Is reform era at an end?

By Rochman Achwan

JAKARTA (JP): Six months have passed since Soeharto stepped down. The "spring" of democracy that arose along with his going has sailed into uncharted waters.

Today, Indonesia is at the crossroads. Will the political system give rise to another military regime or will it progress into democracy? The forces of pro-reform relentlessly engage in undermining and even abolishing Soeharto's political machinery and believe that this is the nation's path for entering a new era.

At the opposite pole, however, this political machinery continues to function and reposition its roles in order to defend its own political and economic interests. The public arena which is believed to be an arena of public salvation turns its face into a threatening one.

Indonesians are witnessing the rise of processes sharpening the boundaries of sociopolitical groups based on deep-rooted ties and narrow political and economic interests. Will this nation start to dream about a father figure, a strong autocratic leader such as Der Fuhrer or a Generalissimo? Or will Indonesian enter the process of reform and democratization peacefully as happened in the countries of Latin America almost ten years ago?

The wave of democracy that sweeps over Indonesia exhibits anomalies seen from the tradition of transition to a democratic society. Olle Tornquist (1998), Scandinavian political scientist, argues that current Indonesian political reform can hardly be compared to other countries which have undergone reform in the modern age.

The real though dangerous festivity of democracy has given birth to new and "rejuvenated" old leaders in the public sphere. The supporters of the Soeharto political machinery try to relegitimize their positions and wealth. Its anti-communist supporters who became political dissidents during the Soeharto era try to recover their losses. Many new faces, unknown by most Indonesians, establish new political parties to achieve their own interests. All speak out about the importance of reform.

It is sadly true, however, most of them do not have clear ideas on the necessity of political institutional reform as one of the prerequisites for democratization. In contrast, students and university lecturers uncompromisingly struggle to demand the abolition of the Soeharto political machinery as the only conditionality for this nation to enter a new millennium.

Why does this all happen in the midst of economic catastrophe? The answer should be put down to two factors. The first refers to the way Soeharto stepped down. The second relates to the breakdown of social trust.

Although the student movement has played pivotal roles, it was the global currency market and the IMF that pushed against the wall of Indonesia's empire of authoritarian institutions, bringing down Soeharto and paving the way for democratization.

One can say that at the close of this century, modern societies for the first time witness the key role played by global financial crises in bringing down the most authoritarian Asian leader. He was not challenged by any single domestic power or leader. This is why the fall of Soeharto is not accompanied by the sinking of his political "ship".

In contrast to the fall of Latin American military dictators and Marcos of the Phillipines, Soeharto's political machinery continues to stand up, repositioning itself even though it is being undermined.

During a certain period of the Soeharto era, this political machinery contributed to achieving a level of prosperity that this nation has never reached in its economic history. But at the same time, it also burned the bridge that connected the state and the nation. Negotiation, compromise, and peaceful conflict solution -- all that is the lifeblood of democracy -- have been substituted by state violence, propaganda, and cooptation in dealing with the whole society.

As a result, upper and middle strata gradually turned their backs on this political machinery. In this tumultuous era, its supporters try to repair the damage so that it is capable of maintaining political power. As time has evolved over the last six months, it is clearly evident that this political machinery maintains the political status-quo rather than making significant political reform.

The second, the breakdown of social trust. Social trust is the very essence of a healthy society. Its functions are to reduce political and economic complexities and uncertainties in modern life. It creates social solidarity among groups, an important element for the rise of a genuine civil society. When social trust is damaged the society as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, society falters and collapses.

A society that is characterized by a high level of trust prefers negotiation, compromise, and peaceful conflict solutions to head-on physical confrontation in solving political and economic problems. In this type of society, institutional and personal leaders create great trust. Unfortunately, Indonesian society can not in any sense be described as having a high level of social trust. On the contrary, this society is painfully undergoing processes of the breakdown of social trust in the midst of the double reform of polity and economy.

A sense of societal distrust toward government institutions and leaders appears in the public arena and haunts the future of Indonesian reform. Moreover, in contrast to other societies that have undergone democratic transitions, Indonesia's moralizing institutions (church, mosques, and universities) play a feeble role in pointing out the direction to the achievement of peaceful solutions.

Other social leaders choose ad hoc options by making public condemnation of every round of violence that erupts in the country. This is quite different to the guiding roles of the Church in Poland and the Philippines during the period of "reform". This ad hoc option, of course, is not sufficient as a strategy to build the trust between the masses and them. It will not be an exaggeration, therefore, if one comes to the conclusion that Indonesian society is experiencing what one calls a "headless chicken syndrome".

This is a situation in which the masses lose trust in government institutions, political and moral leaders and in turn act blindly and sometimes brutally, attacking "objects" that are assumed to harm society. The "festivity" of brutal killings of suspected "ninjas" (men dressed in the fashion of Japanese assassins) in East Java, the recruitment by the military of unemployed men as private paramilitary forces for the guarding of the recent Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly, and the latest brutal violence in Jakarta (Ketapang) are all evidence of the widespread nature of the syndrome.

There is mounting public fear in big cities that the brutal killings and violence that recently spread over Java are being engineered by irresponsible political adventurers aiming at the destruction of public order.

Today, the smell of terror is knocking at the doors of Indonesian houses. How on earth will reform and democratization arrive at a peaceful destination if the public arena is filled by the smell of terror? If this situation continues, if the government fails to reduce sky-rocketing unemployment, and if the silent middle and upper strata lose their patience, one can not deny the chances of the rise of Der Fuhrer or a Generalissimo. If this happens, mothers of reform heroes will keep on crying because the dream of their children of the rise of a new era will never materialize.

It is, therefore, high time for Indonesia's ruling and moral leaders to prevent the rise of a strong autocratic leader who will purge all "suspicious" and "alien" persons, organizations, and institutions with an iron fist. In doing so, they should embrace a policy of inclusion, rather than exclusion, as a means of bringing this nation into the new era of reform.

The state and the nation should look to the future rather than respectively defending old political machinery and retaliating against past leaders. The ruling and opposition leaders must stop debating whether their political decisions are constitutionally and legitimately correct or not. This is not only an unproductive debate but also pushes aside the pressing political problems from the public sphere.

Rejuvenating and creating legitimate institutions should be the new rules of the game for the present government to reduce mounting political tensions. For instance, the planned establishment of the "independent" commission for investigating Soeharto's wealth should include leaders from outside the government so that it will be legitimized by the nation.

The government's attempts to create legitimate institutions will not come to materialize if the nation does not have independent moral leaders who guide it to take the road of moral politics. This nation desperately needs the birth of this sort of leader who has beauty of mind similar to Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia during the communist rule or Cardinal Sin of the Philippines during the last years of Marcos era.

These leaders, undoubtedly, have provided inspiration not only to their fellow citizens but also to the rulers to guide the whole nation to arrive at a peaceful destination.

If this leader emerges, the headless chicken syndrome might be remedied, the irresponsible political adventurers may lose their grip and finally this nation will enjoy the beauty of the reform era in the years to come.

Rochman Achwan PhD is a teaching staffer at the Department of Sociology, University of Indonesia.

Window: In contrast to the fall of Latin American military dictators and Marcos of the Phillipines, Soeharto's political machinery continues to stand up, repositioning itself even though it is being undermined.