Is East Timor a case of UN neglect?

Is East Timor a case of UN neglect?

By Soegio Sosrosoemarto

JAKARTA (JP): The United Nations is coming to East Timor; no
doubt belatedly. In hindsight, taking its cue from the
decolonization of Asia, the UN should have been in East Timor no
later than 10 years after India took Goa back in 1961.

The UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) has been in East Timor
since late-June 1999 under the New York accord of May 5, 1999.
UNAMET has been tasked to hold and supervise the referendum on
the status of East Timor which is scheduled for Aug. 30, 1999,
barring any untoward eventualities.

Under the referendum, East Timorese can choose one of two
options: Either remain part of Indonesia with wide-ranging
autonomy, or secede from Indonesia and establish an independent
entity.

In the meantime, while UNAMET is supposed to maintain its
neutrality and impartiality in executing its tasks and duties in
East Timor, one can unmistakably note a series of apparently
unrelated instances which seem to indicate on oblique campaign on
the part of UNAMET for the second option.

The recent visit to Jakarta of a 1997 Nobel Peace Prize winner
was apparently intended to remind the East Timorese that he is
the heir presumptive to the high office in East Timor, and that
he has all along been the rightful spokesman of the East
Timorese.

The following instances perhaps could raise questions whether
UNAMET has wittingly or unwittingly supported the option of
independence for East Timor:
* The Australian newspaper The Age on July 31, 1999
reported the UN was preparing a draft text on the formation of a
provisional government for East Timor. If the report was true,
the premature leakage of such a plan was probably not as innocent
as it might appear, and probably had an ulterior motive. It could
lead the East Timorese to believe that whatever the results of
the referendum, an independent East Timor was the UN's preference
or had even been arranged.
* Besides complaints about partiality on the part of certain
UNAMET personnel and their assistants, there have been reports
about disrespectful acts committed by certain UNAMET members,
including taking down Indonesian flags and flying the flags of
their own countries. Is this not a blatant expression of
arrogance and ingrained dislike, at the least, toward Indonesia?
Are these acts not intended to dissuade people from choosing to
remain a part of Indonesia?
* A high-ranking official from a neighboring country was reported
by local newspapers to have stated in East Timor that his country
was committed to giving aid to the East Timorese in recognition
of the help they provided his country during World War II.

This statement, made during the voter registration period, was
utterly unwise. It could convey the message -- unintentionally
one surely hopes -- that despite a lack of natural resources, for
example, East Timor could depend on this foreign country for its
well-being and survival. Further, the Commonwealth of Portuguese-
Speaking Countries, which was established in Lisbon in July 1997,
could be a source of aid to East Timor.

UNAMET's task is certainly not an easy one. However, a
referendum on the two options given the East Timorese seems to be
the only practical way to find a lasting and internationally
acceptable solution to the East Timor problem.

Looking back at the genesis of the conflict in East Timor in
the 1970s, one rightfully doubts if the UN presence and face-to-
face meetings between proindependence and prointegration East
Timorese leaders can completely extinguish the burning embers of
hatred and suspicion among them.

Therefore, combined guarantees from the UN and the Indonesian
government are absolutely necessary to ensure that whatever the
results of the referendum, democracy and human rights will be
respected in East Timor. Such guarantees are also needed to make
sure that whoever loses the referendum will not resort to armed
opposition.

The referendum on East Timor is not the first of its kind in
history. Referendums on similar issues have been held before,
notably in Algeria by the French government in 1962, and in
Canada in 1980 and 1992. Canada's high literacy rate and long
democratic tradition seem to be responsible for the peaceful
process of the referendums, even though the origin of the demand
for the referendum had racial backgrounds.

Basically, in a well-established democratic system, one can
expect referendums to proceed peacefully. Nevertheless,
referendums on matters with serious consequences, where ideology
or economic issues and interests are at stake, are usually
charged with potentially explosive and dangerous emotions.

In East Timor, where more than half of its population of some
600,000, according to a 1970 census, are illiterate, a referendum
is more an exercise in formality than a way of ascertaining the
true wishes of the people. Presumably, many of them cannot fully
grasp what their choices entail.

Is the referendum in East Timor free from ideology?

At least one of the three political groups contending for
power in the 1970s was reported to have ideological goals, then
in fashion among national liberation movements in Africa.

Hence, the group's rash and unilateral declaration of
independence for East Timor in the capital of Dili, and the
creation of an armed wing to achieve its purported ideological
goals. Unlike national liberation movements in Africa, this
ideological-based political grouping in East Timor was formed
only after the collapse of the fascist regime in Portugal in
1974, and then at the behest of the Portuguese authorities. Its
armed supporters were equipped with weapons handed out by the
colonial army and police personnel.

If their ideology is no longer relevant, for what reasons then
are they fighting for an independent East Timor?

Independence for the sake of independence would be the most
likely answer. One is certainly intrigued by the underlying
motive of their quest for independence. Is there not a hidden
feeling of superiority on the part of their elite?

Their goal seems to be to establish an independent lusophone
(Portuguese speaking) country in this sprawling archipelago.
Hence, their preference for Portuguese words over native ones,
like Falintil (Forcas Armadas Libertacao di Independencia di
Timor Leste) and CNRT (Conselho Nacionale di Resistencia
Timorese).

It is obvious that a western-oriented lusophone in this part
of the world would be to the West's interests. One should pay
immediate attention to the use of the word "Timorese" instead of
"di Timor Leste" for the last initial of CNRT.

Could the use of the word "Timorese" have a deliberate
purpose? This purpose being that their "long-term ultimate goal"
is a unified independent island of Timor? The then governor of
East Timor, M.V. Carascalao, told a visiting group of officials
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late-1992 that in the
initial confusing months of conflict between the opposing groups
in East Timor, rumors abounded that the proindependence camp was
eventually aiming for a unified independent Timor. This writer
was among that group.

As for the pro-Indonesian group, they believe the natural
process of decolonization in East Timor would dictate the area
becoming an integral part of Indonesia. This belief, which can be
called a quasi-ideology, is based on a number of elements, such
as history, shared experience under colonial rule, geographic
location and ethnic and cultural affinity with surrounding
islands.

It is important to note, however, that a strong trend away
from the "mainstream" ideology of the center could weaken the
attachment the people feel to the center -- Indonesia -- and
strengthen the tendency to pull away.

What prompted Indonesia's involvement in East Timor, as is
widely known, was a combination of unforeseen developments
suddenly taking place in the former Portuguese colony.
Admittedly, the Cold War also played an important role in
Indonesia's involvement.

An intriguing question is what would or should the UN have
done if Indonesia's military had not moved into East Timor? In a
similar case, would the UN -- or any other country for that
matter -- have stood idly by and allowed the killings to run
their own course until they stopped of their own accord or out of
sheer exhaustion?

The UN should have been more active in acting on colonial
problems and shown a greater sense of urgency and foresight,
instead of waiting to be caught by events. Had the UN, for
example, put pressure on Portugal to introduce self-rule in East
Timor years before 1974, the East Timorese would probably be
peacefully enjoying their independence -- whether as a part of
Indonesia or as a separate entity would be irrelevant. Thousands
of lives would have been spared, and the costly and tiring
diplomatic to and fro would have been unnecessary.

Impartial observers would agree that Portugal no doubt bears
the major portion of the blame for the imbroglio. One, however,
cannot expect local colonial authorities long used to a fascist
system of rule to have a clear notion about self-rule, let alone
democracy.

As history would have it, it was the Portuguese military,
usually the bastion of conservatism, and not the UN which
delivered the baby of independence to Africa and would have
delivered it to East Timor but for the unfortunate turn of
events. Indeed, in a number of cases in the past the UN did not
move fast enough. Was the UN's lack of foresight the cause of the
East Timor problem?

Today, Indonesia is like the prophet Job, afflicted
incessantly by troubles and tribulations which come one after
another.

However, comforters are not nearby. Instead, gloaters are
seen, hardly hiding their delight and glee over Indonesia's
misfortunes. They seem to be not only trying to blame Indonesia
for creating problems in East Timor, but are also trying to
disseminate the idea that pro-Indonesia groups are a mere
creation of Indonesia.

The writer was Indonesia's charge d'affaires in Namibia from
1992 to 1995. The opinions expressed here are entirely his own.