Is YLBHI losing steam in fight for democracy?

By Kastorius Sinaga

JAKARTA (JP): The imminent resignation of Dr. Adnan Buyung Nasution from the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) has recently drawn public attention.

This phenomenon suggests that the foundation is becoming a "public asset" rather than simply an exclusive NGO owned only by its founders.

Some observers have tried to get the real reason behind his impending withdrawal, just when the democratization movement in Indonesia has begun to spread within various strategic groups.

Some people speculate that his resignation was caused by political pressure in order to ensure political stability with an eye on 1997 election.

Though this assumption remains speculative (The Jakarta Post Sept. 30, 1995), the foundation's leading position in the movement must be reconsidered.

Long before "political openness" was heralded by power holders in 1985, the foundation had actually taken a leading role in challenging the undemocratic nature of Indonesian politics. This was carried out by scrutinizing the execution of power from a legal aspect and initiating mass rallies to demand freedom and justice.

The foundation and its vocal lawyers stood up to the government by defending the rights of political activists who demonstrated against the New Order Government, like in the Malari (1974) and Tanjung Priok (1983) cases.

As the foundation shifted its focus in 1980 from a merely individual legal aid entity to collective and structural legal society, it proclaimed itself an agent of political democratization and took a position in the forefront of opposition to the state.

In line with this new function, all of the foundation's field offices in 13 provinces began to concentrate on legal cases which draw broader public attention and have a political dimension, like defending the rights of development victims.

At that time, a new wave of highly politicized NGOs began to emerge in the regions. They quickly linked with the foundations' field offices to launch political advocacy in numerous cases.

The Kedungombo case in 1989 is an example. The foundation successfully consolidated the pro-democratic groups consisting of radical students, NGOs, intellectuals and the affected farmers in Kedungombo to launch a unified protest against the government for its authoritarian approach in the Central Java dam development.

In subsequent years, the case has won international attention through which the foundation and other international NGOs together criticized donor agencies, like the World Bank, for the lack of human rights consideration in its development assistance to Indonesia.

Due to external support organized by the foundation, farmers and villagers in Kedungombo area radically resisted the government. This was a first in the New Order era. This stimulated various pro-democracy groups in other regions to become more active in empowering the powerless.

Since the mid 1980s, pro-democracy movements outside the mainstream have gradually converged in collective action to challenge the state. Various issues have been raised and various marginalized groups like labor, farmers and development refugees have been activated throughout the country.

These movements, however, remain sporadic and thus remain politically insignificant in terms of motivating the government to abandon its repressive nature and become supportive. This is particularly due to the lack of charismatic leadership within the pro-democracy groups. It could lead all factions into a synergic coalition.

When Buyung Nasution came back to take over the foundation's leadership in 1993, a new hope for national coalition for pro- democracy groups apparently began to blossom. This was related to Buyung's new strategy, which shifted the foundation's aim to becoming the "locomotive of democracy". A radicalization amongst activists began to escalate, especially in Jakarta. During the last two years, extensive demonstrations followed by arrests and other forms of state pressure reached unprecedented levels.

In facing the growing Buyung-led oppositionist groups, the state set up significant "counter-movements". This has been done either by intimidating the foundation's lawyers or by mobilizing the government organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) and other government-affiliated youth organizations to demonstrate against the foundation and its activities.

Meanwhile, at the national level, the National Commission on Human Rights was set up by the government in 1993 to partly function as a counterbalance to the foundation's leading role as the human rights watch organization in Indonesia

Unlike Buyung's high profile strategy, the commission emphasizes a "problem solving" approach. Its political legitimacy and sufficient resources has enabled it to solve various conflicts and the public has increasingly turned to the commission to settle grievances.

This has resulted in a substantial decline in the foundation's popularity, especially in the eye of activists and students who frequently criticize the foundation for suffering NATO-syndrome (No Action, Talk Only).

The foundation tends to be slow and even passive when addressing many human-rights violations breaking out in the regions like Irian Jaya and East Timor. In contrast, the government-supported commission have apparently been more expedient in their work.

Now, Buyung plans to resign from the foundation. I feel this decision is properly timed as far as his social image as a public figure is considered.

The impact of his resignation on the democratic movement in Indonesia could destroy the movement's spirit. It could also prove the thesis that an inconsistent oppositionist movement can empower the status-quo.

The writer is a lecturer in the postgraduate program of social science at University of Indonesia in Salemba, Jakarta.