Is reform era at an end?

Is reform era at an end?

By Rochman Achwan

JAKARTA (JP): Six months have passed since Soeharto stepped
down. The "spring" of democracy that arose along with his going
has sailed into uncharted waters.

Today, Indonesia is at the crossroads. Will the political
system give rise to another military regime or will it progress
into democracy? The forces of pro-reform relentlessly engage in
undermining and even abolishing Soeharto's political machinery
and believe that this is the nation's path for entering a new
era.

At the opposite pole, however, this political machinery
continues to function and reposition its roles in order to defend
its own political and economic interests. The public arena which
is believed to be an arena of public salvation turns its face
into a threatening one.

Indonesians are witnessing the rise of processes sharpening
the boundaries of sociopolitical groups based on deep-rooted ties
and narrow political and economic interests. Will this nation
start to dream about a father figure, a strong autocratic leader
such as Der Fuhrer or a Generalissimo? Or will Indonesian enter
the process of reform and democratization peacefully as happened
in the countries of Latin America almost ten years ago?

The wave of democracy that sweeps over Indonesia exhibits
anomalies seen from the tradition of transition to a democratic
society. Olle Tornquist (1998), Scandinavian political scientist,
argues that current Indonesian political reform can hardly be
compared to other countries which have undergone reform in the
modern age.

The real though dangerous festivity of democracy has given
birth to new and "rejuvenated" old leaders in the public sphere.
The supporters of the Soeharto political machinery try to
relegitimize their positions and wealth. Its anti-communist
supporters who became political dissidents during the Soeharto
era try to recover their losses. Many new faces, unknown by most
Indonesians, establish new political parties to achieve their own
interests. All speak out about the importance of reform.

It is sadly true, however, most of them do not have clear
ideas on the necessity of political institutional reform as one
of the prerequisites for democratization. In contrast, students
and university lecturers uncompromisingly struggle to demand the
abolition of the Soeharto political machinery as the only
conditionality for this nation to enter a new millennium.

Why does this all happen in the midst of economic catastrophe?
The answer should be put down to two factors. The first refers to
the way Soeharto stepped down. The second relates to the
breakdown of social trust.

Although the student movement has played pivotal roles, it was
the global currency market and the IMF that pushed against the
wall of Indonesia's empire of authoritarian institutions,
bringing down Soeharto and paving the way for democratization.

One can say that at the close of this century, modern
societies for the first time witness the key role played by
global financial crises in bringing down the most authoritarian
Asian leader. He was not challenged by any single domestic power
or leader. This is why the fall of Soeharto is not accompanied by
the sinking of his political "ship".

In contrast to the fall of Latin American military dictators
and Marcos of the Phillipines, Soeharto's political machinery
continues to stand up, repositioning itself even though it is
being undermined.

During a certain period of the Soeharto era, this political
machinery contributed to achieving a level of prosperity that
this nation has never reached in its economic history. But at the
same time, it also burned the bridge that connected the state and
the nation. Negotiation, compromise, and peaceful conflict
solution -- all that is the lifeblood of democracy -- have been
substituted by state violence, propaganda, and cooptation in
dealing with the whole society.

As a result, upper and middle strata gradually turned their
backs on this political machinery. In this tumultuous era, its
supporters try to repair the damage so that it is capable of
maintaining political power. As time has evolved over the last
six months, it is clearly evident that this political machinery
maintains the political status-quo rather than making
significant political reform.

The second, the breakdown of social trust. Social trust is the
very essence of a healthy society. Its functions are to reduce
political and economic complexities and uncertainties in modern
life. It creates social solidarity among groups, an important
element for the rise of a genuine civil society. When social
trust is damaged the society as a whole suffers; and when it is
destroyed, society falters and collapses.

A society that is characterized by a high level of trust
prefers negotiation, compromise, and peaceful conflict solutions
to head-on physical confrontation in solving political and
economic problems. In this type of society, institutional and
personal leaders create great trust. Unfortunately, Indonesian
society can not in any sense be described as having a high level
of social trust. On the contrary, this society is painfully
undergoing processes of the breakdown of social trust in the
midst of the double reform of polity and economy.

A sense of societal distrust toward government institutions
and leaders appears in the public arena and haunts the future of
Indonesian reform. Moreover, in contrast to other societies that
have undergone democratic transitions, Indonesia's moralizing
institutions (church, mosques, and universities) play a feeble
role in pointing out the direction to the achievement of peaceful
solutions.

Other social leaders choose ad hoc options by making public
condemnation of every round of violence that erupts in the
country. This is quite different to the guiding roles of the
Church in Poland and the Philippines during the period of
"reform". This ad hoc option, of course, is not sufficient as a
strategy to build the trust between the masses and them. It will
not be an exaggeration, therefore, if one comes to the conclusion
that Indonesian society is experiencing what one calls a
"headless chicken syndrome".

This is a situation in which the masses lose trust in
government institutions, political and moral leaders and in turn
act blindly and sometimes brutally, attacking "objects" that are
assumed to harm society. The "festivity" of brutal killings of
suspected "ninjas" (men dressed in the fashion of Japanese
assassins) in East Java, the recruitment by the military of
unemployed men as private paramilitary forces for the guarding of
the recent Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly,
and the latest brutal violence in Jakarta (Ketapang) are all
evidence of the widespread nature of the syndrome.

There is mounting public fear in big cities that the brutal
killings and violence that recently spread over Java are being
engineered by irresponsible political adventurers aiming at the
destruction of public order.

Today, the smell of terror is knocking at the doors of
Indonesian houses. How on earth will reform and democratization
arrive at a peaceful destination if the public arena is filled by
the smell of terror? If this situation continues, if the
government fails to reduce sky-rocketing unemployment, and if the
silent middle and upper strata lose their patience, one can not
deny the chances of the rise of Der Fuhrer or a Generalissimo. If
this happens, mothers of reform heroes will keep on crying
because the dream of their children of the rise of a new era will
never materialize.

It is, therefore, high time for Indonesia's ruling and moral
leaders to prevent the rise of a strong autocratic leader who
will purge all "suspicious" and "alien" persons, organizations,
and institutions with an iron fist. In doing so, they should
embrace a policy of inclusion, rather than exclusion, as a means
of bringing this nation into the new era of reform.

The state and the nation should look to the future rather than
respectively defending old political machinery and retaliating
against past leaders. The ruling and opposition leaders must stop
debating whether their political decisions are constitutionally
and legitimately correct or not. This is not only an unproductive
debate but also pushes aside the pressing political problems from
the public sphere.

Rejuvenating and creating legitimate institutions should be
the new rules of the game for the present government to reduce
mounting political tensions. For instance, the planned
establishment of the "independent" commission for investigating
Soeharto's wealth should include leaders from outside the
government so that it will be legitimized by the nation.

The government's attempts to create legitimate institutions
will not come to materialize if the nation does not have
independent moral leaders who guide it to take the road of moral
politics. This nation desperately needs the birth of this sort of
leader who has beauty of mind similar to Vaclav Havel of
Czechoslovakia during the communist rule or Cardinal Sin of the
Philippines during the last years of Marcos era.

These leaders, undoubtedly, have provided inspiration not only
to their fellow citizens but also to the rulers to guide the
whole nation to arrive at a peaceful destination.

If this leader emerges, the headless chicken syndrome might be
remedied, the irresponsible political adventurers may lose their
grip and finally this nation will enjoy the beauty of the reform
era in the years to come.

Rochman Achwan PhD is a teaching staffer at the Department of
Sociology, University of Indonesia.

Window: In contrast to the fall of Latin American military
dictators and Marcos of the Phillipines, Soeharto's political
machinery continues to stand up, repositioning itself even
though it is being undermined.