Is the military the winner?

Is the military the winner?

By Susanto Pudjomartono

JAKARTA (JP): Exit Abdurrahman Wahid. Enter Megawati
Soekarnoputri. The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) fired Gus
Dur (Abdurrahman) last week and elected Megawati as the fifth
president of the Republic of Indonesia to succeed him.

Does it mean that the Assembly and the legislature are the
winners in the battle against Gus Dur? Or is Megawati the winner,
getting the position that she rightly earned 21 months ago, but
lost at the last minute because of the Islam-oriented Axis
Force's plot to foil her?

From a political perspective, can we say Golkar is the party
that most benefited from Megawati's election, for certainly it
has gained a respite, at least temporarily, from the public wrath
that demands its dissolution? And did the United Development
Party (PPP) at last win a consolation prize with the election of
its chairman Hamzah Haz as vice president?

Or, are Gus Dur, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the National
Awakening Party (PKB), Gus Dur's main political supporters, the
losers in this struggle? For obviously in the long run, wouldn't
the public question the capability of anyone from these
organizations to lead a government, for its value system has
proved to be incompatible with democracy?

One can also question whether the reform movement is the
biggest loser because it lost its momentum due to the political
turmoil during Gus Dur's 21-month reign.

But, has not democracy and common sense at last prevailed with
the democratic election of Megawati and Hamzah Haz, despite
criticism that somehow the battle was only among the politicians
and that the common people were mere spectators?

Whatever the answer, suddenly the nation seems to be breathing
a lot easier. And there is an air of high expectation and hope.
Everywhere people feel that gone are the days of political
bickering that brought the nation to the brink of a second
economic crisis and national disintegration. There is hope that
now is the time to heal wounds and start the national recovery
program.

Yet, one question lingers: Is the military -- mainly the army
-- the clear winner in this battle? And will this victory have
some sort of political implication in the future?

Thanks to its timely repositioning, resoluteness and firm
leadership, the military has emerged from an almost political
nothingness a year ago into (once again) a formidable political
force.

Two years ago, thanks mostly to Gus Dur's democratic drive,
the military was forced to define a so-called "new paradigm" that
left its social and political role behind. From then on the
Indonesian Military (TNI) agreed to remain a defense force, with
its representation in the legislature to be terminated by 2009.

But, ironically it was Gus Dur himself who pushed the TNI back
to center stage. It began early this year when he started toying
with the idea of imposing a state of civil emergency to stop the
legislature from unseating him.

Gus Dur believed that the Constitution empowered him with the
status of "supreme commander of the armed forces" that would give
him a free hand to do whatever he pleased with the military. This
turned out to be his biggest mistake.

It is quite true that until last year the military had been
demoralized and in complete disarray. It failed to solve
conflicts in Maluku, Aceh, Irian Jaya while communal clashes and
lawlessness were on the rise nationwide, not to mention the
public outcry to bring to court military officers suspected of
being involved in human rights violations.

As if adding insult to injury, Gus Dur threatened military
leaders that they either support his plan to declare a state of
emergency or be ready to be replaced by more accommodative
generals. It was the last straw for the military leadership and
they swore they could not swallow anymore "humiliations".

The credit for the military's revival must go to Army Chief of
Staff Gen. Endiartono Sutarto. Starting from the end of January
he organized meetings among military top brass to study the
situation. Sources revealed that the general feeling among them
was a kind of restlessness since they consider themselves the
"most trusted vanguard of the nation" and that the country was at
stake.

The biggest question among them is the future role of the
military. Should it remain outside practical politics, or should
it, if the situation demands, allow itself to engage in any
activity to save the nation?

Surprisingly, almost all 30-something generals who attended
the meeting opted to resist any attempt to lure the military back
into politics. In line with this thought, they saw that Gus Dur's
efforts to influence the military may undermine this new stance.
They also took note of Gus Dur's erratic way of governing, by
repeatedly issuing the same threats from time to time, which
became a source of tension, leading them to conclude that Gus Dur
was the problem, not the solution.

Yet, they also agreed that to be able to stand firm the
military should unite. But they are aware that aside from
"military members within the structure", meaning the officers who
hold office, the fact remains that there are also "military
members outside the structure", a term referring to active
officers without positions. At present, for example, there are
three active four star generals who have no position.

According to sources, to preempt the possibility that Gus Dur
may have tried to pit them against each other, all high-ranking
officers from both within and outside the structure pledged to
unite and to stand together. Gen. Sutarto also held meetings with
retired generals who fully supported him. Thus, within a few
months Gen. Sutarto succeeded, to a certain extent, in
solidifying not just the Army but also the military.

It was against this united force that Gus Dur had to deal with
when he repeatedly and unsuccessfully tried to get military
support for his declaration of a state of emergency. The extent
of military unity was none better shown then when a few hours
before Gus Dur's declaration of a state of emergency Gen. Johny
Lumintang rejected Gus Dur's offer to be nominated as military
deputy commander in chief.

Hence, there is no doubt that Gus Dur's failure to gain
support from the military, plus his unsuccessful attempts to
secure the police force to back him in the plan to impose a state
of emergency, was the key to his downfall.

The question now is, with the certainty of IOU notes in its
hands, will the military play these cards to secure some kind of
gains from President Megawati? Or will it use them to get a
better bargaining position in future deals? There is even
speculation that Megawati may fall into the hands of the
military, which will then make her its puppet.

Judging from her past record, taciturn as she is, it is very
unlikely that in the future Megawati will be influenced, or even
controlled, by the military. The way the military leaders
consulted Megawati in anything they planned to do during the
showdown with Gus Dur indicates otherwise.

In a recent conversation, Megawati assured that there was no
way the military would play a political role in her future
government. She said that Indonesia needed a strong armed forces,
but that it would remain a defense force which would guard the
nation's unity.

Will the military be satisfied with this role? Although it is
too early to predict, there is every indication that the current
military leadership would prefer to stay away from politics.
Solid as they are now, they still have huge problems. Public
distrust of the military is just too strong. It also has yet to
answer questions such as: Why has there not been any satisfactory
accountability to past human rights abuses and violations
committed by military members? Why do some of them still behave
as they did in the past, before the military's new paradigm?

Yes, one can say that the military has come out victorious in
the battle against Gus Dur, but it still has to engage in a
battle against itself to prove it is sincere and what it says is
true. It could be a long, long fight.

The writer is chief editor at The Jakarta Post.