Is the military the winner?

By Susanto Pudjomartono

JAKARTA (JP): Exit Abdurrahman Wahid. Enter Megawati Soekarnoputri. The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) fired Gus Dur (Abdurrahman) last week and elected Megawati as the fifth president of the Republic of Indonesia to succeed him.

Does it mean that the Assembly and the legislature are the winners in the battle against Gus Dur? Or is Megawati the winner, getting the position that she rightly earned 21 months ago, but lost at the last minute because of the Islam-oriented Axis Force's plot to foil her?

From a political perspective, can we say Golkar is the party that most benefited from Megawati's election, for certainly it has gained a respite, at least temporarily, from the public wrath that demands its dissolution? And did the United Development Party (PPP) at last win a consolation prize with the election of its chairman Hamzah Haz as vice president?

Or, are Gus Dur, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the National Awakening Party (PKB), Gus Dur's main political supporters, the losers in this struggle? For obviously in the long run, wouldn't the public question the capability of anyone from these organizations to lead a government, for its value system has proved to be incompatible with democracy?

One can also question whether the reform movement is the biggest loser because it lost its momentum due to the political turmoil during Gus Dur's 21-month reign.

But, has not democracy and common sense at last prevailed with the democratic election of Megawati and Hamzah Haz, despite criticism that somehow the battle was only among the politicians and that the common people were mere spectators?

Whatever the answer, suddenly the nation seems to be breathing a lot easier. And there is an air of high expectation and hope. Everywhere people feel that gone are the days of political bickering that brought the nation to the brink of a second economic crisis and national disintegration. There is hope that now is the time to heal wounds and start the national recovery program.

Yet, one question lingers: Is the military -- mainly the army -- the clear winner in this battle? And will this victory have some sort of political implication in the future?

Thanks to its timely repositioning, resoluteness and firm leadership, the military has emerged from an almost political nothingness a year ago into (once again) a formidable political force.

Two years ago, thanks mostly to Gus Dur's democratic drive, the military was forced to define a so-called "new paradigm" that left its social and political role behind. From then on the Indonesian Military (TNI) agreed to remain a defense force, with its representation in the legislature to be terminated by 2009.

But, ironically it was Gus Dur himself who pushed the TNI back to center stage. It began early this year when he started toying with the idea of imposing a state of civil emergency to stop the legislature from unseating him.

Gus Dur believed that the Constitution empowered him with the status of "supreme commander of the armed forces" that would give him a free hand to do whatever he pleased with the military. This turned out to be his biggest mistake.

It is quite true that until last year the military had been demoralized and in complete disarray. It failed to solve conflicts in Maluku, Aceh, Irian Jaya while communal clashes and lawlessness were on the rise nationwide, not to mention the public outcry to bring to court military officers suspected of being involved in human rights violations.

As if adding insult to injury, Gus Dur threatened military leaders that they either support his plan to declare a state of emergency or be ready to be replaced by more accommodative generals. It was the last straw for the military leadership and they swore they could not swallow anymore "humiliations".

The credit for the military's revival must go to Army Chief of Staff Gen. Endiartono Sutarto. Starting from the end of January he organized meetings among military top brass to study the situation. Sources revealed that the general feeling among them was a kind of restlessness since they consider themselves the "most trusted vanguard of the nation" and that the country was at stake.

The biggest question among them is the future role of the military. Should it remain outside practical politics, or should it, if the situation demands, allow itself to engage in any activity to save the nation?

Surprisingly, almost all 30-something generals who attended the meeting opted to resist any attempt to lure the military back into politics. In line with this thought, they saw that Gus Dur's efforts to influence the military may undermine this new stance. They also took note of Gus Dur's erratic way of governing, by repeatedly issuing the same threats from time to time, which became a source of tension, leading them to conclude that Gus Dur was the problem, not the solution.

Yet, they also agreed that to be able to stand firm the military should unite. But they are aware that aside from "military members within the structure", meaning the officers who hold office, the fact remains that there are also "military members outside the structure", a term referring to active officers without positions. At present, for example, there are three active four star generals who have no position.

According to sources, to preempt the possibility that Gus Dur may have tried to pit them against each other, all high-ranking officers from both within and outside the structure pledged to unite and to stand together. Gen. Sutarto also held meetings with retired generals who fully supported him. Thus, within a few months Gen. Sutarto succeeded, to a certain extent, in solidifying not just the Army but also the military.

It was against this united force that Gus Dur had to deal with when he repeatedly and unsuccessfully tried to get military support for his declaration of a state of emergency. The extent of military unity was none better shown then when a few hours before Gus Dur's declaration of a state of emergency Gen. Johny Lumintang rejected Gus Dur's offer to be nominated as military deputy commander in chief.

Hence, there is no doubt that Gus Dur's failure to gain support from the military, plus his unsuccessful attempts to secure the police force to back him in the plan to impose a state of emergency, was the key to his downfall.

The question now is, with the certainty of IOU notes in its hands, will the military play these cards to secure some kind of gains from President Megawati? Or will it use them to get a better bargaining position in future deals? There is even speculation that Megawati may fall into the hands of the military, which will then make her its puppet.

Judging from her past record, taciturn as she is, it is very unlikely that in the future Megawati will be influenced, or even controlled, by the military. The way the military leaders consulted Megawati in anything they planned to do during the showdown with Gus Dur indicates otherwise.

In a recent conversation, Megawati assured that there was no way the military would play a political role in her future government. She said that Indonesia needed a strong armed forces, but that it would remain a defense force which would guard the nation's unity.

Will the military be satisfied with this role? Although it is too early to predict, there is every indication that the current military leadership would prefer to stay away from politics. Solid as they are now, they still have huge problems. Public distrust of the military is just too strong. It also has yet to answer questions such as: Why has there not been any satisfactory accountability to past human rights abuses and violations committed by military members? Why do some of them still behave as they did in the past, before the military's new paradigm?

Yes, one can say that the military has come out victorious in the battle against Gus Dur, but it still has to engage in a battle against itself to prove it is sincere and what it says is true. It could be a long, long fight.

The writer is chief editor at The Jakarta Post.