Is YLBHI losing steam in fight for democracy?

Is YLBHI losing steam in fight for democracy?

By Kastorius Sinaga

JAKARTA (JP): The imminent resignation of Dr. Adnan Buyung
Nasution from the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) has
recently drawn public attention.

This phenomenon suggests that the foundation is becoming a
"public asset" rather than simply an exclusive NGO owned only by
its founders.

Some observers have tried to get the real reason behind his
impending withdrawal, just when the democratization movement in
Indonesia has begun to spread within various strategic groups.

Some people speculate that his resignation was caused by
political pressure in order to ensure political stability with an
eye on 1997 election.

Though this assumption remains speculative (The Jakarta Post
Sept. 30, 1995), the foundation's leading position in the
movement must be reconsidered.

Long before "political openness" was heralded by power holders
in 1985, the foundation had actually taken a leading role in
challenging the undemocratic nature of Indonesian politics. This
was carried out by scrutinizing the execution of power from a
legal aspect and initiating mass rallies to demand freedom and
justice.

The foundation and its vocal lawyers stood up to the
government by defending the rights of political activists who
demonstrated against the New Order Government, like in the Malari
(1974) and Tanjung Priok (1983) cases.

As the foundation shifted its focus in 1980 from a merely
individual legal aid entity to collective and structural legal
society, it proclaimed itself an agent of political
democratization and took a position in the forefront of
opposition to the state.

In line with this new function, all of the foundation's field
offices in 13 provinces began to concentrate on legal cases which
draw broader public attention and have a political dimension,
like defending the rights of development victims.

At that time, a new wave of highly politicized NGOs began to
emerge in the regions. They quickly linked with the foundations'
field offices to launch political advocacy in numerous cases.

The Kedungombo case in 1989 is an example. The foundation
successfully consolidated the pro-democratic groups consisting of
radical students, NGOs, intellectuals and the affected farmers in
Kedungombo to launch a unified protest against the government for
its authoritarian approach in the Central Java dam development.

In subsequent years, the case has won international attention
through which the foundation and other international NGOs
together criticized donor agencies, like the World Bank, for the
lack of human rights consideration in its development assistance
to Indonesia.

Due to external support organized by the foundation, farmers
and villagers in Kedungombo area radically resisted the
government. This was a first in the New Order era. This
stimulated various pro-democracy groups in other regions to
become more active in empowering the powerless.

Since the mid 1980s, pro-democracy movements outside the
mainstream have gradually converged in collective action to
challenge the state. Various issues have been raised and various
marginalized groups like labor, farmers and development refugees
have been activated throughout the country.

These movements, however, remain sporadic and thus remain
politically insignificant in terms of motivating the government
to abandon its repressive nature and become supportive. This is
particularly due to the lack of charismatic leadership within the
pro-democracy groups. It could lead all factions into a synergic
coalition.

When Buyung Nasution came back to take over the foundation's
leadership in 1993, a new hope for national coalition for pro-
democracy groups apparently began to blossom. This was related to
Buyung's new strategy, which shifted the foundation's aim to
becoming the "locomotive of democracy". A radicalization amongst
activists began to escalate, especially in Jakarta. During the
last two years, extensive demonstrations followed by arrests and
other forms of state pressure reached unprecedented levels.

In facing the growing Buyung-led oppositionist groups, the
state set up significant "counter-movements". This has been done
either by intimidating the foundation's lawyers or by mobilizing
the government organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs)
and other government-affiliated youth organizations to
demonstrate against the foundation and its activities.

Meanwhile, at the national level, the National Commission on
Human Rights was set up by the government in 1993 to partly
function as a counterbalance to the foundation's leading role as
the human rights watch organization in Indonesia

Unlike Buyung's high profile strategy, the commission
emphasizes a "problem solving" approach. Its political legitimacy
and sufficient resources has enabled it to solve various
conflicts and the public has increasingly turned to the
commission to settle grievances.

This has resulted in a substantial decline in the foundation's
popularity, especially in the eye of activists and students who
frequently criticize the foundation for suffering NATO-syndrome
(No Action, Talk Only).

The foundation tends to be slow and even passive when
addressing many human-rights violations breaking out in the
regions like Irian Jaya and East Timor. In contrast, the
government-supported commission have apparently been more
expedient in their work.

Now, Buyung plans to resign from the foundation. I feel this
decision is properly timed as far as his social image as a public
figure is considered.

The impact of his resignation on the democratic movement in
Indonesia could destroy the movement's spirit. It could also
prove the thesis that an inconsistent oppositionist movement can
empower the status-quo.

The writer is a lecturer in the postgraduate program of social
science at University of Indonesia in Salemba, Jakarta.