Islam, national identity and democracy

Muhammad Qodari Indonesian Survey Institute Jakarta qodari@hotmail.com

Suspected terrorists such as Hambali, Imam Samudra, Amrozi and the Jamaah Islamiyah network have raised questions regarding the link between Islam, national identity and democracy.

Why? First, these people claimed Islam was the motive behind the bombing of various places in Indonesia, resulting in almost 250 deaths and many more people injured. Perhaps their cause was just, but the means was violent and against democracy.

These people live, build networks and operate in many countries. They claim to fight for the interests of people in far away lands such as the Palestinians. The target of the attacks is also foreign, such as U.S. citizens and Westerners.

People like Hambali and his group strengthen the image -- pervasive in Western society -- of Islam as a religion incompatible with democracy. The image has also been justified by academic figures such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington.

Huntington argues that Islam stands for the unity of religion and state. That is why, for Muslims, it is impossible to separate the "mosque" from the "king", the religious authority from the political.

The religious authority in Islam is the ulema. As the religion comprises of God's teachings -- to be applied in every aspect of human life -- politics must be subsumed under religion. Ulemas are the ones who master the religion. It is therefore legitimate for them to rule "politics".

A democracy, where the government (political authority) is to be selected by the people, is thus against religious teaching as the chosen ones may not necessarily be ulemas.

This line of argument seems to be backed by people like Hambali and the Jamaah Islamiyah network.

Hambali and his colleagues are reportedly members of the Jamaah Islamiyah organization that, according to investigations, aspires to establish a pan-Islamic country in Southeast Asia. This is due to the belief that the Muslim community should be treated as one entity or ummah.

The belief in the ummah contradicts another modern political conception that despite the religion an individual holds, he or she belongs to a national identity. We can conclude that Hambali was born an Indonesian, lived in Malaysia, fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and was captured in Thailand while holding a Spanish passport.

Apart from speculation as to what his actual citizenship is, it is also possible that Hambali is stateless. If he believes in the ummah, he may have decided not to "subscribe" to any citizenship.

To him, his main and foremost identity is not as an Indonesian born from a Sundanese mother in West Java; his identity is not "national" but "universal", a "citizen" of the ummah. So he would not be struggling for "domestic" reasons, say the marginalization of Islamic groups in Indonesia, but for "global" causes (so long as they concerned Muslims).

It is likely that only very few Muslims hold such beliefs. But these terrorist acts have attracted worldwide media coverage, which in turn promotes the idea that most Muslims are like this.

A recent world survey by prominent political scientists Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart revealed that Muslims are not really different from non-Muslims. Muslims are just as supportive of democracy as Christians, Buddhist, Hindus, or non-believers.

People like Hambali are an exception to Muslims worldwide and in Indonesia. Of interest here is a new study, written by Saiful Mujani for his dissertation at the Ohio State University in the U.S., titled Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Participation in Post Suharto Era.

On the basis of the data he collected in two national surveys in 2001 and 2002, Mujani argues that being a Muslim does not necessarily mean being against democracy. Being religious can even produce "social capital" -- an important element of democracy -- as long as one gets involved in collective religious practices, such as collective prayers, and activities such as joining religious organizations.

As for Muslim organizations, the two biggest in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, both publicly support democracy and their founders were among the republic's pioneers. Its leaders despise bombings and other types of terrorist acts.

Nowadays there is no separatist movement which is Islamist in nature, not even in Aceh where the Islamic influence is very strong.

This also applies to past separatist movements. In the 1950s Kahar Muzakkar and Kartosuwiryo led rebellions in South Sulawesi and West Java, respectively. But the true motive behind their struggle was disappointment toward Jakarta's regional development policy -- not the self professed aspiration to establish a pan- Islamic state in Southeast Asia or beyond.

The Islamic beliefs held by people like Hambali and other alleged terrorists are the beliefs of the minority of Muslims, both in Indonesia and the international community, in the past or the present.