Islam, national identity and democracy

Islam, national identity and democracy

Muhammad Qodari
Indonesian Survey Institute
Jakarta
qodari@hotmail.com

Suspected terrorists such as Hambali, Imam Samudra, Amrozi and
the Jamaah Islamiyah network have raised questions regarding the
link between Islam, national identity and democracy.

Why? First, these people claimed Islam was the motive behind
the bombing of various places in Indonesia, resulting in almost
250 deaths and many more people injured. Perhaps their cause was
just, but the means was violent and against democracy.

These people live, build networks and operate in many
countries. They claim to fight for the interests of people in far
away lands such as the Palestinians. The target of the attacks is
also foreign, such as U.S. citizens and Westerners.

People like Hambali and his group strengthen the image --
pervasive in Western society -- of Islam as a religion
incompatible with democracy. The image has also been justified by
academic figures such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington.

Huntington argues that Islam stands for the unity of religion
and state. That is why, for Muslims, it is impossible to separate
the "mosque" from the "king", the religious authority from the
political.

The religious authority in Islam is the ulema. As the religion
comprises of God's teachings -- to be applied in every aspect of
human life -- politics must be subsumed under religion. Ulemas
are the ones who master the religion. It is therefore legitimate
for them to rule "politics".

A democracy, where the government (political authority) is to
be selected by the people, is thus against religious teaching as
the chosen ones may not necessarily be ulemas.

This line of argument seems to be backed by people like
Hambali and the Jamaah Islamiyah network.

Hambali and his colleagues are reportedly members of the
Jamaah Islamiyah organization that, according to investigations,
aspires to establish a pan-Islamic country in Southeast Asia.
This is due to the belief that the Muslim community should be
treated as one entity or ummah.

The belief in the ummah contradicts another modern political
conception that despite the religion an individual holds, he or
she belongs to a national identity. We can conclude that Hambali
was born an Indonesian, lived in Malaysia, fought against the
Soviets in Afghanistan, and was captured in Thailand while
holding a Spanish passport.

Apart from speculation as to what his actual citizenship is,
it is also possible that Hambali is stateless. If he believes in
the ummah, he may have decided not to "subscribe" to any
citizenship.

To him, his main and foremost identity is not as an Indonesian
born from a Sundanese mother in West Java; his identity is not
"national" but "universal", a "citizen" of the ummah. So he would
not be struggling for "domestic" reasons, say the marginalization
of Islamic groups in Indonesia, but for "global" causes (so long
as they concerned Muslims).

It is likely that only very few Muslims hold such beliefs. But
these terrorist acts have attracted worldwide media coverage,
which in turn promotes the idea that most Muslims are like this.

A recent world survey by prominent political scientists Pippa
Norris and Ronald Inglehart revealed that Muslims are not really
different from non-Muslims. Muslims are just as supportive of
democracy as Christians, Buddhist, Hindus, or non-believers.

People like Hambali are an exception to Muslims worldwide and
in Indonesia. Of interest here is a new study, written by Saiful
Mujani for his dissertation at the Ohio State University in the
U.S., titled Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim
Participation in Post Suharto Era.

On the basis of the data he collected in two national surveys
in 2001 and 2002, Mujani argues that being a Muslim does not
necessarily mean being against democracy. Being religious can
even produce "social capital" -- an important element of
democracy -- as long as one gets involved in collective
religious practices, such as collective prayers, and activities
such as joining religious organizations.

As for Muslim organizations, the two biggest in Indonesia,
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, both publicly support
democracy and their founders were among the republic's pioneers.
Its leaders despise bombings and other types of terrorist acts.

Nowadays there is no separatist movement which is Islamist in
nature, not even in Aceh where the Islamic influence is very
strong.

This also applies to past separatist movements. In the 1950s
Kahar Muzakkar and Kartosuwiryo led rebellions in South Sulawesi
and West Java, respectively. But the true motive behind their
struggle was disappointment toward Jakarta's regional development
policy -- not the self professed aspiration to establish a pan-
Islamic state in Southeast Asia or beyond.

The Islamic beliefs held by people like Hambali and other
alleged terrorists are the beliefs of the minority of Muslims,
both in Indonesia and the international community, in the past or
the present.