Is battle for power bogging down TNI bill?

Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Head, Political Research Center, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta

While problems related to the purchase of four Sukhoi jet fighters and two Mi-35 combat helicopters from Russia are dangling for a solution, a new puzzle is whether a regional administration is justified in buying equipment for the military (TNI).

The commander of Indonesia's West Zone Naval Fleet, Adm. Mualimin Santoso, who signed a memorandum of understanding for the purchase of 35 patrol ships in late August with Riau governor Saleh Djasit, said that the plan did not violate the defense law. Can we really have patrol ships belonging to the Riau or Bangka Belitung province?

True, article 10 of Law No. 22/1999 on regional autonomy stipulates that a regional administration is authorized to provide "assistance to maintain national security ...". Meanwhile, Article 25 of Law No. 3/2002 on national defense says "... national defense shall be funded by the state budget."

The regional autonomy law was passed before the police force was officially separated from the military. Unfortunately, there is no further explanation of the above stipulations, which could lead to varying interpretations.

Authority over defense should lie with the central government, hence it would seem that the MOU violates the defense law.

This law provides for, among other things, the defense minister's powers, which includes the formulation of policies on the use of military units and other defense components; and the stipulation of policies on "budgeting, supply, recruitment, national resources management and the development of defense technology and industry".

The purchase of Russian jet fighters was also said to violate procedures because the deal did not involve the defense minister, which is in violation of the defense law.

Can the military commander, in this case Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, act on behalf of the defense minister in Cabinet discussions on the purchase of the Russian aircraft, and also in negotiating deals with the Russian side, without the knowledge of the defense minister?

Can the other ministers and heads of relevant government bodies draw up and implement strategic defense plans without being invited to do so by the defense minister? What has happened shows that the military commander acted as if he led both TNI headquarters and the defense ministry -- in the way that military commanders did during the New Order regime.

An earlier controversy was the introduction of Article 19 in the February 2003 version of the TNI bill. It states that in an emergency, the TNI commander may deploy the military "as an initial step to prevent further losses to the state" and that the deployment of military force must be reported to the president within 24 hours at the latest.

Yet another issue is whether the army chief-of-staff is authorized to set up a number of raider units in the absence of a review of ground forces' capabilities by the defense ministry.

What is the use of a law if the old military style remains, including that regarding troop deployment and logistics? The above examples display a lack of understanding among senior military and civilian officials regarding powers and authority in defense matters.

One reason for this is the lack of harmonization in the laws governing defense and security matters. Another is the fact that Law No. 3/2002 on defense may be considered too liberal, reducing the freedom and powers of the military in areas that used to be considered its turf.

A third reason may be that the military still doubts the capabilities of civilian officials in understanding defense issues, leading the military to often by-pass the political authority.

Fourth, civilian politicians may also lack self-confidence in speeding up TNI reforms with a view to transforming it into a professional military organization.

Fifth, the defense law aims to clearly define the relationship between the defense minister and the military commander. In the drafting process, the suggestion was raised for the insertion of a clause stating that "the commander in chief shall be accountable to the president through the minister (of defense) regarding the employment of national defense components ....".

This stipulation was intended to place the military commander under the minister of defense. If the wording had read, "The military commander shall be accountable to the defense minister", this would have contradicted the 2000 MPR Decree on the respective roles of the military and the police, which explicitly places the TNI under the president. Unfortunately, this insertion was scrapped.

Regarding authority in national defense management, the defense law provides for, among other things, the powers and responsibilities of the president, the defense minister and the military. Article 19 deals with the forms and nature of non- military threats and the procedures for handling them. Unfortunately, there is no specific elaboration on the relationship between the defense minister and the military commander.

What has been provided for in Law No. 3/2002 on defense must be set out in greater detail in the TNI law.

Yet the drafting of this bill has dragged on and on, leading us to suspect that a battle for power and dominance is going on, as well as a heated debate between the reformists in the defense ministry and the neo-conservatives in TNI headquarters and at the lower level, particularly in army headquarters.

The new TNI law will determine the course of military reform.

Apart from the relationship between the defense minister and the military commander, other crucial issues include: First, will the military perform its function and role in line with the policies of the legitimate government? Or can it have its own policies?

Should the military play the main role in facing external and domestic military threats and in other operations besides wars, or will it deal with threats of a very broad scope?

Second, will the deployment and use of military troops refer to the provisions of the defense laws on such things as the president's powers regarding the deployment of military forces, or will such matters be governed by the controversial clauses in the February draft?

Third, will the TNI's territorial function still take the New Order-era form of a military command structure running parallel to the civilian administration structure, or will it be returned to the divisions of combat troops similar to the period during and shortly after the independence revolution in the 1940s and 1950s? There is not a single article in the February version of the draft that deals with the TNI's territorial function and commands -- one of the most vital aspects regarding military reform.

Fourth, what about the TNI's financing sources?

Legislators must screen the fine print of all the chapters, articles and sections of the TNI bill if we indeed wish to make the TNI a reliable instrument of national defense -- and not "a state within a state."