Is future of RI really at stake as Hassan says?

Is future of RI really at stake as Hassan says?

Damien Kingsbury, Head, Philosophical, Political and
International Studies, Deakin University

In trying to justify the actions of the Indonesian Military
(TNI) in Indonesia's westernmost province of Aceh, Indonesia's
foreign minister Hassan Wirayuda says that nothing less than the
future of the state is at stake. Wirayuda may be right, but not
in the way that he thinks.

The behavior of the TNI in Aceh has, by all accounts, been
appalling since it started its most recent campaign. The reports
published here and elsewhere are disturbing enough.

Further worrying is the flood of private reports coming from
non-government organizations which details more horrific events,
including an escalating rate of murder, in detailed cases by
locking civilians in their homes and burning them, the
destruction of villages, and rape. This looks not so much as a
military campaign against a rebel force, but of an invading
feudal Army intent on destroying an enemy people.

The TNI now clamping down on the media's reporting of the
situation is a further sign that it wishes to conduct this
campaign unhindered by poor publicity. There is no thought,
however, that poor publicity derives from poor behavior.

The clearly stated aim of the TNI is to "exterminate" the Free
Aceh Movement (GAM). However, based on the TNI's previous form in
Aceh, this operation will not be quick, and may not be
successful. The TNI is not especially well equipped and often
poorly trained, the terrain is difficult, and GAM are very
experienced guerrilla fighters with a long history of surviving
seemingly tight situations.

Beyond the immediate military outcome, there is also the
likelihood that rather than bring Aceh back into the Indonesian
nationalist fold, the TNI is in the process of creating a new
generation of GAM, as it has done before. In this respect, a
military solution may be no solution at all.

Hassan Wirayuda, and other Indonesian leaders, are fearful
that if Aceh does manage to achieve independence then Indonesia
will fall apart. But the only other substantial claim to
independence in Indonesian is West Papua, and it is quite
possible that Indonesian could survive without these two
provinces.

It would be poorer, certainly, but it would still be viable,
and much less violent. Yet without external recognition, and
some form of diplomatic intervention, independence for Aceh is
all but impossible. And this seems unlikely. To that end, a
compromise solution must be found.

Aceh has already experienced "special autonomy", from 1962, to
address claims similar to those now being pressed, and most
Acehnese believe that failed because it was subverted by Jakarta,
not least through ravaging the province's economy.

Added to longstanding human rights atrocities by the TNI,
there is a profound sense of distrust of Jakarta and its
intentions.

As a consequence, a new "special autonomy" that was proclaimed
last year is not regarded as either substantial or sincere.
Negotiations therefore have to be reopened, and a new offer needs
to be put on the table. This would involve Aceh being offered the
chance to vote for a far more extended form of autonomy, external
to Indonesia in nearly all but name.

With agreement for the disbursement of a nominal percentage of
revenue, Aceh could otherwise be self-governing in effectively
all areas but for foreign affairs, monetary and defense. Under
such an arrangement, the TNI would have to leave Aceh entirely,
which it would be loathe to do because of its lucrative business
interests there, and the blow to its sense of "prestige".

Such a move would also challenge the TNI's self-defined
"territorial structure", by which it is located throughout the
archipelago.

Because of the parallel role the National Police have played
alongside the TNI in Aceh, not least through the paramilitary
Mobile Brigades (Brimbob), "Hunter" battalions, and the BKO
(under operational control) units in which elite soldiers are
technically accredited as police, they too would have to end
their presence in Aceh. A local police would then have to be
raised, under a local administration.

Such a settlement would take a huge amount of good will on
both sides, a high degree of honesty and transparency, and
international monitoring for several years at least. The TNI
would certainly reject such a settlement, but it could have some
support among civilian politicians in Jakarta who know the war
in Aceh is not very popular. Such a solution could also attract
the backing of third countries, such as Japan, Malaysia,
Thailand, the Netherlands, the U.S., and even Australia.

Indeed, GAM has said, privately, that it would have accepted
such an offer until a couple of years ago, although that option
vanished when the military campaign escalated in early 2001. With
the latest events, however, it would take a superhuman effort to
get back to this point of negotiation.

Wirayuda is right; the future of Indonesia is at stake. But
what is at stake is less the geographic shape of Indonesia, than
what sort of state Indonesia wants to, or can, be.

The writer is also the author of Power Politics and the
Indonesian Military, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.