formerly solid military.

The effect of this manipulation was that the attitude of many of these Islamic groups became set against pro-democracy movements, which were identified with "secular forces."

They could not see that the pro-democracy movement was not against Soeharto, the promoter of Islamic interests; the movement was against Soeharto as an authoritarian leader whose style of government was a major cause of the suffering of many in society.

The writer is a researcher at the Jakarta-based Institute for the Study of Flow of Information, and chaired the Eka Prasetya study group from 1995 to 1996 at the University of Indonesia.