Is TNI slowly regaining its grip on politics?

Imanuddin, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

After years of privilege under Soeharto's rule, the Indonesian Military's (TNI) role in politics has been gradually fading since 1998. Freedom of speech, which began to flourish in that year, stepped up intellectuals' pressure for the military to leave the political stage.

The military finally relinquished its grip on the police force, when the police separated from the military in April 1999. The number of seats occupied by the military in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) was reduced from 75 to only 38, and they will no longer have any by 2009.

However, President Megawati Soekarnoputri's sudden announcement agreeing to the planned reestablishment of the Iskandar Muda Regional Military Command in the Aceh province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam has shocked many.

The recent announcement, as conveyed through Minister of Defense Matori Abdul Djalil, contradicts the ABRI (former name of TNI) Headquarters' 1985 decision to reduce the total number of regional military commands from 16 to 10 in observance of the minimum state budget for the military. The Iskandar Muda Regional Military Command was among the military commands affected by the military reorganization in 1985.

Local Acehnese have expressed fear that the plan to reestablish the military command in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, which has for years been troubled by separatism, would mean a more violent and repressive approach of the military in handling separatist activities in the province.

Military observers, however, have a different perspective on the planned reestablishment of the military command. They said it was an indication that the TNI might be preparing to regain control of the country's political affairs.

They also said that the government's desire to reestablish the military command in Aceh, and probably elsewhere in the future, was a clear indication that the military was rebuilding its political infrastructure.

One observer, Kusnanto Anggoro of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said at a recent seminar that the reestablishment of a military command in Aceh was a sensible indication that TNI might be preparing a comeback in the country's political arena.

He also accused TNI of being involved in internal conflicts within political parties, which had made politicians eager to serve their own interests and thereby forgetting to further encourage strong civilian institutions. He cited the current internal conflicts at Golkar, the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the United Development Party (PPP).

The bargaining position of the military has also been strengthening, as is obvious from the government's indecisive stand in dealing with the numerous violations of human rights, in which the military is suspected.

Former chairman of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) Munir cited the delayed tribunal for military officers implicated in rights abuses in East Timor (in 1999) as an example.

The return of TNI to take control of the country's political affairs is also the responsibility of the country's civilian government.

Kusnanto and Munir said that the deployment of about 1,000 troops last July in the vicinity of the state palace was to intimidate then president Abdurrahman Wahid, who was facing impeachment at the time, into immediately resigning. Abdurrahman was known as a leader who wanted to see the military out of politics.

Abdurrahman was later removed from office during a Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) last July. He was replaced by his deputy Megawati Soekarnoputri.

But what are the reasons for TNI to regain its grip on the country's political affairs?

Many high-ranking and promising TNI officers have expressed their commitment with a reform movement. While citing the reforms that TNI has been implementing in the military, they have also expressed their commitment to focus on and develop their professionalism in military affairs and to quit politics.

Whether there is a connection or not in this issue, the fact that history repeats itself is an undeniable fact.

Then president Abdurrahman's moves to "hastily" bring TNI out of politics angered officers, at least those, either retired or active, who have an influence on the military.

It was Abdurrahman's defense minister, Mahfud MD, who revealed in October 2000 that the former president had made some 127 active generals quit their military career after offering them civilian posts. But Abdurrahman's decision to "simplify" the government's organizational structure has rendered them without a position.

TNI Headquarters questioned the accuracy of the figure revealed by Mahfud, but it admitted that there were a few dozen generals with no positions.

If we look back on the incidents of the early 1950s, a series of rationalizations in the military had destabilized the political condition during that period and eventually contributed to the downfall of founding president Sukarno.

The rationalization of 1950, which reduced the total number of military personnel from 500,000 to 200,000, caused an abundance of retired officers. Many of them, who were dissatisfied with their early retirement, joined forces with opposition groups, criticizing and condemning the ruling government.

A planned rationalization in 1952 to reduce the number of troops from 200,000 to only 120,00 shook the military and government.

Sukarno was ousted from presidency during a Special Session of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) in 1967 after a nationwide campaign against communism a few years before, which peaked with the controversial abortive coup of the now defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in September 1965.

The fact that TNI will no longer have seats in the legislative body within the next few years has likely put it in a difficult position in which its officers could be deployed.

Then Army chief of staff Gen. Rudini, who was among the initiators of the 1985 reorganization of the military, once said that the restructuring of ABRI should not harm its members. He was referring to the events in the early 1950s.

Megawati, who is the daughter of Sukarno, must have learned from her father's case. She must put all her efforts into winning the support of TNI, at least until she completes her term in 2004.

And that is probably the reason why her government has endorsed the planned reestablishment of the Iskandar Muda Regional Military Command in the troubled province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.