Is Realpolitik still relevant in today's world?

By Hidayat Jati

JAKARTA (JP): Many American pundits of international-affairs these days, especially those who believe in a no-nonsense leadership that doesn't quibble over scruples, are wary.

Richard Nixon is dead and they fear America's world leadership, persistently in limbo, may soon follow the master of Realpolitik to the grave.

They point to the mess in Asia. They shudder at the way their current chief shifts policies, bowing to pressure from negligible sources like annoying human-rights campaigners and the Commerce Department.

These pundits, similarly, will not forget a Nixonian credo: Great powers cannot allow their foreign policy to be determined by the scruples or prejudices of the liberal media or the skeptical intelligentsia.

They will also fondly recall the time, recently written of in The New Yorker, when Nixon (who had the habit of referring to himself in the third person) told his Chinese contacts after the Tiananmen massacre "Tell your leaders that when Nixon was President and Leader of the Free World, he found that firmness paid."

This month, the hardliners may find new hope that Realpolitik will regain its rightful importance in the world.

Henry Kissinger, Nixon's most important National Security adviser and former Secretary of State, just published a book, about 800 pages long, called Diplomacy.

Kissinger, always a true-believer in the 19th century European concept of the balance of power, undoubtedly wants the book to be a lesson for the post cold-war world. His longtime refrain has been that the best way to run international affairs is to pay minimum attention to "scruples" like what is moral or fair.

The measure of Realpolitik is does it in itself guarantee effective action to help solve the problems of the world?

Judging that both the Bush presidency (often dubbed an adherent to realpolitik) and Clinton (often labeled an incompetent Wilsonian) have been weak in their handling of Haiti, Bosnia and Somalia, the answer is not so clear cut.

Realpolitik experts will tell you that the essence of the doctrine lies in raison d'etat, roughly translated as "national interest".

How, then, is "national interest" defined? Disciples of Nixon or Kissinger will explain that it is determined, more or less, by weighing "every rational consideration, economic and strategic, which will benefit the country in the long run".

This is of course not an answer, as the question subsequently becomes: Who decides the nation's interests? On what basis?

This is the catch of Realpolitik.

Of course, this doctrine--ideally-- requires a political elite which does not need consent from its subjects at home. This elite, ultimately, must be free to define what the country needs.

This explains why raison d'etat was best applied by despotic 19th century European politicians like Bismarck or 17th century figures such as Cardinal Richilieu.

No wonder that commentators like George Kennan, in his recent political autobiography, sometimes wish that a leader like Plato's philosopher/king were in place, rather than the pluralities and liberal constitutions we are stuck with today.

To sum it up, these no-nonsense champions of Realpolitik will hurrah for a long peace between major countries and will refuse to take any risks, including lending a hand to the Moslems in the former Yugoslavia or Chinese students in Tiananmen Square, which might break up the difficult peace.

They will, though, wickedly attack any small-town politician who tries to preach to leaders of countries like China and Indonesia about human-rights. "Don't be a boy scout," they sneer.

They will say, using their understanding of history, that the world today needs to be reminded of the tragedies of the Old World to prevent the prevalence of Wilsonian naivete after the Cold War.

It is a shame that this doctrine seems to be slowly creeping back into the hearts and minds of the powers which still control the Security Council.

To them, paralysis means peace for the mighty. By the same account, atrocities in minor countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia or Angola cannot be classified as serious problems.

The members of the Security Council seem to forget that a foreign policy goal does not have to be amoral to fit into their national interests, whatever they may be.

They also forget that great leaders throughout history were capable of that: Meeting the beady-eyed with the starry-eyed.

All it takes is leadership and willingness to make unpopular decisions acceptable to their national constituencies. Big ideas like Realpolitik or the Wilsonian concept of international affairs become irrelevant in the face of successes like the UN's recent achievement in Cambodia.

The Security Council, moreover, should look back at Truman, who succeeded, despite the initial opposition of his own Secretary of State, to blend benevolent vision into a political asset as shown in his staunchly pro-Israeli policy.

Look at Roosevelt. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. recently wrote how FDR stood in opposition to Hitler from the beginning, when isolationist America was ripe with anti-Semitism.

One should not forget de Gaulle either. Despite death-threats and a risk of disuniting the military, he went on to pull the French troops out of Algeria.

The examples are rare indeed, but they are precious.

It is high time for the UN and its main sponsor the United States to get their act together. Define a policy and execute it well. There's work to do.