Is Indonesia really collapsing?

Is Indonesia really collapsing?

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): Much has been written in the press about the
mess in Indonesia. There is also a lot of speculation about
Indonesia's implosion and its demise as a nation. Contingency
plans have reportedly been drafted to include joint military
exercises under the United States, in anticipation of the impact
on Southeast Asia.

How valid are all these speculations, assessments and
scenarios about Indonesia's future breakup?

The depth of the crisis and the lack of sense of urgency among
leaders and the elite has often led us to despair. Yet we should
take a longer, historical view of the Indonesian crisis.

A more balanced view might further result from a sociological
understanding of the crisis environment and a psychological
explanation of the Indonesian character. That will give us a less
pessimistic view about Indonesia's future, especially her chances
for recovery and survival.

This also helps one to understand why Indonesia has survived
the last three years of deep and multiple crises.

Following eight years of authoritarian rule under Sukarno and
another 32 years under Soeharto, the current disorder is
understandable. It was contributed to by the swing of the
political pendulum from one end to the other. It will need some
time to settle again at the center, especially for a country as
huge and diverse as this. The complication is that the political
crisis has coincided with an economic and social crisis -- and
even a cultural crisis regarding values.

Soeharto's regime was not only authoritarian but also very
Javanese centric and centrally organized. Immediately after his
fall, the regions, which bore deep resentment against the center,
asserted themselves. In part, this resulted in the outbreak of
regional tensions and conflicts. Some of the conflicts, such as
in Aceh and Irian Jaya, however, had already begun under
Soeharto.

Indonesians are still very paternalistically inclined and to a
certain extent remain feudal, especially in Java. On top of that
the Constitution stipulates a presidential system of government,
albeit not a complete one as the president is not directly
elected by the public but by the People's Consultative Assembly.

But the president's position is still very strong and is also
looked upon as a model. With a weak presidency, such as that
under B.J. Habibie or Abdurrahman Wahid, not much could be
achieved, while an overtly strong one might create havoc and
excesses -- as in the case of Soeharto.

All these factors have had a bearing on the crisis. But there
are also countervailing streams in Indonesia's history and
character that have helped alleviate some of the negative
impacts.

One is strong nationalism that began in the last century,
marked by the founding of the Boedi Oetomo organization in 1908.
This was consolidated during the national revolution against the
Dutch (1945-1949) and through the efforts and struggle of
president Soekarno during the 1950's. The second is the
resilience and patience of Indonesians at large. Only if these
countervailing streams in the psyche and intellect of Indonesians
are taken into account can one start to understand why the
country still survives.

Even the Acehnese in general did not think of separation and
independence initially. Their number one concern has been whether
their sense of justice is being listened to, and whether the main
perpetrators of human rights abuses there will be brought to
trial.

And second, they are concerned whether a new social contract
could be reached with Jakarta, giving them full "home rule" or
"special status". Although Aceh's separation could be considered
the main threat against Indonesia's unity, nationalism has always
been strong in Aceh. They have been the centerpiece of
Indonesia's struggle for independence and against Dutch
colonialism. The weak government of President Abdurrahman cannot
deliver what has been promised to the Acehnese and therefore a
solution is still elusive.

Irian Jaya's problems are different. The degree of nationalism
is not as high, since the province only became part of Indonesia
in 1963. Since society is largely tribal, their resistance
against Jakarta is obviously limited. But Indonesia must take
heed of increased international support for independence
movements in Irian Jaya, given allegations of widespread gross
human rights violations, as in the earlier case of East Timor.

Irian Jaya also needs a substantive "special status". It is
important that Jakarta can deal effectively with Irian Jaya in
the near future. Elsewhere in Indonesia, real autonomy, as drawn
up in the new legislation, appears to be adequate so far. The
capacity of the regions have however to be strengthened before
they can exercise fully fledged autonomy.

Nationalism is therefore still very strong here; it has been
able to keep alive the idea of a united nation, despite the deep
crisis over the last four years.

This emotional, unifying factor has been complemented by a
resilient, patient populace. Without these vital characteristics
many more conflicts could have occurred. There have been so many
political conflicts, but never one which could split the nation.

All this does not mean that further efforts should not be made
to overcome the crisis; the threshold for misery and pain
nevertheless has its limits. The country is starting to burst at
the seams with all the recent ongoing conflicts.

Given the importance of the President as the highest
executive, an immediate change of leadership is critical. He or
she must be a model, being willing to sacrifice for the nation,
while receiving the support of a majority and having a good team
to implement policies. If such a leader could be elected,
rehabilitation and reform could be undertaken more smoothly. At
least there would be hope that the country could move again.

The past three years have been a difficult transition period
and we have not been fortunate to get the right leader. Soeharto
never allowed anyone to grow to be able to take over from him.
But the nation has learned a dear lesson. While an "ideal" leader
may not be immediately available, a new generation of leaders
from non-governmental organizations, the press, intellectuals,
political parties and bureaucrats is likely to take over after
2004.

Then there have been new economic forces driving real growth
last year. Informal businesses and small and medium enterprises
together contributed up to 45 percent of gross domestic product,
which grew by 6 percent to 7 percent last year. In a number of
sectors these businesses have been performing very well in the
first few months of 2001.

They are of course temporary in strength, while real reforms
and new investments, especially foreign, must sustain their
future growth. The raging political conflict and the slowdown of
the developed world have dampened the hopes of these small
businesses.

But at least it has been shown that new economic forces which
are not dependent on the government are coming up and will be
playing a greater role. As soon as steady leadership is in place,
some real development is possible again very soon.

If the last few weeks have been an indication, and if
Indonesia is able to overcome conflict that could create civil
war and chaos, we still have a chance -- more so if a new
president can lead us into stability and hope.

This period of transition is one of a catharsis for Indonesia.
It is uncertain how it will end. It has yet to run its course
before a turnaround can happen. Thus patience in assessing
Indonesia is called for, while conviction is needed that the
country is not falling to pieces.

The writer is a member of the Board of Trustees at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.