Is Indonesia really collapsing?

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): Much has been written in the press about the mess in Indonesia. There is also a lot of speculation about Indonesia's implosion and its demise as a nation. Contingency plans have reportedly been drafted to include joint military exercises under the United States, in anticipation of the impact on Southeast Asia.

How valid are all these speculations, assessments and scenarios about Indonesia's future breakup?

The depth of the crisis and the lack of sense of urgency among leaders and the elite has often led us to despair. Yet we should take a longer, historical view of the Indonesian crisis.

A more balanced view might further result from a sociological understanding of the crisis environment and a psychological explanation of the Indonesian character. That will give us a less pessimistic view about Indonesia's future, especially her chances for recovery and survival.

This also helps one to understand why Indonesia has survived the last three years of deep and multiple crises.

Following eight years of authoritarian rule under Sukarno and another 32 years under Soeharto, the current disorder is understandable. It was contributed to by the swing of the political pendulum from one end to the other. It will need some time to settle again at the center, especially for a country as huge and diverse as this. The complication is that the political crisis has coincided with an economic and social crisis -- and even a cultural crisis regarding values.

Soeharto's regime was not only authoritarian but also very Javanese centric and centrally organized. Immediately after his fall, the regions, which bore deep resentment against the center, asserted themselves. In part, this resulted in the outbreak of regional tensions and conflicts. Some of the conflicts, such as in Aceh and Irian Jaya, however, had already begun under Soeharto.

Indonesians are still very paternalistically inclined and to a certain extent remain feudal, especially in Java. On top of that the Constitution stipulates a presidential system of government, albeit not a complete one as the president is not directly elected by the public but by the People's Consultative Assembly.

But the president's position is still very strong and is also looked upon as a model. With a weak presidency, such as that under B.J. Habibie or Abdurrahman Wahid, not much could be achieved, while an overtly strong one might create havoc and excesses -- as in the case of Soeharto.

All these factors have had a bearing on the crisis. But there are also countervailing streams in Indonesia's history and character that have helped alleviate some of the negative impacts.

One is strong nationalism that began in the last century, marked by the founding of the Boedi Oetomo organization in 1908. This was consolidated during the national revolution against the Dutch (1945-1949) and through the efforts and struggle of president Soekarno during the 1950's. The second is the resilience and patience of Indonesians at large. Only if these countervailing streams in the psyche and intellect of Indonesians are taken into account can one start to understand why the country still survives.

Even the Acehnese in general did not think of separation and independence initially. Their number one concern has been whether their sense of justice is being listened to, and whether the main perpetrators of human rights abuses there will be brought to trial.

And second, they are concerned whether a new social contract could be reached with Jakarta, giving them full "home rule" or "special status". Although Aceh's separation could be considered the main threat against Indonesia's unity, nationalism has always been strong in Aceh. They have been the centerpiece of Indonesia's struggle for independence and against Dutch colonialism. The weak government of President Abdurrahman cannot deliver what has been promised to the Acehnese and therefore a solution is still elusive.

Irian Jaya's problems are different. The degree of nationalism is not as high, since the province only became part of Indonesia in 1963. Since society is largely tribal, their resistance against Jakarta is obviously limited. But Indonesia must take heed of increased international support for independence movements in Irian Jaya, given allegations of widespread gross human rights violations, as in the earlier case of East Timor.

Irian Jaya also needs a substantive "special status". It is important that Jakarta can deal effectively with Irian Jaya in the near future. Elsewhere in Indonesia, real autonomy, as drawn up in the new legislation, appears to be adequate so far. The capacity of the regions have however to be strengthened before they can exercise fully fledged autonomy.

Nationalism is therefore still very strong here; it has been able to keep alive the idea of a united nation, despite the deep crisis over the last four years.

This emotional, unifying factor has been complemented by a resilient, patient populace. Without these vital characteristics many more conflicts could have occurred. There have been so many political conflicts, but never one which could split the nation.

All this does not mean that further efforts should not be made to overcome the crisis; the threshold for misery and pain nevertheless has its limits. The country is starting to burst at the seams with all the recent ongoing conflicts.

Given the importance of the President as the highest executive, an immediate change of leadership is critical. He or she must be a model, being willing to sacrifice for the nation, while receiving the support of a majority and having a good team to implement policies. If such a leader could be elected, rehabilitation and reform could be undertaken more smoothly. At least there would be hope that the country could move again.

The past three years have been a difficult transition period and we have not been fortunate to get the right leader. Soeharto never allowed anyone to grow to be able to take over from him. But the nation has learned a dear lesson. While an "ideal" leader may not be immediately available, a new generation of leaders from non-governmental organizations, the press, intellectuals, political parties and bureaucrats is likely to take over after 2004.

Then there have been new economic forces driving real growth last year. Informal businesses and small and medium enterprises together contributed up to 45 percent of gross domestic product, which grew by 6 percent to 7 percent last year. In a number of sectors these businesses have been performing very well in the first few months of 2001.

They are of course temporary in strength, while real reforms and new investments, especially foreign, must sustain their future growth. The raging political conflict and the slowdown of the developed world have dampened the hopes of these small businesses.

But at least it has been shown that new economic forces which are not dependent on the government are coming up and will be playing a greater role. As soon as steady leadership is in place, some real development is possible again very soon.

If the last few weeks have been an indication, and if Indonesia is able to overcome conflict that could create civil war and chaos, we still have a chance -- more so if a new president can lead us into stability and hope.

This period of transition is one of a catharsis for Indonesia. It is uncertain how it will end. It has yet to run its course before a turnaround can happen. Thus patience in assessing Indonesia is called for, while conviction is needed that the country is not falling to pieces.

The writer is a member of the Board of Trustees at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.