Is East Timor a case of UN neglect?

By Soegio Sosrosoemarto

JAKARTA (JP): The United Nations is coming to East Timor; no doubt belatedly. In hindsight, taking its cue from the decolonization of Asia, the UN should have been in East Timor no later than 10 years after India took Goa back in 1961.

The UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) has been in East Timor since late-June 1999 under the New York accord of May 5, 1999. UNAMET has been tasked to hold and supervise the referendum on the status of East Timor which is scheduled for Aug. 30, 1999, barring any untoward eventualities.

Under the referendum, East Timorese can choose one of two options: Either remain part of Indonesia with wide-ranging autonomy, or secede from Indonesia and establish an independent entity.

In the meantime, while UNAMET is supposed to maintain its neutrality and impartiality in executing its tasks and duties in East Timor, one can unmistakably note a series of apparently unrelated instances which seem to indicate on oblique campaign on the part of UNAMET for the second option.

The recent visit to Jakarta of a 1997 Nobel Peace Prize winner was apparently intended to remind the East Timorese that he is the heir presumptive to the high office in East Timor, and that he has all along been the rightful spokesman of the East Timorese.

The following instances perhaps could raise questions whether UNAMET has wittingly or unwittingly supported the option of independence for East Timor: * The Australian newspaper The Age on July 31, 1999 reported the UN was preparing a draft text on the formation of a provisional government for East Timor. If the report was true, the premature leakage of such a plan was probably not as innocent as it might appear, and probably had an ulterior motive. It could lead the East Timorese to believe that whatever the results of the referendum, an independent East Timor was the UN's preference or had even been arranged. * Besides complaints about partiality on the part of certain UNAMET personnel and their assistants, there have been reports about disrespectful acts committed by certain UNAMET members, including taking down Indonesian flags and flying the flags of their own countries. Is this not a blatant expression of arrogance and ingrained dislike, at the least, toward Indonesia? Are these acts not intended to dissuade people from choosing to remain a part of Indonesia? * A high-ranking official from a neighboring country was reported by local newspapers to have stated in East Timor that his country was committed to giving aid to the East Timorese in recognition of the help they provided his country during World War II.

This statement, made during the voter registration period, was utterly unwise. It could convey the message -- unintentionally one surely hopes -- that despite a lack of natural resources, for example, East Timor could depend on this foreign country for its well-being and survival. Further, the Commonwealth of Portuguese- Speaking Countries, which was established in Lisbon in July 1997, could be a source of aid to East Timor.

UNAMET's task is certainly not an easy one. However, a referendum on the two options given the East Timorese seems to be the only practical way to find a lasting and internationally acceptable solution to the East Timor problem.

Looking back at the genesis of the conflict in East Timor in the 1970s, one rightfully doubts if the UN presence and face-to- face meetings between proindependence and prointegration East Timorese leaders can completely extinguish the burning embers of hatred and suspicion among them.

Therefore, combined guarantees from the UN and the Indonesian government are absolutely necessary to ensure that whatever the results of the referendum, democracy and human rights will be respected in East Timor. Such guarantees are also needed to make sure that whoever loses the referendum will not resort to armed opposition.

The referendum on East Timor is not the first of its kind in history. Referendums on similar issues have been held before, notably in Algeria by the French government in 1962, and in Canada in 1980 and 1992. Canada's high literacy rate and long democratic tradition seem to be responsible for the peaceful process of the referendums, even though the origin of the demand for the referendum had racial backgrounds.

Basically, in a well-established democratic system, one can expect referendums to proceed peacefully. Nevertheless, referendums on matters with serious consequences, where ideology or economic issues and interests are at stake, are usually charged with potentially explosive and dangerous emotions.

In East Timor, where more than half of its population of some 600,000, according to a 1970 census, are illiterate, a referendum is more an exercise in formality than a way of ascertaining the true wishes of the people. Presumably, many of them cannot fully grasp what their choices entail.

Is the referendum in East Timor free from ideology?

At least one of the three political groups contending for power in the 1970s was reported to have ideological goals, then in fashion among national liberation movements in Africa.

Hence, the group's rash and unilateral declaration of independence for East Timor in the capital of Dili, and the creation of an armed wing to achieve its purported ideological goals. Unlike national liberation movements in Africa, this ideological-based political grouping in East Timor was formed only after the collapse of the fascist regime in Portugal in 1974, and then at the behest of the Portuguese authorities. Its armed supporters were equipped with weapons handed out by the colonial army and police personnel.

If their ideology is no longer relevant, for what reasons then are they fighting for an independent East Timor?

Independence for the sake of independence would be the most likely answer. One is certainly intrigued by the underlying motive of their quest for independence. Is there not a hidden feeling of superiority on the part of their elite?

Their goal seems to be to establish an independent lusophone (Portuguese speaking) country in this sprawling archipelago. Hence, their preference for Portuguese words over native ones, like Falintil (Forcas Armadas Libertacao di Independencia di Timor Leste) and CNRT (Conselho Nacionale di Resistencia Timorese).

It is obvious that a western-oriented lusophone in this part of the world would be to the West's interests. One should pay immediate attention to the use of the word "Timorese" instead of "di Timor Leste" for the last initial of CNRT.

Could the use of the word "Timorese" have a deliberate purpose? This purpose being that their "long-term ultimate goal" is a unified independent island of Timor? The then governor of East Timor, M.V. Carascalao, told a visiting group of officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late-1992 that in the initial confusing months of conflict between the opposing groups in East Timor, rumors abounded that the proindependence camp was eventually aiming for a unified independent Timor. This writer was among that group.

As for the pro-Indonesian group, they believe the natural process of decolonization in East Timor would dictate the area becoming an integral part of Indonesia. This belief, which can be called a quasi-ideology, is based on a number of elements, such as history, shared experience under colonial rule, geographic location and ethnic and cultural affinity with surrounding islands.

It is important to note, however, that a strong trend away from the "mainstream" ideology of the center could weaken the attachment the people feel to the center -- Indonesia -- and strengthen the tendency to pull away.

What prompted Indonesia's involvement in East Timor, as is widely known, was a combination of unforeseen developments suddenly taking place in the former Portuguese colony. Admittedly, the Cold War also played an important role in Indonesia's involvement.

An intriguing question is what would or should the UN have done if Indonesia's military had not moved into East Timor? In a similar case, would the UN -- or any other country for that matter -- have stood idly by and allowed the killings to run their own course until they stopped of their own accord or out of sheer exhaustion?

The UN should have been more active in acting on colonial problems and shown a greater sense of urgency and foresight, instead of waiting to be caught by events. Had the UN, for example, put pressure on Portugal to introduce self-rule in East Timor years before 1974, the East Timorese would probably be peacefully enjoying their independence -- whether as a part of Indonesia or as a separate entity would be irrelevant. Thousands of lives would have been spared, and the costly and tiring diplomatic to and fro would have been unnecessary.

Impartial observers would agree that Portugal no doubt bears the major portion of the blame for the imbroglio. One, however, cannot expect local colonial authorities long used to a fascist system of rule to have a clear notion about self-rule, let alone democracy.

As history would have it, it was the Portuguese military, usually the bastion of conservatism, and not the UN which delivered the baby of independence to Africa and would have delivered it to East Timor but for the unfortunate turn of events. Indeed, in a number of cases in the past the UN did not move fast enough. Was the UN's lack of foresight the cause of the East Timor problem?

Today, Indonesia is like the prophet Job, afflicted incessantly by troubles and tribulations which come one after another.

However, comforters are not nearby. Instead, gloaters are seen, hardly hiding their delight and glee over Indonesia's misfortunes. They seem to be not only trying to blame Indonesia for creating problems in East Timor, but are also trying to disseminate the idea that pro-Indonesia groups are a mere creation of Indonesia.

The writer was Indonesia's charge d'affaires in Namibia from 1992 to 1995. The opinions expressed here are entirely his own.