Is Indonesia going to lose Aceh?

Is Indonesia going to lose Aceh?

Imanuddin, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Implementing the special autonomy status was supposed to be
the latest breakthrough to end the conflict between Jakarta and
Aceh. Yet violence and calls for a separate state remain.

The promise of special autonomy was first made by first
president Sukarno in 1959. He had agreed to restore Aceh's status
as a province and vowed to grant autonomy status on education and
religious affairs. This was a response to the first armed
resistance against Jakarta, launched by the influential ulema
Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureuh. He had challenged Sukarno's
decision in 1950 to merge Aceh with North Sumatra and name it a
regency under the North Sumatra provincial administration.

Under Soeharto, the Acehnese took up arms again as the pledge
remained unrealized. To crush the movement Soeharto placed the
province under the heel of the military in 1989.

The subsequent decade of military operations, marked by
widespread brutality and human rights abuses by the Indonesian
Military (TNI), has not only destroyed the faith of the Acehnese
in the central government, but has also failed to halt the
separatist campaign.

After Soeharto's downfall in 1998, the government tried to
change its policy and proposed talks with the Free Aceh Movement
(GAM). Jakarta, however, appears to be tired of this after three
years of effort.

Early this month, Sukarno's daughter, President Megawati
Soekarnoputri, issued a direct order to the man in charge of
overseeing the troubled province, Iskandar Muda Military
Commander Maj. Gen. Djali Yusuf, to act resolutely against GAM.

Her statement followed weeks of debate over whether the
government should conduct an intensive military crackdown on GAM
rebels, as the planned all-inclusive dialog in the natural
resources-rich province seems doomed to fail.

The government's plan to take resolute action has renewed fear
in the Acehnese; thousands have died over the years from the
atrocities committed here, while another 600 more have been
killed this year alone. Most civilians have been pitted between
security forces and the rebels in the conflict.

Observers and activists have lamented moves to revive the
military approach, feared to bring more casualties.

They say military and political leaders should have learned
Aceh's history of its cycle of conflict. They say that past
rulers, from the Dutch colonial government to president Sukarno
and president Soeharto, had all adopted iron-fisted military
approaches to deal with the desire for independence among the
Acehnese, but none had ever extinguished this desire.

The military operation was lifted under Soeharto's succesor
B.J. Habibie, while the ensuing administration of Abdurrahman
Wahid pursued a peaceful solution by engaging in dialog with GAM.

However, Abdurrahman later issued a presidential decree that
gave the military another free hand to operate in Aceh. The
decree was then extended by Megawati.

Presidential Instruction No. 1/2002, which required the
government to engage in dialog with GAM, expired last month with
the government appearing reluctant to extend the policy.

Speculation is rife that a harsher stance may rest on the
government's belief that GAM is a weakened force, allowing it to
discount negotiating.

A military source, however, said the current situation in Aceh
had not met the requirements for a full military operation and
was similar to what happened in the country's former province of
East Timor, following the independence vote in 1999.

The decision to take resolute action against GAM also violates
an agreement in Geneva, Switzerland, last month in which Jakarta
and GAM pledged to fully execute the law on Aceh's special
autonomy as a starting point for negotiations. The law gives Aceh
higher oil and gas revenues and the opportunity to implement
sharia law.

Meanwhile there has been a conflicting and absurd statement
made by the TNI over its security policy in Aceh.

Maj. Gen. Djali Yusuf recently requested 8,000 soldiers as
reinforcements to bring peace to Aceh. Since GAM is conducting
guerrilla warfare, theoretically he needs 10 soldiers to counter
each GAM combatant, he said. Since he has only 22,000 troops,
while GAM has some 3,000 active combatants with 1,400 weapons,
the reinforcments would bring the number of troops to 30,000.

A senior TNI officer, however, said recently that intelligence
reports revealed GAM was not so strong that the Cilangkap
headquarters needed to send so many troops there. "GAM's weaponry
is poor and the number of its troops is not significant compared
to the number of TNI personnel deployed in the province."

So, what is likely to be the reason for the TNI to maintain a
large number of troops in the area?

Some military officers have jokingly said they needed Aceh and
Irian Jaya, as well as East Timor in the past, as training
grounds, "and the regular deployment of troops was part of the
scheme". Analysts argue that the large revenue from oil and gas
in Aceh may have led to the plan to impose a state of civil
emergency, including the large deployment of troops there.

But others speculate that the considerably strong presence of
TNI's troops in the westernmost province has something to do with
its business interests there. It is a public secret that the TNI
has long been involved in business activities.

The TNI has repeatedly complained of its minimum defense
budget. The TNI, along with the National Police, recently asked
for an additional budget of Rp 1 trillion (US$112 million) for
its operational expenditure.

Legal uncertainty and continuing violence have provoked anger
and disappointment among the Acehnese, with many of them
repeatedly demanding a referendum be held in Aceh.

Following the "defeat" in the 1999 East Timor referendum,
which resulted in the separation of East Timor from Indonesia,
such calls should not be granted again. However crushing the
separatist movement through military operations, arbitrary
arrests and murders will only increase demands for independence.

As sociologists have suggested, efforts to dismiss calls for a
referendum should be held through dialog and by promoting
measures to win the hearts of the Acehnese.

Or can we afford to lose another province, just to accommodate
the interests of certain groups or institutions, and neglect
those of most Indonesians who have long dreamed of a peaceful and
prosperous land?

Bogged down with regional unrest and conflict, we will merely
become spectators, while other countries engage in globalization
and prepare for trade liberalization. We will continue to
experience the massive influx of foreign products and workers
because we cannot develop and improve the skills and knowledge of
our own people -- many of whom are focused on their survival and
do not have access to further educate themselves.