Is Australia on collision course with Indonesia?

Is Australia on collision course with Indonesia?

Paulo Gorjao, Lecturer, Lusiada University, Portugal,
paulogorjao@yahoo.com

In February, with just a few weeks interval, Australia
released a new foreign policy white paper, Advancing the National
Interest (ANI), and a defense white paper update, Australia's
National Security: A Defense Update (ANS).

Both documents are highly welcome since they provide relevant
and useful information about Australia's official thinking in the
fields of foreign affairs and security. Yet, they raise more
questions than answers. ANI is a radically different document
from the foreign affairs and trade white paper of 1997, In the
National Interest.

While the former was highly influenced by the prospects of
Asia's economic growth, which the Asian financial crisis rapidly
shattered, the later is deeply influenced by the new security
challenges.

In the same way, the 2000 defense white paper, Our Future
Defense Force, was highly influenced by the Australian
intervention in East Timor, while the defense update is deeply
influenced by the new security challenges. Indeed, both ANI and
ANS reflect recent developments concerning the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the terrorist attacks on
Sept. 11, 2001, in New York and Washington DC, and on Oct. 12,
2002, in Bali.

Both documents identify the proliferation of WMD as a
significant security challenge and a real concern. In part, this
is a consequence of increasing globalization, with its expanded
flows which make the proliferation of WMD easier. Thus, according
to ANS, a "layered defense" must be adopted.

In the first place, this involves diplomatic efforts. However,
when diplomacy fails, Australia may contribute to coalition
military operations. But, as ANI admits, although states involved
in the proliferation of WMD must be challenged (otherwise others
will attempt to emulate them), nevertheless counter-proliferation
efforts will "not necessarily halt (the proliferation)".

This is why Canberra supports a third defense layer: the U.S.
strategic missile defense program.

Yet, how do we determine that diplomacy has failed and
coalition military operations should be pursued? What are the
criteria? Moreover, as North Korea has shown, not all cases have
the same number of layers. If diplomacy fails to disarm North
Korea, a coalition military operation is not an option. Indeed,
North Korea receives surprisingly little attention in both
documents.

It is almost impossible not to feel that it is U.S. priorities
that will almost exclusively determine what Australia will do.
The problem with this is the fact that U.S. priorities might not
be the same as Australia's.

The Australian-led intervention in East Timor demonstrated
this and North Korea seems to be doing so once again. Will
Canberra act against the proliferation of WMD only as part of a
U.S.-led military operation?

Certainly, some still recall Australia's willingness to act as
the "deputy sheriff" of the U.S., and neither document does
anything to change this perception.

The other challenge identified by the ANI and ANS is the fight
against terrorism. ANS perceives this as a long-term task, and
ANI believes that "countries in the region need to do more". The
Bali bombings confirmed that extremist organizations in Southeast
Asia are no longer focused exclusively on local issues.

Obviously, the existence of links between militant regional
extremist groups and global Islamic terrorism is a particularly
disturbing development to Australia. Unsurprisingly, the Bali
bombings inflicted a strong sense of vulnerability, not only
because Australian citizens were the direct targets, but also
owing to the fact that it took place in Australia's immediate
neighborhood.

Therefore, Canberra is willing to "contribute to further
efforts on the war on terror", particularly regarding Southeast
Asia and the South Pacific. This is a direct consequence of
Australia's perception of its neighborhood as a "troubled region"
with several potential "failed states".

In the case of Indonesia, the situation is particularly
complex and troubling owing to poverty, unemployment,
democratization, economic recovery, corruption, governance and
legal reform, as well as religious, ethnic and separatist
challenges.

Thus, Indonesia is considered "fertile ground for
international extremist Islamic influences", but also for
nonterrorist related security challenges such as people
smuggling, illegal fishing, drug trafficking and money
laundering. Moreover, geography dictates that the success of
reform in Indonesia and its efforts to eradicate terrorism are
crucial to the future security of Australia.

Still, is Australia willing to intervene to counter terrorist
threats in Southeast Asia, even against the will of sovereign
states such as Indonesia? Is Australia prepared to take the lead
in such situations if necessary? Are preemptive strikes a real
option?

While cooperation between Australia and Indonesia is much
better than it was prior to the Bali bombings, the odds seem to
play against such cooperation. Indeed, the commitment in both
documents toward increasing close cooperation with the United
States implies certain difficulties concerning Australia's
engagement with Asia.

Moreover, Canberra's willingness to intervene militarily in
its immediate neighborhood makes it safe to assume that political
friction between Australia and Indonesia (as well as other
countries) is likely to occur in the next few years.